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2ABSTRACT
Fc:;ced \:"Ath the potential threat of oil embargoes imposed by
producer countries for political reasons, the consumer countries
reacted by creating different alternatives which granted them some
energy indeperldAn~~t ,;11 1"': security o{ supply by using alternative
prnrl,..!::.;'sand technologies available in their own countrles,
Can a middle level developing country break out of the cycle of
dependency in the area of energy?
This dissertation investigates the strategy developed and
implemented by South Africa between 1973 and 1993, which
invested heavily in the generation of fuel extracted from coal in order
to rescue. its country from crisis and support it through critical periods
of history..
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8INTRODUCTION
The future of the less developed countries is one of the most pressing
issues of international politic economy in our era, and the resolution of
this issue will probably affect the future of the planet. The intense
desire of the majority of the human race to escape its debilitating
poverty and loin the developed world, is a determining feature of
international politics, Yet in the final decades of the twentieth century,
bitter controversy exists regarding the causes of and possible solutions
to, this problem.'
The structuralist argument (or what became known as the Singer~
Prebisch theory) is that the world economy is composed of a core or
centre of highly industrialised countries and a large under-developed
periphery", Technical progress th:=;\t leads to increasing productivity
and economic development is the driving force in this system, but
technical advance has different consequences for tile industrialised
centre of the non-industrialised periphery due to structural features of
the less developed economies and to the international division of
labour inherited from the past.
$amir Amin, a structuralW~ theorist, and termer professor at the Dakar
University arid director of the Institute of African Economic
Development and Planning, suggests that "today about '15 per cent of
the under-developed countries' raw material exports come not from
"tradltlonal" low-produotislty, but from "modern" high-productivity
1 Robert Gilpin. Tile Political Economy of Intemational Relatkms ell 7, p 263.
2 See Paul Preblsch. Towards a Dynamic Developmellt Policy for Latin A.herictl.
New York, 1963
9processes and sectors, 8S in mining, plantation agriculture, to say
nothing of, in our day, petroleum. In this sense, the production of raw
producers' goods need not per se be so different from that of
lndestrlat producers' goo':l5,·3, Moreover, the industria(;sing countries
such as Britain and the United States also produced important
amounts of raw materials and exported them- the former coal and the
latter cotton and wheat - in tne course of their development.
By the 1960's, liberal assumptions about the development prospects
for many LOCs came under intense criticism from a number of
scholars, especially in Latin America. These critics of the liberal model
of development were primarily from the C:CLA4, Among the earlier
critiques is the work of Raul Prebisch, which provided a significant
momentum for the dependency perspective and its interpretation of the
development dilemma among LOCs, as dealt with in Chapter t. The
Economic Swvey of Latin America ~ 1949 by the Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) marked the birth of the ECLA
perspective of political economy, Oelso Furtado, a non-Marxist
dependentlst theorist, best represented it in Brazil, and it clearly
delineated the specific problernatics of peripheral capitalism. The
Survey, coord!nated by Raul Prebisch, developed from evidence that
L~tinAmerican growth relied directly upon the export sector which
furnished the foreign exchange necessary to import manufactures.
This centre-periphery structure tended to perpetuate itself, in tnat its
dynamics were controlled by decisions made in the centre and were
accentuated by the deterioration at the terms of trade. In this context,
3 L.'t.ccumulation a' I'echel/e mondiale. Paris, 1970, p.44
4 ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America, founded in 1949,
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only national industrialisation would be capable of breaking the vicious
cycle of under-developments.
A promoter of UIIlCTA06 and its first secretary general, Prebiscn
argued that the development dilemma in Latin America was inextricably
linked to; factors outside of the region. Prebisch was especia.Hycritical
of the eXisting lnternaftonal division of labour and free trade system.
He andothers (Andre G. Frank, Theotoneo dos Santos, F. Henrlque
Cardoso) arno,'g Marxist and non-Marxist anti-imperialists, f.rgued that
the internatioral trade system reinforced the LOCs' role as producers
of primary products and raw materials, white the developed countries
continued to prosper as producers of lndustrbl products".
This term of trade pessimism, as dealt with in Chapter i I has come to
be known as the Prebisch-Singer thesis, after the two famous
development economists who explored its implications in the 1950's8,
they argued that there was and would continue to be a secular decline
in tile terms of trade of primary-commodity exporters due to a
combination of low income and price elastlcltles of demand. This
deciine resulted in a long-term transfer of income from poor to rich
countries that could be combated only by efforts to protect domestio
rnanutacturnq . inciustries through a process that has come to be
known as irt;;prt substitution.
5 Bertha K Becker. Brazil: A NeV\' ;""ult'mat Power in the WOrld-Economy. Cambridge,
1992 p.1C.
G UNCTAO Is a body of the United Nations whose primary objective is to promote
international trade and commerce with a principal focus on trade and balance of
-ment problems of developing nations.
oup of 77 countries ?' UNCTAO in 1964 formed a loose coalition - the Group
. ,1 • to express and further thsir collective Interests in the world economic system.
Toc,',:} Ihere are more than 100 countries in that group.
8 1\.~!cha"!F ~. ':lara. Eccnomia Development. New Y!lrk. 1997. p.42.9
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One dependency theorist in particular has focused a good deal of
attention or' tho erfects of imperialism in the Third World, Andre
Gunder Frank, a IVI.arxist dependentlst theorist, rAjected the Marxist
notion that socleres go through different stages or modes of
production as they develop. However. he supported the imperialism
thesis that connections between developed and developing regIons of
the world resulted in exploitation of peripheral regions by rnetropolltan
capitalist countries."
The structuralists, under the leadership of Raul Preblsch, balieved that
a reform of the international economy and a development strategy
based on import substitution would be a solution to those problems".
unfortunately for the developing countries, the number of commodities
whose supplies can be effectively controlled is rather smalt".
Nevertheless, the resolution of the energy question is intimately related
with the transformations carried out in the international economlc
sphere. Rapid transitions in the ever-greater search of energy
resources by the international consumers caused a profound alteration
in terms of dependencies, leading the world industrial economy to
depend more on scarce sources of energy. A state is politically
dependent when its power structure and institutions are controlled from
outside, and economically dependent when experts and imports are
necessary for its survival.
9 Oavid N Balaan. Introduction to International Pofitical Economy. New Jersey, 1996.
p.71.
10 Robert Ghpin. Op. cit p. 295
11 W. Arthur LeVo/'j5. TIle Evolution of tile International Economic OrcMr. Ch.5.
"Commodity Police" Princeton, 1978. p.27.
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Energy has come to assume a dominant position within the broad eco-
political agenda. Jt is not hard to see why, because energy, in its
various forms, is synonymous Illlith economic development and
therefore with wealth. Oonsequently, access to and control of energy
r8SC)IJrCeshas become a central concern of governments as well as 0'(
those involved in the processes of industrial production. There is,
moreover, ana source at energy, which outstrips all the others in its
importance ~oil, as dealt with in Chapter 3. In 1984, oil accounted for
39 per cent of the total world prlrr;E~ryenergy demand. This fact would
not in itself place oil on the lnternatlorrd agenda since, were i~the case
that consumers of oil could satisfy their energy needs from their own
resources, the likelihood is that oil would remain an issue of greater
significance in domestic rather than in international terms. However,
this is not the case. Oil has become an issue in world politics as a
consequence Of the imperatives of geology, geography and the
patterns of global economic development which have created a
situation whereby the producers of oil are not its major consumers.
III 1873, a number of Arab nations imposed an oil embargo on the
United States and its allies in an attempt to influence US policy with
respect to Israel", The oil embargo of 1973 was a momentous event
for the States of the. Arabian Peninsula as well as for the world
eco. .omy, Arab oil producers discovered that their petroleum could be
used as a diplomatic and political weapon In the Arab-lsraell conflict as
dealt with in Chapter 5, and oil consumers were brought to a sudden
recognition of their growing dependence on Middle Eastern oi113•
12 Alan Randall, Resource Economics, Chapter 16, "Thl3 E::nergy Crisis arthe 1970's".
New York. p. 13.
13 William L Cleveland. A History of the Modem Middle East, Part. 4. Chapter 19.
Conclusion. Oxford, 1994 p.396.
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Only the oil crisis of the 1970's headed by OPEC would lead the
lnternatronal players to re-crlentate their energy policies from Oil14, to
different energy resources. The coal" alternative does not solve all the
problems faced by the dependent countries, since it does not
compensate all the uses 0; oil as liquid fuel. South Africn, the unique
case in the whole world, due its coal and technology availability, chose
the coal alternative. Natural gSls and nuclear energy do not present
very optimistic perspectives. TM first because of the establishment of
strong dependence links between the producer and the consumer, and
the second due to the difflcl'l<es it presents relating to the high costs
of installation of technological Infrastruotures, enrichment of uranrum
and the need for a high initial investment associated with a reduced
dimension of the national markets of less developed countries.
After 1973 and during the OPI2C decade, the Western industrial
cou!1trias sought to reduce their dependence on foreign suppliers of
oiL FOI example, in February '1974, US President Richard Nixon
proposed to 're-establlsh [US} capability for self-suffioiency" by 1980
and called for "an acceptable pattern of world trade in petroleum"; and
the new conservation measures and a shift to alternanve sources of
energy (along~ide an economic t~oession) did, in fact. combine to
push down thf) demand for all.
A shift to ahernatlve energy sources conn lbuted to the reduced
reliance on OPEO oil. Coal, for example, a~air. became a major
source of US energy. Similarly, Japan increased its imports of coal to
meat a growing proportion of its electrical generation and industrial
-.._~"-..-------.. : -. ------.-------~--.--------
14 See t::igure 12
1S See Figure 17
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needs, and China relied heavily on coal as its primary source of fossil
fuel, Elsewhere, nuclear power became an altBrn '.tive. The French,
for example, increased their electrical generc.tion through nuclear
power mere than seventeenfold between 1973 and 1986, to help
reduce their dependence on imported oil. The German government
encouraged a shift from oil to natura! gas.
Faced with tile threat of oil embargoes imposed by producer countries
for political reasons, South Africa reacted by creating different
alternatives which granted it some energy independence and security
of supply by using alternative products and technologies available in
its own country, as dealt with in Chapter 6. In December 1974, one
year after .;,e Arab oil embargo, the South African Minister of
Economic Affairs announced the decision taken by the Cabinet to
increase the oll-frorn-coel production 16. The new plant would produce
more than ten times the amount of petrol and petroleum products than
the existlng oil-from-coal plant, and would be one of the largest
industrial projects ever undertaken in South Africa.
$Ot..th Afrioa with e moderate aspiration to become a great world
power with medium economical, technological, educational, and social
levels, and having extensive territory, wanted to free itself from this
'form of economic imperialism -which was used by the oil cartel in 1973
~ when the oil cartel intended to reach political aims acting In the
supply continuity of strategic energy resources",
16 Petra Wessels, Crescendo TrySuccess, SASOL 1.975·1987, Cape Town. 1990
p.12.
17 As Machiavelli wrote: "One should ask if £I ruler has enough resources to be able,
if necessary, t,1 look after himself, or whether he will always be dependent on having
alliances with other rulers". Selected Political Writings. Chapter Ten. p,34.
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Whereas It1 1S86, the Middle East produced nearly 22 per cent of the
world's ail, it consumed only 3,8 per cent. In contrast Japan, with
scarcely !3ny energy resources, produced less then 0,05 per cent of
the world'~ oil and consumed 7/1 per cent. As a result of this. oil
became a key commodity in International trade and, as consumers
sought. to established secure resources of supply, as South AfrIca had
done, so the conditions were created under which "oil politics" could
develop.
Indeed, it was against this backdrop that the polltlos of oil forced
themselves to the top of the world's political agenda in the 1970's and
1980's, That they did $0 reflected a complex interweaving of trends
and events in several centres and involved a variety of State and non-
State actors. On the one hand, the large oil multinationals, for long the
dominant influence in the oil industry, were confronted during the
1950's and 1960's with declining profits as the price of crude oil fell.
At the same time, the rise of nationalism in the Third Wor!d1u affected
the attitudes of the oil producing ststes, which began to demand
higher revenues from, and more control over, their oil resources. The
main manifestation of this latter development was the enhanced role
played by the oil producers asaoclation, the Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). t::stablished in 1960, with an C1riglnal
membership comprising Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran, OPEC was
1l1itially largely ig!10red by the oil companies and failed to act as a
cohesive e:1tity in promoting the often-divergent Interests of its
---....-......_...,.---~-.------- .....
18 The World Bank ch~sslfied as Third World the present 145 developing countries
of Asla, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, mainly characterised by low levels
of living. high rates of pnpulation growtf'. Ivw income per capita and general economic
and technological dspendanee on First Wl)rld economies. It considered as Flrst
World the now sconomlcally ad"anced capltallst countries of Western Europs, 1\lort~
America, Australia. "rJW Zealand and Japan. The::.e were the first countries to
experience sustained long,term sccnomlc growth.
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members, By the beginning of the 1970's however, the map of world
oil power was assuming a different shape. In part, this was due not
only to a strengfhening of the demand for oil but also to changing
political attln...des among producers, mostly clearly indicated by the
actions of the O~:1dhafiregime, which seized power in Libya in 1970
(ousting the pro t'P~ester'-,qovernment of I<ing ldrls), Uby!3 bsqan to
seek control over the supply and price of Its oil which, since the
closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, had become of major importance
to the West1D• Against this backdrop, and in the wake of declslons
made at a meeting in Caracas in December '1970,OPEC demonstrated
a capacity tor collective action in exercising greater control over the
price and supply of oil. Initially, the strengthening role of OPEC was
not unwelcar1'Jl:3either to the oil companies, who SJ.W its actions as
\.having a beneficial effect on the profitability of oil, or to the US
government, f9r whom the prospect of enhanced energy costs far Its
economic rivals in Western Europe and Japan Wl;lS not displeasing.
However, it Was soon clear that OPEC could use its newly found
strength thrqugh control over supply and price to threaten the
econornlc security of the advanced industrialised States. The dramatic
400 per cent rise in the price of oil in the wake of the 1973 Arab-lsraell
war and the embargo on oil exports imposed by the Organisation of
Arab Petroleum Exporting cousmes (OPEC), 011 selected countries
regarded A.S pro-Israeli showed the potential effects of contrlved"
scarcity at a time when concern was being expressed about the
naturally lmpoesd scarcity of energy resources. In the long term, the
--------- ..-------~------
19 Ian Brownlie Principles of Publio Illemational Law. Oxford. 1990 p.27G.
4(\ See Pl~tei' R Odell Oil and World Power : Baokground to the Oil Crisis.
Aylesbury, 19'14.
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capacl';1 of OPEC to set the price of oil (which again rose dramatically
in the lat€) t970's) was lessened by declining demand in the West and
t'ie growing tensions within the organisation itself· particularly those
generated by tile conflict betweer. Iran end Iraq. At the present time,
the slump in oil prices from over $29 per barrel to $9 in 1986 has only
partly been reversed. However, the impact of OPEC policles on the
Western economies has been and remains profound, constituting a
threat which, as Odell suggests, possesses three dimensions:
(i) The challenge to the West's supply of oil threatened the survival
of the economies and thereby the legitimacy of governments;
(2) Rapid oil price rises induced high levels of inflation which,
because OPEC linked oil to the inflation rate in the West,
became even more marked; and
(3) The large trading surpluses acquired by OPEC's oil sales
threatened to reinforce the world recession and disrupt the
monetary system.
Bearing this in mind, h is clear that the energy crisis exhlblted all the
features likely to force this issue to the top of tt"le agenda. The
essence of its urgency lay in the fact that for the reasons outlined
above, the very survival of the Western economic system was brought
into question. Moreover, despite the fact that in terms of tocatlon,
affeoting as it did the advanced industrialised states, the energy crisis
touchsd, directly or indirectly, the majority of States In the international
system" tbus underscoring the extent of the problem. Finally, the
impac.t oJ (,PEC policies were highly visible as an issue at national
level, aff~lcting the motoring public and creating powerful domestic
political pressures.
i8
Twenty years after it burst into international politics with the 1973 crisis,
oil remains a strateqlc commodity critical in the global balance of
power, as dealt with in Chapter 4, but looking towards the 21st
century, the perspective has changed radically since those days when
it seemed that oil pow- 'ould engulf world politics.
Today, economics takes precedence over pOlitics. Many exporting
countries court the international oil companies that they once shunned.
The door that was slammed shut In the 1970's Is being reopened. In
fact, with the prospect of the opening of the petroleum reserves in
Russia and many other countries that up to now have been politically
inaccessible, oil is tflJly t global business for the first time since the
barricades went up with the 30ls1evik Revolution.
In retrospect, the shocks 0"" (h~ 1970's can be seen as the high point
of oil nationalism. It was the era when the world economy hung on the
comments of oil ministers in the hall-ways of OPEC meetinqe and when
the wrongs of colonialism were to be set right. It was to be the
beginning olthe "new lntsrnatlonal order", a zero-sum game thatwould
see a wholesale redistribution of wealth from the North to the South
and a diminution of the lnternatlenal stature of the United States and
the other major industrial powers.
Much of that is now hIstory. The oil exporters learned that they
needed the lmporters as much. as the importers needed them. The
producers may have had oil tc sell, but the consumers provided the
markets. They could also pmvide, when needed. security. These
developments led to new questions about the very meaning af security,
and what durable relations were now possible between consumers and
producers that would serve the long-term interests of both. The
19
Persian Gulf War illustrates both the critical position of oil in the global
balance of power and the importance of interdependence between
producers and industrial consumers. There is also thA increasingly
important question of how to reconcile energy use and environmental
imperatives.
With the collapse of communism, the global security issues that were
uppermost have receded. Regional security issues, however, remain.
The world is now shifting back to ell dependence on the Middle East,
where rnedernsanon and Islamic revivalism are in conflict. Moreover,
ell's traditional relationship to other global issues continue. It is
intertwined with Russia's translnon to free markets and Asia's
economic growth. The United States is back on the track of higher oil
imports, which means that its ~oreign policy will remain acutely sensitive
to developments in oll-exportlnq countries.
In the years ahead, the global oil industry will require much higher
levels of investment than in the recent past, to meet both energy needs
and environmental requirements. pOlitics, which in the 1970's
sundered econornic links between producers and consumers, is now
permitting the reconnectlon of those linl<s, though on a different basis.
Thus, a new dimension elf security between exporting nations and oil
companies will come from the interweaving of investment, trade and
finance. This reconstruction will mobilise the investment necessary to
develop supplies for the next century. As a result, producers will be
able to tap Into the oapltal, tecr,nology and skills of consuming
countries while supplying their markets.
On the other hand, South Africa's government decided to support
improvement In the production of the oll-frorn-coal produced by sasol
20
in South Africa. The rrw : t notable element on the new technology
drive at Saso( Synthetic Fuels is the launch of a programme to replace
the original Synthol reactors. at Secunda witi 1 a new-qsneratlon sasol
Advanced Synthol (SAS) reactor at a cost of R86!) 000 000.00. Synthol
reactors converted coal-derived syntheses gas into Iiq'Jid petroleum
products i:1nd ,8 variety of petro-chemical feedstock. The new SAS
reactor would enhance the high-temperature Fischer-Tropsch process
by reducing capital, operatlnq and maintenance costs, increasing
productivity and economies of scale and improving thermal efficiency21.
Chapter "1 of my dissertation deals with economic imperialism and
dependence and considering the world resources management and
foreign political control, the negative impact of GAIT in under-
developed countries and its development strategies based on self-
reliance and import-substitution as decided by South Africa when
threatened by oil embargoes imposed by producer countries for
pOlitical reasons. In chapter 2 I analyzed the economic threats posed
by the globe's scarce natural resources and the sovereignty over them,
and what prompted the oil producer countries to use that important
and strategic source of energy as an economic and di;::>lomaticweapon
over the dr'pcmdent consumers. The importance thereof for industry
and war is dealt with in Chapter 3. The Southern oil-exporting States
acting together in a producer cartel which substituted the former One,
as discussed in Chapter 4, formed a very successful new system
which controlled the world oil supply, so powerful that it permitted the
use thereof as en economic and diplomatic weapon, namely in oil
embargoes imposed by Arab petroleum exporting countries in i967
and 1973·1974 against Western etates Which directly aided israel in its
;21 SASOL, Annual Report, 1996. p.4
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war with Arab adversaries, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Faced with the potential threat of oil embargoes imposed by producer
countries for political reasons, the dependent consumer countries
reacted by creating different aiternatives which granted them some
energy Independence and security of supply, In Chapter 6, I deal with
South Africa's option. Due to Its substantial lack of crude-oil, its coal
availability and its technical capacity, the South African governm~~nt
decided to invest heavily in the generation of fuel extracted from its
own coal in order to rescue its country from crises and allow in the
future, South Africa to more easily defend itself from political pressures
and external embargoes.
22
CHAPTER 1 : ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM AND DEPENDENCE
Latin Americanists representing various branches of the social sciences
have produced some of the more provocative work in the globalist
tradition. Thay have come to be known collectively as dependency
theorists, and they now include North American and European
scholars as well as Latin Americans. Several of these writers were
associated in the "19aO's with the Economic Commission on Latin
America (ECLA) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). They were concerned with the important
problem of explaining why Latin America and other Third World regions
were not developing as anticipated",
Dependency theory was a popular radical critique of Western capitalist
nations in their relations with the Third World during the 1960's and
1970's, and still has its advocates today. The basic idea is that major
powers exercised enormous political control over Latin America, Africa
and Asia, However, they do this now by the use of economic pressure
and by exploiting their superior market positions to extract unfair
advantage to international trade,
Be~lorlr:lt, ~historical studies that are concerned with accumulation and
theouss or development and under-development, it would seem
reasonable to concentrate inquiry on international political economy
around theories of imperialism and dependency, The following
discussion, summarises the major lines of thought on imperialism and
dependency.
22 Paul R. Viotti. International Relations Theory. New Yor~;, 1993. p.455.
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1.1 Economic Imperialism
ihe common characteristio of the policies we call economic
lrnnerlalism is their tendency, on the one hand, to overthrow the status
quo by changing the power relations between the imperialist nation
and others and, on the other hand, to do so not through Lher~onquest
of territory but by way of economic control". If a nation cannot or will
not conquer the territory tor the purpose of establishing its mastery
over other natlons, it can try to achieve the same end by establishing
its control over those who control the territory24.
As Carl von. Clausewitz wrote: ''War is thus an act of force to compel
our enemy to do our will. Force - that is, physical force, ... - Is thus tile
means of war, to lmpose our ,!yill on the enemy is its objeiCt2F".
he nature of economlc imperialism as an unobtrusive, indirect, but
fa;rly effective method of gaining and maintaining domination over other
nations, is particularly sIrikir,9 .vhsre two rival imperiali,sts compete with
economic means for control over the same government.
Structuralism argues that a Jibere.Jcapitalist world economy tends to
'preserve or actually increase inequslltles between developed and I( :.
developed economies. Whereas trade was indeed an engine of growth
23 ,As sun-tzu said: "... attaining onehundred Victories in \lne hundred battles Is not
the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true
pinnacle of excellence". TlJe An of War. Book 3, "Planning OffenSive':'. beginning
p.i77
24 Hans J. Mo(genthau. Op. cit. p.72
25 On War. Cnapter One. p.75
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in the nineteenth century", structuralists argue that it cannot continue
to perform this role because of the combined effects of free trade and
the economical, sLJciological and demo graphical conditions (structures)
prevalent among I13S5developed economies in the tWenti8th century.
The heart of the ::It'gument is that the nature Or technical advance,
cycliQ;:\I price movements atld differenco'? in d.;~marV:i tor illduE:l;'fz1!
goods and primary pr'.)duct!:>cause :;;seeurar i.!r':~eriaration in the terms
of trade21 for comrnodity exp0r!t:$;, i.hat is, caterlorauon of thtt; pr:r:e the
L.P:Cs receive for their comfi\l.Jdtty exports relative to the rdces of the
mJInufactured graods thfiY import from developed t1'"'!untri6s, In the
industrial cere, teclink~al progress is ~ , to arise 'from the
...spontaneeus operations of the economy and to diffuse throughout the
whole economy so that employment displaced by increasing efficiency
can be absorbed by investment in other expending industrial sector s.
Without large-scale unemployment and with the pressures of powerful
labour UNions, there is an increase in real wages. Further,
monepollstlo c uporations can maintain the price levor despite
productivity increases and the decreaslnq cost of production. The
fruits of technical progress and increased production are thus retained
in the core economy and are absorbed by a sizeable fraction OTthe
society.
26 Bernard Hoekman, The Politic-aI Economy of the World Trading System. p.i0:
"Although trade flows between cteveloplTlg countries regions (If the world are much
smaller than those involving high-income r:;gicns, the volume and growth rate of
global trade flows are. important because international trade is an engine of growth."
27 By terms of trade is considered the ratio of a country's average expert price to its
average import price; also r.nown as the commodity terms oftrade. A country's terms
c~ trade are SOlid to in." va when this ratio lnereases and to worsen when It
decreases, that is, When r;t port prices lise at a relatively faster rate than export prices
(the e)·; ..",rience of most LDCs in recent decades). See Michael P Todaro. Eoonomio
Develop lent. 6'h ed. New York, 1997 p.723.
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Econcr '10 itnperialism is less obtrusive ':.£1(.' als~ generally less effective
than the military variety and is, C.,"l a rclt\onal method of gaining power,
a product Of modern times. As SqCii: it is a concomitant of the age of
mercantilism am; capitalist sxpansicn". British supremacy" in the
Arab world was the result of economic pollcles for which the term "oil
diplomacy" is not msplaeed, Similarly, the Arab discovery of the
p:Jlitlcai USElS of oil has given the oil-producing Arab nt'tioilS
unprecedented power over the industrial nations importinrJ Arab (.")il30•
The agreement of 197'2 betWf' 'ln the oil producers to rals~3all prlcss is
a return to the pre-war mods. The consumers are not (:< party to the
aqreernsnt, "l;"ld 8re not consulted",
The renewed outbreak ()f war b0tween Is ael and the Arab Stater. in
October i87;;s snd the latter's declslon to use 011as an economic and
poUtical weapon in their s·~n.lgglei, provided the motivation for the
accentuation and ecceleranon of this process" It was a situation in
which two 01 the major industrialised regions of the world • Western
Europe and Jap,'m ~ had not only allowed themselves to become
almost entirely dependent on OPF!C oil for sustaining their economic
systems, but had also failed to take any effective counteraction, even
-----._.---_-------------
26 Andre Gunder Frank. Dependent Accumulation and Under-development. London,
19i'8, p. XI, distinguished three main stages or periods In this world embracing
process of capitol accurnulahon a:1d capitalist development mercantilism (1500-1'170).
Industrial capitaU"t (1770·1870), and imperialIst (1870-1930).
20 Richmd NIxon, Tile ,qoal War. London. 1980. 1'.75.
"The British first moved Int() the Gulf In the early 1800's in order to prover'! pirates
from cliqrupting their trade, From then until the e:.."ly 1970's British military power kept
order. provided protection and salU(\ld dis~lIto:)in the "urlolls shslkdc Ins dotting the
Oliff's coastline"
30 Hans J Morgenthau. Po/illas among Nations. Part Two, Ch. 5, "Economio
Imperialism" New York. 1965, p.72.
3t W. Arthur Lewis. Tile £voiutiofl of tlie intemotion!)/ Economic vrriar. Princeton,
1978, 28.
32 Peter R Odeil 011and World Pov:or: 3r~ed, Middlesex, 1974, p.200.
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in the iight of the deteriorating outlook for the viability of their cheap-
energy policies as a result of the chanqed post-iSl0 oil situation.
Western Europe failed even to take a serious look at the option of an
indigenous energy policy opened up by the prospects for North Sea
oil and gas production on a very large scale indeed.
The State's power is a function of its dependence on the outside world,
at the same time as of its resources and degree of mobilisation. An
industry, or an army, can be paralysed by the lack of a raw material or
of a particular product.
States rely on each other for resources anu commodities that enable
them to develop and sustain their economies and the well beinq of
their peoples. This reliance Is central to the ideas of leverage and
vulnerability. Those who possess them to influence those who do not,
can rnanipulate economic resources.
Nothing in the international system is equally distributed. Ttlis, of
course, applies to economic resources as well as to the economic
requirements of various States; States that possess a surplus (or a
monopoly) of resources may achieve greater eoonomlc influence;
States that lack the resources and commodities they require are more
vulnerable to economic influence33• The economic resources of States
can be used across the whole range of influence mechanisms, The
nanlpulatlon of economic resources takes many forms. States can
use trade, monetary policy, or international organisations to acquire
more economic resources or to deny them to their adversaries, These
33 Bruce Russett. World PolitieR' Thp Menu for Cflolce. 51h ed. New York, 1996.
p.151.
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resources cart then be used to generate additional economic and
military resources". The centra! use of economic tecrniquEls for
international influence is the exploitation of the vulnerability of other
States. Few States can even attempt a policy of autarky, because in
one way or another, all States have economic needs they cannot
satisfy. Thus they are vulnerable to the influence of States that have
leverage of some kInd - what they need.
1:2 The word resources management
The challenge to humankind is to manage effective!ythe ..esources of
the planet so as to maximise the satisfactIon derived from thorn. The
challenge lias a time dlrnenslon that is absolutely critical. If humankind
were willing to accept the extinction or demise of civilisation within a
few generatiol1S,resource extraction could proceed without restraint.
and the harvest of renewable resources could exceed equilibrium rates
and thus bring about the demise of those resources. The resources
of immediate concern are components of highly complex systems.
The earth's resource system Is a vast, complex, dynamic, interactive
system,' Attempts t" 'odify individual components Of that system will
i\
result irll,'ohangeselsewhere In the system. Yet human understanding
of this system is very, very limited and so tha consequences of
manipulating cornp..ments of the system are not easy to predict. Often
these consequences manifest themselves in unexpected ways and are
observed some considerable time after the Initialstimulus. Cause and
effect are difficult to link. The effects of new actions are difficult to
predict, this is a malor source of concern In a time of rapid
34 Idem, p.152
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technoloqlcai progress. Another may see as adverse what is sean as
beneficial to ana individual. Any decision will influence many people
whose well bAing will be e.fiected differently and whose power to
particlpate in docision-making will vary widely. Thus, there are few
resource-related decisions that are truly private, in the sense that all
their impacts are. confined to U'19 individualS who voluntarily agreed
upon the decisions.
1.3 Public tnterest
It is perhaps only a minor exaggeration to claim that today's major
disagreements about the limits of government power to coerce
individuals in the attempt to pursue the public good are essentially
replays of much earlier debates among social contract theorists.
Today's clashes between the individualists and defenders of "the public
interest" are foreshadowed in the argurTll:lntsof social contractarlans
John Locke" and Jean-Jacques Rousseau~G. As England was
emergil'lg trom feudalism, the old patterns of authority were breaking
down, and the relationships among the church, the monarchy, the
arlstoorccy, and everyone else needed reaefitlition. Thomas Hobbes37
constructed a social theory rooted In individualism. The individual, not
society, we.s. considered the fundamental entity, anti the only truly
fundamental right was that of the individual to preserve him or her and
to choose the means of self-preservation. Thus, governmental
authority is derived from Individl.A.:'ls,who voluntarily delegate to it some
---...,._---.--~-------------------
35 S!3e Two '(moUses of Govornment. C"mbridgG Unlvers1ty Press, 1988.
31) S('(l Social tontroct
~7 Sea Loviotlwn. Everyman's Library. London. '\987.
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rights that ar e fundamentally theirs".
There are many arenas in which conflicts may be resolved. These
include the legislature, the executive branch, the judiciary, and the
market-place.
Public decisions are often not final. That is, they can often be reserved
at some tolerable cost (notable exceptions, c/ course, include the
irreversible destruction of natural systems). So those disappointed by
a decision will etten continue to battle, seeking its reversal in the same
or different arenas. Given the multiplicity of conflict-resolution arenas,
the open process in which agendas are set and conflicts are assigned
Cltrlong arenas, the lack of finality in many decisions, and the wide
range of self-interested participants in the p.ocess, the notion of "the
publlc-polloy decision maker" loses its credibHity.
The problem of power forbids the sacrifice of any vital piece of the
machinery of production. The negative impact of the energy crises on
the welfare of ordinary consumers were to be minimised, and
redistribution from citizens to domestic oil producers was to be limited
to politically acceptable levels. Obviously, the foreign and domestic
political objectives were In direct conflict. If the government wishes to
reduce the quantity of enerGY demanded as a means of reducing
imports. it is counter-productlve to protect the ultimate consumers of
energy from large price lnoreasss".
36 See Anura Vincent. Modem Political Ideologies, Ctl. "Individualist". Oxford.
Blackwell. 21\U ed, 1995.
39 Raymond Aron, Pe[lc(J and War. Ch. 9 "On Resources", p.255. Malabar, Florida,
19\')6.
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1.4 Political control exercised by major powers
Oil may have once been a matter for exploitation and political control
by the First World; it is now o'serly a weapon of considerable power
in the hands of the oil States against their former exploiters.
Nevertheless, the theory, l'y pointing out how irrelevant formal political
control may be, does help to show how long-lasting are the chains of
empire as they were cast during the great development of colonial
economic exploitations by the European powers in the 19th century.
Combined with the spread of multinational companies outside the
control of any Westorn governments, companies that Ti"e:quently do
control the raw resources of poor countries, the general notion of
ec "")nomic dependency cannot be ignored.
Poor countries aie dependent on rich countries when the WJo"way
aspects of interdependence are minimal. They are unequally
vulnerable; there is only a very lopsided lnterdependenca". Acts by
the government of developed centre countries or by MNCs based in
those countries affect what happens in peripheral" countries much
more than almost any action in the peripheral country (especially a
small, poor one) can affect what happens in a rich industrialised
country. Poor countries are dependent, penetrated, vulnerable- hardly
the unital'Y independent actors of some realist theorists. Nearly &11
developing countries are now deeply penetrated by and in important
ways dependent on, the industrial world and espacially the world
economy. Penetration can occur in a variety of economical, political,
----------,-------------- ....~----~--~----------
40 Bruce Russett op, cit. p. 364
41 Centre in dependence theory, the First World, the economic developed world.
Periphery in dependence theory, the Third World.
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and cultural modes and at different periods in a country's development,
The main problem of the uneal1al North-South system of relations
among the developed market economies and the Third World ~ the
less developed economies of Africa, Asia and Latin America ~ is
dependence", Dependence usually takes one or more forms. First,
it can be trade dependence. A second form of depenuence is In the
area of investment. A third form of dependence is financial. Usually,
these economic dependencies - trade, investment, finance - are
reinforced by other types of relationships with the North' cultural ties,
alliances and treaties, more informal political ties, and military llnks
ranging from military aid tu military intervention. In political terms, the
dependent Southern country is subjected to the political decisions
rns.de by institutions in which it has little say.
Article (13) of the United Nations Charter declares that one of the
purposes otthe United Nations is "to achieve international co-operation
in solving international problems of an economic .. character", and the
poorer States in the world have often used meetings of the United
Nations organs as an occasion for urging the richer States to help the
poorer States to develop their economies. On such questions United
Nations orqans have no power to take decisions which are binding on
member-States; they can only make recommendations; for instance,
the British governmetlt spends more than 14 2./3 times as much on
defence as it spends on overseas aid43. However, the fact that it has
42 Joan E spare, Tile Politics of Intemat/cr;al !Economic ~elati()ns. London. 19i';10
p.13.
<13 Michael Akehurst. A Modern introduction to fntemationa{ Law. 61» ed. London, 1987
p236.
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become standard practice for richer States to give aid to poorer States
is quite a remarkable development, when one remembers that before
the Second World War no government provided aid to help the
economic development of other States on a continuing basis (as
opposed to temporary relief after earthquakes, famines and similar
disasters). The quadrupllng of the price of oil in late 1973 aggravated
the economic problems of most of the poorer States, but it
strengthened their political positions because tl~9 newly rich oil-
exporting States supported the demands of the poorer States against
the richer industrialised States.
As Jan Tinbergen wrote: u .... But there should also be redistribution
at the lnternatlonal level through development co-operation. How
much should the industrial nations make available to the deveic'':'j.Jirtg
countries? In "1970,the UN Gfilneral Assembly decided that 0.7% was
needed. By 1991, the actual average for the OI::ODcountries was only
0.33% but the UN target figure is itself too low. In the 1970's and
1980's, the gap between the developing and industrial countries
widened. To prevent this would have required aid equivalent to 1.3%
of GDP. As the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, so
the redistribution of world income should become similar to that within
well-governed nations4411•
44 Human Development Report 1994, United Nations Development Programma. New
York, 1994, p. 88
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1.5 Dependence theory
The dependency theory arose in ~he mld-tseo's, partially as a
response to the apparent failure of the structuralist analysis and
prescriptions, Dependence theorists argue that the import-substitution
industrialisation strategy oHM structuralists failed to produce sustained
economic growth in the less developed countries because the
traditional social and sconomlc oonditions of the LDCs remained intact;
indeed the neo-co'onialist. alliance of indigenous feudal elite with
International capitalism had been an increased maidlatrlbutlort of
income, domestic demand too weak to sustain .continued
industrialisation, and ever-greater dependence on those multinatlonal
corporations of developed economies that took advantage of the
import-substitution policies. Less developed countries ned lost control
aver their domestic economies as a consequence and had become
more and more dependent on International capitalism.
The major component ill dependence theory included analysis of:
(1) the nature and dynamics of the capitalism world system,
(2) the relationship or linl<age between tile advanced capitalist
countries and the less developed countries, and
(3) the internal characteristics of the dependent countries
themselves.
All dependency theorists rraintain that underdevelopment is due
primarily to external forces of the world capitalist system and is not due
to the policies of the LDCs themselves. Both LOG under-development
and capitalist development are the product of the expansion of
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international capitalism", The historical situation h,.'''' tfundamentally
cnanqed; the international balance of economic and portlcal power
continues to be distorted in favour of the developed capitalist
economies. Although the dependent less developed economy may
advance in absolute terms, it will always be backward in relative terms.
The ~lllrd major component of dependency theory is a quasi-Marxist
analysts of the dependent economy; it is this aspect of dependency
theory that best dlstlnnulshss it from what its adherents regard as the
reformist, bourg!:; ition of the structuralists.
A central proposition in dependency theory is that the relationship
between the advanced capitalist socleties and those at the periphery
of the world political economy is exploitative. From this view pt'int,
under-development is not a stalled stage of linear development, a
question ~)fpre-capitalism, retarded or backward development, but
rather a structural position in a hierarchical world division of labour.
The vary term "dep6ndenoy" highlights the extent to which the
movement of economics and politics in poor countries is conditioned
by a global economy dominated by others. Hence dependency
theorists aver that we reed only to look to contemporary relations with
other societies ttj expluin under-development",
Samir Amin47has shown the two tendencies of capitalism. In surveying
changes in the international division of labour, Amin argued that South
45 Robert Gilpin. Op. cit. p.236
46 Ib;d. p.137
47 The Future of South At'rlca. Journal of Southern African Affairs. 11.3.1917
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Africa reprer=nted a backward form of capitalism. It depicted "the
hideous plct, e of what the ~."rld imperialist system would increasingly
be if continued to develop according to its logic", According to Amln,
the division of the world imperialist system between dominant
imperialist centres and dominated peripheries had led to the over-
development of the tertiary sector of the world economy and its
concentration at the centres of the system. This was made possible
by super exploitation in the periphery of the primary sector. For Amin,
therefore, South African capital had largely been forced by the politlc(:\1
hegemony of the local bourgeoisie to estab'lsh an integrated auto-
centred structure, and not an externally orientated structure as ,rr the
Third World. Capital investment in the South African formation has
been a fact running through the world historical phase of capitalist
development up to the time when United states finance capital
abounds", The South African economy ranges from the affluence and
sophlstlcatlon of gleaming shopping malls and an advanced financial
services industry to levels of poverty associated with developing
ce 'I1tries, South Africa has one of the most unequalled distributions
of income in the world. The dominant source of economic activity is
centred on minerals and energy49.
The first major stream, called the neo-colonial iependence rrodel, is
an indirect outgrowth of Marxist thinking. It attributes the existence
and continuance OT Third World under-development primarily to the
48 Derrick Chltals. SADCC: Prospects for Dlsrmgagement and Development in
Southern Africa. London, 1987, p.15
4iJ The Econulflist Intelligence Unlt, South Afrfaa: Country Proli7e, 1996-1997, London,
1977
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historical evolution of a highly unequal international uapitalist system of
rich country/poor country relationships'". Whether because r.ch
nations are Intentionally exploitative or unintentionally neglectful, the GO-
existence of rich and poor nations in an international system dominated
by such unequal power relationships between the centre (the
developed countries) and the periphery (the LOCs) renders attempts
by poor nations to bE'! self-reliant and independent difficuit and
sometimes even imposslble'"
In contrast with the "stages of growth" theory that developing States
would attain autonomous self-suste,lning growth as they mature, the
"development of under-development" to the hlstorlcal expansion of
capltallst systems that "effectively and entirely penetrated even the
apparently most Ipr:lated sections of the under-developed world".
Dependentista.· , 'A3 they were frequently called, viewed the penetration
process as {Ilellea by capitalism's need for external sources of demand
and profitable investment outlets".
Dependency theorists, proceeding in most instances from a Marxist53
perspective, argue that "class" is a much better unit of analysis than
\\
----"\'\-'. ~,.._._--~~-...._--.,
50 Perri~ndo Henrlque Cardoso and ~n:.oFaletto /·1979) contended with the idea that
capittllisn\ promotes under-development. To the c('ntrary, they argued that capitalist
development can occur ln depene!::;n! situations They believed that dependent
capitalist development has become a new form of mcncpollstlc expansion In the Third
World. Development thus takes place Within the now dependency.
51 Michael P. Todaro. Economic Development. p.S1. 1994.
52 lbld., p.137
53 Dependency theory builds on Lenin's theory tor iltlperialism, but Il UOS$ bsyond
Lenin by specifying the nature of Imperialism more completely and by accounting tor
changes that have occurred since Leni!' wrote his treatise at the beginning of the
century. :Jharles W. Kegley. World Politics. NtlW York. ·1995. p.13$)
----~--------------------------
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"state", They believe that international relations divide the world
horizontally (into nation-states) while the leality of political and
economic life can be better understood in vertical terms by depleting
the capitalist class and their oornlnatlon of the working classes"
Specifically, dependency theory asserts that the dependent country ;$
fastened to the world economy by a transnational class tinl<age.
"The structure of the global political economy essentially enslaves the
less developed countries of the "South" by mal<ing them dependent on
the nations of the c3pit~lnst core ot the "North", Theotoneo des
Santos, one of thA Marxist dependentist theorist, polnted out.-
""., 8y depenrJC:rlCOwe mean a Situation in which the economy
of cerL,in ccuntrtes is conditioned by the development anci
expansion of anomer economy to which the former I:::;subjected,
The relation uf intel'deperxlt:H10e between two or more
econornlos, and between these Rnd world trade, assumes the
form of indt)pendence when san ,q countrlsa (the dominant
ones) can (;~xpandand can be self-sustaining, while athol'S (tho
dependent ones) con do this only as a renecnon ot that
exp,msion, which can have eith 3r a positive or a negative effect
on their immediate dov(llopm~.rlt."
nos St'lntos sees three eras c.,f dependence In modern history: colonial
depentlonco (during tile eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), financial-
in(;Justl'ialdOiJendenc~~(during tho nineteenth and early twentieth
"4 nl()otlJfO A Goul\1umbis. III/rmiuiJtif!tl tll/lltO(/),'tiiWl1 Hp/atlons. 19m). 1).21.
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centuries) and a structure of dependence today based on the post-war
multinational corporatlons".
Contemporary perspectives of dependency reveal the contrasting
forms of aominance and dependence amany the nations of the
capitalist world. Capitalism may be either progressive or regressive.
Depend' 'It nations may develop as a reflection of the expansion of
dominant nations or under-developed as a consequence of their
subjective relatlonshlpa".
Those who employ dependency in the analysis of development and
under-development" often focus on the problem of foreign penetration
into the political economies of the Third World. Outside economical
and pOliticC',\influences affect local df'velopment and reinforce rLlling
classes at the expense of the marginal olassea
Chilean economist Osvaldo Sunkell one of the non-Marxist
dependentist theorists, elaborated on this lnterpretatlon.-
"F:'oreign factors are seen not as Intrinsic to the system I with
manifold and sometimes hidden or subtle political I financial,
economic, technical and cu!tural effects inside the under-
developed country ... Thus the concept of "cependencla' links
the post-war evolution of capltalism Internation8.ly to the
discriminatory nature of the local process of development, as
$5 David N Hulnan, /llIrmlIlGti(m to flltomatf(.lno/ flo/menl £;Fe;onomy. p,i'3. 1990
so Ronald H Chi:cole. Tfworios of CompafIJtiv(J Politics. Oxford, 1094. p.236.
SI r:mnomj(} Homiquo Cortio(:e; argued thnt dependent cnpi~ali$t development was
evident in tho lIndat·(lp'·')10Pod world. CQruoso and othol' also began to IInl, thoir
lhcorlcG of dependency to I.onin's theory of imp"w3Iism.
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we know It. Access to the means and benefits of development
IS selective; rather than soreadlnq them, the process tends to
ensure a self·reinforcing accumulation of privileGe for special
groups as well as continued existence of a marglna! class. uSB
MarxistsS9 as well as non-Marxists" might find that these definitions
depict the world today. At some time, It is clear that there is no
consensus about a theory of dependency. Indeed no common theory
exists; the literature on dependency moves in many directions, and
critics set forth a multitude of positions. Some critics attack the
nationalist inclinations of some advocates of dependency who oppose
outside Influence. Many argue that attention to external considerations
of dependency avoids conslderatlcne of the external class stn Iggle,
and otbers believe tnat dependency obscures the analysis of
imperlalisl1i.
The fioA·Marxlst theories are based on several positions. One position
advocates turning Inward to develop by promoting national autonomy
throug~l State control and planning of the politir.al economy under the
direction of petit-bourgeois intelligentsia and the industtial bourgeoisie.
Under the modernising State, the bourgeoisie will become a
progressive influence and support national lnterests as capitalist
development diffuses itself into rural areas and as economic and
political policies restrict the influence of foreign interests. A dual
society, one advanced and modern and the other backward and
,---------------------------------,----------
so Osvuldo Sunkel. "Big Business and 'Dopend[)llcla"'. Foreign Affairs. 50 April 19·{2.
DO The branch of tho Mtlrxist dapendantlst theorists Includes mainly: Paut Baran,
Swoezy. Ruy Mauro Morlni. Andto Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney and Thec,l(v,10(, dOG
Santos.
GO lho brunch Qf non.Morxtst dependentis! theorists tncludo~ mainly Paul Preblsch.
cetsc Furtado, Osvaldo Sunkol. Pablo GOl'lzolez casaoeve and Manuel Correia do
Andrad<:l.
40
feudal, characterises the developing nations, which In turn represent
a primary producing periphery whose resources tend to be
appropriated by the industrial centre".
celso Furtado developed this position by examining inequalities in
Brazil throughout historical periods and tracing the shift of major
economic activity and production from the North-East to the Centre-
South region where Sao Paulo is located. He believed that the State
should intervene to rectify this Imbalance and to move capitalist
development along its future course02,
Dependence theory was a popular radical critique of Western capitalist
nations intheir relations with the Third World during the 1960's and
1970's and still has its advocates today. It derives from a theory of
ecor 10m!\} imperialism, and is also used as a critique of fOl'elgn aid
programs. The basic idea is that major oapitalist powers like the USA
and leading members of the European Communities have not really
given up their powers of coionlaHsrnc3t but in fact exercise enormous
~olitlcal control over Latin America, Africa and Asia, However, they do
this now by the use of economic pressure and by exploiting their
superior market position to extract unfair advantages in international
trade. The theQry holds that as most of the finance for Industrial and
agriGultura! development In the Third World has to come ircm thEl
-----------------------------,,1 Rt;lJ')aldH Chilcote, T/worios of Compamtive Politics. 2flj 1'0. Oxford, 19~4. p.sse
6<t Seo /Economio Growth ofBra.:il: A Survoy from Colonial In Modem Timos. Berkeley,
1963
sa Gilpin pOinted out thot tho oxtornal transfer of wealth from colonlos to colonlel
powers couldn't explain the dlstnblttfo(l of w(;lalth and power In the contomporary
world.
M"lfOOVer, Intornational economic relations have existed primarily 0(110n9tho more
advanced countries thomsolves. RobOlI Gilpin, '>P, cit.
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money markets in the developed capitalist States, that development is
tied to the economic interests of the West.
J. Samuel and Arturo Valenzuela criticised the "modernisation
perepectlvetthat economists, anthropolc ts, sociologists and political
scientists had developed in the post-war period to explain the failure
of "new nations" to reach the "economic take-off" point with an Infusion
of Western foreign ald. Such a perspective, In their view, was an
outgrowlh of the tradition-modernity dichotomy of nineteenth century
European sociology that saw culture itself, resistant to chango: as the
main obstacle to economic modernisation. Dependency theorists, note
the Vaienzuelas, reJect the modernlsatlonlst assumption that genuine
development can result only through an appropriate response to stimuli
from exogenous sources according to the uniquely successful Western
model, as if development and Westernisatlon were Identical processes.
They also reject the notion that the national society Is the proper unit
of analysis in this context. The valenzuetas arque that differ'ent levels
in the transition from tradition to modernity cannot explain differences
in levels of economic growth achievement. Nations and regions can
be analyz.ed only by mferenc6 to their locus in the world pelitlcal-
economic system whether they are closer to the core or to the
periphery04.
Although capitalist economies possess a powerfLlIlncentive to expand,
it does not follow that this expansion must tal<etthe form of colonial
()4 Janes E Dougherty. Contendlilg TheOries of Intornational Relations. New Yorlt,
1990, p.250.
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imperialism. Economic expansion through the market mechanism is
also possible; there is a wide range of economic and non-economic
~'actors that are of significanc.e in affecting th€ type of expansion.
Furthermore, capitalist exparelon by itself's not necessarily
responsible for war; it may 8£'gravate relations among States and
even lead to minor connlots, but major wars are due to the clash of
more fundamental strategic and vital national mterests.
The argument tnat capitalist economies have a powerful lncentlve to
expand through the mechanisms of trade and investment does not
support the position ot some contemporary dependency theorists that
capitalistic imperialism has purposely underdeveloped the so-called
Third NCJlld65•
A Stale is pOlitiC"'IlIy dependent whsn its power structure and
institutions are controlled from outside, economically dependent wh,.m
exports and imports are necessary for its survival". The degree to
which (:J. countrv is dependent on for~igl1 economic, social and political
forces is relate.I tv ilti :;'Il.~, resource endowment, and political hlstory,
F most Third World 'countries) this dependence is substantial. In
some cases, It touches almost every facet of life. Most small natil'lr)s
are highly dependent on foreign trade with the developed world.
Almost al! small nations are dependent on the importation of foreigri
and often inappropriate techno!og!€"'. of produot'on. This faot alohe
exerts an extraorclnary influence on the character of the growth
process in these dlppendsnt natlons".
05 Robert GilpIn. op. olt p.283.
6(1 See C. Lewis. An essay on tho Government of Dependencies.
07 Michael P. Todaro. :Economic Devl3fopment. 6!n ed. New York, 1997, p.3tt
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The theory is even taken by some to the point that outright foreign aid
gifts are suspect because the funding is simply used to develop Third
World economies in such a way that they remain totally dependent on
markets in the First World. While it is clear that economic power is
vital, and that the Western investors will try to maximise their
advantage, it is far from clear that poor and over-populated countries
have any alternative, at ;eRstin the short term, to exploit tholr primary
products for the Western markets.
There is, after all. nothing fixed about the terms of trade in primary
goods.
Theorists focused on the Third World in order to work out a theory of
under-development. The idea that the diffusion of capitalism promotes
under-development and not development in many parts of the world
Ji
was embodied in Andre Gunder Franl<'s Capitalism and Under-
dew ..opmen: in Latin America (1967), Waltsr Rodney's How Europe
Under~deveJoped Afrioa (1972), and Malcolm Ce,dwell's The Wealth
of Some Nations (1979). Theotoneo dos Santos formulated the ldoa
of the "new dependency" to explain the tradltionl.1: relationship of
nations In these areas to the advanced capitalist countries, especially
the United States; this form of d~~pendency'Wi:~S especially
charactenstlc of the mul~h1atlohalfirms in the period aftt::lrthe Second
World War. A variation of this theme appeared In Ruy Mauro Marini's
notion of "subimperialism", a situation in whIch same Third WOl'id
countries could serve as intermediaries for imperialist natlona in the
exploitation of other countries. Finally, Fernando Henrique cedcec
advocated (he idea of associated dependerll, development, whereby
some capitalist growth was possible In dependent counmes. These
ideas appeared as radical alternatives to the North American literature
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Or) development, but they eventually became absorbed into the
mainstream of political science, despite the objections of Gabriel
Almond, Samuel Huntington and some other cornparatlvlsts who
responded to the criticism that largely dis iredlteo their earlier
tneorles".
The financial dependence of the developing countries on the
developed Is not due to their poverty, since even the richest countries
have been borrowers'" The developing countries' dependence fur
finance derives ultimately from their high rate of population growth and
intermediately from their high rate of growth of urbanisation - around
5 per cent per annum or more ~to which this population growth gives
rise. Arthur L(i)wis oonsdsrs two disadvantages of financial
dependence that were already evident before the First World War. The
first of these disadvantages is the vulnerability of debtors to
international recession and the second is the speed with which t: IS
debt charges mount. Exporters of primary products are vulnerable to
international recession, whether they borrow or not, because the price
of their exports swing very widely over the course of the trade cYI~!e.
In the non-lncustrlal periphery, however, technical progress Is
introduced from the outside and is restricted primarily to tho production
at commodities and raw materials that am exported to the core.
Inflexible structures and immobile facts of production make adaptation
to price chanoss impossible. Increased produotivity in the pdmary
sector, a shortage of capital due to a low rate of savings and a elite
consumption pattern imitative of advanced countries all combine to
<1.U Ronald H. Chilcote. Op. cit. p. 11.
6S. W Arthur Lewis Op. cit. p.43.
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increase the level of national unemployment. With surplus labour in
primary occupations and the absence of strong trade unlons, the real
wage in the periphery economy then declines, transferring the fruits of
technical advance In the periphery economy to the core economies via
depressed prices for commodity exports.
AS Samir Arn'n argued, the under-development was not a backward
phase of development but a modern phenomenon of world-wide
capitalist expansion responsible at the time for the development of the
centres and the under-development of the peripheries. He borrowed
the terros "centre" and "periphery" from the eatly writings of Preblscn
but gave them a new content. sarrn Arnln argued from the outset that
under-development was produced by the structural adjustment of
socletles that were not in at the beginning of the qualitative leap
represented by the constitution of the national bourgeois state and an
autocratic capitalist economy on the basis. The societies were
subjected to the external expansion of the bourgeois States. He
stressed the fundamental distinction to be made between perlpherles
and new centres. They have a different social dynamlcs".
Dependoncy theorists differ from orthodox analysts in the indui3trialised
Western t:tEltes most fundamentally on two polnts, First, orthodox
analysts of sconomlc and political developments who considered the
problems of newly independent nations after the second World War
tended to assume that the path to economic and political success for
those countries was essentially the same path followed by rich,
industrialised countries in the North. The rich countries had started
down that path earlier, so natunally they were more advanced than
70 Rn-Reading tllO Postwar Period. New York, 1994. p.63.
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newly independent countries. The way for the latecomers to catch up
was to emulate the early birds. They had been democratic, so less
developed countries should strive to be. So-called heavy Industries
had been leading sections of their economies decades earlier, so less
developed countries should focus their efforts on such industries.
They had developed under capitalist, market-oriented systems, so that
was the type of system best suited to the needs of the less developed.
It, briefly, less developed States would adopt development strategies
as similar as possible to those tried-and-tested strategies devised by
Great. Britain, the United States, and the other rich countries, before
too .1011gthey would progress down .he same path biazed earlier by
those countries, reach a take-off stage, and enjoy the fruits of modern
prosperity.
Globalists and dependentlsts
An elliance of CONvenience and common Interest exists between the
centres of international capitalism and the clientele class that wields
power in the dependent economy". This parasitic or feudal-capitalist
alliance is composed of agrarian interests, the military, and the
indigenous managers of the multinational corporations, who have a
vested interest in maintaining the linkage with international capitalism
and in prever.ting the development of an independent and powerful
industrial economy through social and political reforms. Dependency
theorists argue that this co-opt elite resists the loss of its privileges and
is kept In power by the forces of world capitalism and also that the
strategy of import-substitution supported by the structuralists merely
7t Rober, '3i1pln. Op. cit. p. 286.
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increases the foreign hold over the economy.
Once those that are under-developed have been penetrated by the
advanced capitalist States, continues the dependency argument, the
inherently exploitative linkages that bind them together are sustained
by the local elites within the penetrated societies. -I-he fortunes of
these privileged aristocrats Is tied to the dominant powers; therefore,
they are co-opted by their desire to maintain their privileged positions
in their own societies. Ttl!rd World local elites perpetuate their
countries' domination and dependence by acting dornestlcall,' in ways
that favour their international connections. They put personal weltare
over that of their country,
Dependency theorists also reject duafsrn as a description of Third
World countries' economic and social systems. Instead of a dlvlslon
into "moclern" and "traditional" sectors, they maintairl that in fact there
is only a single international capitalist economy that determines social,
economical, and political outcomes throughout the global economy.
Globalists assume that it is not only useful but also imperative to view
international relatlons from a historical perspectlve". It Is only through
an examination of history that one can understand the current
envlronrnent within which world pOlitics take place. For many
globalists, Marxists as well as non-Marxlsts, the defining characteristic
of the International system is that it is capitalist. Some States and
societies benefit from this capitalist system, others do not.
Furthermore, the evolution of the world capitalist system supposedly
accounts for the; creation of States, not Just their behaviour. Whh0
------------
77 naul R Viotti. op. cit. p. 9
tl.1'.1
realists and pluralists tend to see States as a given, utilising them as
independent variables, some globalists view States ElS dependent
variables.
Although globalists recognise the importance of State-as-actors
international organisations, and transnational actors and coalltlozr
particular focus of their enalysts is on how these and other factors
as mechanisms of domination by which some States, classes, or
manage to benefit from the capitalist system at the exnense of others'S,
More specifically, globalists are typically concerned with the
development and maintenance of dependency relations among
northern, industrialised States (In North America, Europe, Japan) and
the poor, under-deve'oped, or industrially backward Third World or less
developed countries (LOCs) of Latin America, Africa and ASia. The
baslc argument Is that these latter States and societies are under-
developed not because they have failod to develop a capitalist
economic system or because they are poorly integrated into the world
capitalist system On the contrary, it ;3 not 'a matter of too little
capitalism but too l1':..Ich. Far from being placed outside the
mainstream of the world capitalist system, LOGs have become an
integral pan of it. The structure of the global pOlitical economy has
developed in such a rnanner • intentionally and unintentionally " as to
keep the Third World countries under-deveioped and oependent on the
rich Northern States. As part of the world capitalist system, LCOs
cannot .choose their own path towards economlo and political
development Autonomous developmer~ in these circumstances is
lmposslble,
-------------------
7~ Idem p.g
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1.0 Oovolopmont stratogy based on solf~rollunuo
Both strllciurolillts ~mfj c:if1pl)flrJoney the(:)ri~it8 have ndVl:lCoroci n
development stmtegy bas~,J on natinl1e! solf-reliance, For
structuralititB, this has mOMt an mnphtUJis nn imf.mfHllJIJBtitution
strategy, mpid industriCllim)tiem behlrKll1inli tariff wuns, mid a reform of
international inrltitutions. Dopnndency theorios go further and clrgklA
tllot eutonomous solf·reliclnt (Jov(;)lopmont requres n sacie\! +I'om@c;.n
from a f(;!Ut.iGI ci.·pitcllist soeioty tCJ a SO(;i;:;11Ist one. Domestic equity ean
bo tlCI'liovod. 1110Y o.r~.lUo.only by IOm)Oning or aetunHy brtKu<ing tho
links with uie world eapitt1ln.it oecncrmos.
'Tho world I(.lQlmquito rilffnmnt from ttle view point of dopondoncy
ttlOoritlts. TllIO, In(lu8ti'loliood countries ~to.rt(ld flown u paUl to W(1ulth
tj~foro the Third Wmld C'jluntriOS f~ut~Icpond()ncy ttlOOt'i5t8 r:;)(,lluI10
thnt lose fJovolopeci States n1Ul:lt follow n clifferont pam jll~t bli)C:CIUSO
I'it:he!' CC)W'ltriO£l (1ot that f1HnI'j fltmt tess rJoVfJiJpO(J C1fluntr'j()D must
1'10WcompotD in n Bystom t!ominotorj economically. pOlitl(;ally. nnd
l'fulttarily by Stnlol; that navo C'If'thl'.j~\ tlOGOmO rOlativoly li(;h ond
pt'wcrful. ThiD (lifl(lront SihJ~ition. Q(;Gmdlno to t''''~) \,Joponclency
tlmOf'iGWj (.latin tOt' quite} (ltffUt"(l.lt mrmO~~iODfront meso used ln b'Jrliol'
(lOYDov motOf.";sueh OD(ilrn,lt Rfltnin nnel tim Unlto(} Sitnton. 1n f~"\~t.tel
uso th1Voh:mmont ntmteoiml of thu cnpltahst wlrioty Cl1.)I.lOW)odh\' <:lrflot
[Jritoin nncl tim UnitQc1Status I~! to ploy ri~ll1t Intel tho htmtlf; elf
r;opitfill5ts In tho ricl'lf,lf, industrinlirmd clJuntri(ln nml tel ensure 10m:;
cl~;v(Jk)P0~;'Htatofj a Dul:ml'd.nato ami (oc(:ordinq tf1 noma dopl'mioncy
tl1C'ori~tG) to!otivDI:{ irnpovO;iGhfl~' : tPlUG in tilt) WI,fIC{eGomJmv"~.
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DopcflC1oney theorists beHove Ulnt ouch n ~:tratiflgy w{;1ulcJperpetuate a
rm;mom:J tlKlt orti1(JdOl( econcmlsts I'lrld rJif;tOl'imm in tllo Nortrl tend to
ovcrlOolt WllQrl ftmy fli111Iyzo me hintC': lcal OXJ)Ol'ionC;(Jof tho currently
vmalthy lmlu8trlo'leni smtes, T!Klt pro\jomi trmltifon) wDalth from
poorc I rOfjiof18 on{1 countries t.} wea1U1lor count il:iE;. Such a
reaistrllJuHon of wooith, ir. tho viow of most dopondency tflCOliots, is n
more (IF less nnturol consoquenco of capitali&~m. Qrttlodox oconomists
and hiotorlmm in tho ,iovoIOP8c1 fltnto8 nlu9t aclmowlOufjO thc~t
Colt)f1ialimn ~ncl impElfi8liEim oxisted. but trlllY umJrJrstL'to thl) oxtont to
which crj(}flomiG progress in t,m rich NorUlcm ccmntric'B worn bm.lOu nn
oxp10itDti()I1 ('f tho r.url'Ort!y ul1(jcr,{J()VO!()r:;:~i wuiatls. In brioT,
:JOPOflCltI!r1C:{ theorists \If<GCh't that rich cnuntrir.:'2; £lot riGl" to an
important o)ltont, by mo!~irttJ coer CClLlfltrie;::.poor. 11(:ro O~l(lln, {It
course, is C! fOGtol' pointln[1 in tho cllrcctkm of dOv{)I(}r,mlont ntmtcolOG
quito different from t "1(.;;. ~'(;,cdin earlior (lPOCt19. t;ufl'cntly 10m]
dovo!opoci Stat!)s hove no n;;lativol} c1ofom:olcl!JU,1,ltitou{ilmlj sreas
GIlt1ilnblo fdl' l~xplcl:t,ltion " tho Itoy to 8!J{;CO!?B~(lrcapitalist Stntns.
'mo nu~on(lfllfldmncntQI (lisogmcmont k)otwfl(,;n (lrU1Q(jt)x Bcl101nrc
frmn t10vOlnpotl countrlm; onfi (Jopomlem:y tIlomiGto (HI miclitiem to tlw,
one [CUWfjif1U tim roloVEmco of {j(;VOhJpniopt GtrotO!]iClD UGf)(i by Fir'Dt
WI..111ejeounll'iOn for mlrl'ont:y poor C{}Unli'loo} irwolvcm Giarldy Ciiifol'l1)nt
esumates of tllO rnlotM) ImrKlct IJf Gxt0mal Ofl(i lntornnl tntt(}IS on tho
prQCO'l!~of ti!JvoIO!)"'(Jf1t '1110fOl'mor OQs~\ttcdofteF UiO~cGonti Wmlci
Wo.r tlmt tho (::11011(1DO neem~8ory l]f'ing oeononuc pmrJfO!JS to IO[l(j
dmrol{~~mCl(:~)tmtrim) W08 Inrgol1' "lntornsl" to th08<i COllntrios. oml mnst
Oft! jCldnx anolyfitG mill beliovo this to bo ((UD. In l)l'iof, intonml,
rj0H10stir" pOlitic;;:1tmd eeencmie t~rl(111gCG oro tho Imy to poliiical om;!
Oel,lf101l.'lle proHm~.'8. DOpoo(foney thoorlntil do not dony tllot intornDl
ctmnooe oro necnszory. but from their viowpnint f'if'Gt Worlfl OflnlyutD
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sorimmly under-estimate tho extent to which thQ problems of leas
dovoloped countrlos aro caused by taetors "external" to those countries
mid tho Impaot of the in!ol'notional economic ami political environment
on them,
1.7 Torms of ")radtJand GATT
t!conl}mi~jtH have of course long recognised that a country, espoclally
a largo ono, cOl)leJ ImprovQ its terms of trade and national walftlro
through the imp()sition ()f a SQ·cuI!GrJ effoctive tHrift 01' t111optilnurn t'lriff.
'rho rnonipulatiem of tfll'iff schodules on {iiffOl'ont typos of oroducts
((mnll11oC'JitiOti, somi,pf'i'lC08S0d and finishod 900(;19) (')r' tho oxploitation
e)fJ ITIclfIopoly position with rospecjt to a purtioular product or market
can enol?I'~on "ce)f1omy to improve its terms of trade, as OPEt::i proved
In ttm 'lUte's. Lmgo (lc(}nomio9 con manlpuloto their commercif:ll anci
othor Pf)!iCIOS in oreor to improve U1b/ torms of trndo, and tho less
(ioveillpocl c:lUntrios umltJumufily hOVCl b:tff~ror;J fr(:')[fI tariff~1 that
rliDminh'1nto llgninst tl10lr oxparhl of l~~rni"plocos80tl pro(;iUtlt8.
WNmtholons, tho COM$) t)f rosulting eonctt'IGtlom~on toto! trado anei of
fmuion f'Ctollnticm oro mlfficlent to fTlal<OtllOh' over'oll offE:1ctsminil'f'C\\and
tflmporory.
Dopem:iort(iY thoori~tG ohm urnuo that tho terms of trmJo involving tlv)
primary products em which dovolc>pinn eountrtos dop(md hi.x\lo
dotOl'ic)ffltO(i5t0(1(liIy. Tilift in. tho amount of 0. (livon nw matorit'I ttl(':r'
mUDtox~)ort to (lot a rnonufncturo(i prodtJ',;t in romrn l\Dopa grQwinr{'.
i~~nC}t:K~rt cqnt\uaOG -~'Iho tihul LuoUnt teten thnt tho \0!UllD or tr(k~(} f/j1
@mmniMy t'lIpmtQr;} Mvo lIo\C:iiOfiJtccl Ollay U,o lor.') term nmi UiJt II:'~J10 1110fC':l:~tlf\
for mei! t'COll;:jf{li(; plll)llt 10 n(l~ I)UPPQli'\'(ilil' evi[Jont'O", 0" ,';1 I,:Il,/ p.;'!)n
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Also, the prices of raw materials and commodities fluctuate in a
notorious fashic:m. OccS\sionally,the prices of sxports from developing
countries, such as copper, coffee, or sugar, have been very I'igh, and
the procucsrs have experienced temporary windfalls. However, in ttl€!
next year, the prices nf mose same products will drop prsclpltously,
and tho developing countries tl1st export them suffer grievous balance-
ct-trace defioits and other painful dislocations in their highly vulnerablc7
economies.
Ths ina! 'ec;uacy of internationul arrangerl"l~-mts to deal with tl',e
economic difficulties of the trani.jition from war TC peace was partly
offset iJ'I attempts to combine special temporary assistance for thls
purpose with acme of the me~eures for reconstructing a permanent
internettlonal system1(l. The UK subscribed to thd American
government's proposa' f(lr liberalising 1!lorldtrode tY'lrough the creation
of an International Trade OrtJtlnisalti~n (ITO) of the United Nations.
S:nci:Jone of ihe oiJligations ot the members of tl1ii!-body was to agree
to abide by the exchange principles laid t.ioWfl at Bretton Wood::;, its
sponscrs os 01'10 of thr~ key lnstltutlons c,f the new system envlselgf.'ld
tho IT\). As Imlg as it was miJrely a qusstlcn uf devising acn inistr@tiVH
machinbry and prop~lriI'lC)8 statement Of principles, ste."ldy r:rogre$~
was made, hut whon it came to ri1~;k\rlgthO :.1cl1emo~.wO~kin9 "Golity,
very little happened. What limo was achie'/ad to reduce trade
restrictions, was clono separat~1lyby means ot a lart:tCl number of
cornrnercel agreements.
"ho first important action of this Idnd after the WOf' taol( plac€Jat
~n wlm;)mA,',hwortll A Sl1ut NiJtmy :If 'Tho /n!llmnfiwmf !iiC{)!loms': 1!)HO'')~fJO.
lon(l~lI1. tHb2. p,234
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Gel19VD in 1947. While discussions about the formatlon of the ITO
went on there, the representatives of 23 countries concuoted tariff
negOtiations among themselves. The outcome was 123 bilateral
agreements wnlch were all embodied in a General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trede (GATT)17
The most obvious example of exclusion from management of the
under-developed countries has been in the major economic institutions
of the NOttrl -the International Monetary Fund, the International Sank
for Reconstruction and Development and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade • institutions that were created by the developed
countries and reflected their dominant power" This political structure
also moans thl1t the management decisions made by the North reflect
the interests, des:rat and goals of the North, not those of the South.
This adds another diIT'ension to rlependenay - the feeling among the
under-developed countrles that not only do they not share in the
management of the system but also they do not share In the resources
and tM benefits (Jf tile system, and the system exists to perpetuate the
South's dependont status. Tile impact of cependcnoe Is seen as the
perpetuation !Jf dependp,ncy and under-development.
In a highly Interdopendent world cornpclsed of powerful Illiberal
economies, the ('..iATT principles C'f non-discrimination, National
Treatment, and Most f'!'a...."lured Nation may MCllorlger be appropriate'O,
If a greater harmonisation a. "i1ong national eecnornio pracnces and
Tl Idem p, 23'}'
7IJ Joan E Spero. 1110 Po itiCH of Intom,IUana/ t:c()/);)mi,: f~QI(lti{)fw. London, 1990,
~.14.
18 Hobert Gilpin. Op. cit. p. 3:)3.
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domestic societies does nat occur, liberal societies may be farced in
their own defence to adopt industrial and other countervailing
practices. The question of whether statist societies should become
more liber-al,or liberal soclefles rnr statist, or, as most economists
aver, domestic structures do not really ma;t.l'lr,has become central to
an evaluation of the problem posed by the inherent conflict between
domestic autonomy and international norms,
Developing countries were strongly Involved in shaping the WTOsO
agreements. They had a significant impact on issuessuch as GATS81,
textiles and clothing, agriculture, tropical products, TRIMs8~, and
dispute settlement. This Influencewas alreadymanifested at the 1986
ministerial meeting in Punta del Este, where a group of smaller
developing and developed economies (the Swiss·Colornbiancoalition)
played a mediating role betwsen the United States, me Eui ",pean
Union \ large developing countries such as Brazil and India, This
marked a sea change: developing countries could no longer be
regarded as a bloc. Instead, they pursued their self-interest in a much
more open way than in the past".
eo1'110World Trode OrganIsation (liVrO) is an International organisation, established
in 1995. It Is responsible for admlnl!>teting ml,lltilaternl trade agreements negotiated
by Its members, particularly the General Agr~emant on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), tho
GOf'lE)ralAgreement on Trade In Services ("ATS) and tho Agreement on TriZlde·
Rolated Intellectual Property Rights {TRIPs). Total world trade In goods, services anti
Intellectual property stood at US$ 5 trillion in 1995, of which services onel intellectual
property acceuntee for over $ 1 trUilnn, Tho wro's rules :and principles establish a
set of disciplines regarding the rogulatory framaworl< in which the exchflngtt takes
placo.
81 Gent-al Agreement on Trado in sorvlees.
02 Trade-related Investment Moasura.
03 Bflrnard M, Hcelenan. Tllo Political E~()nomy of tn« World Trading Systom : From
GATI' to WTO. Now York. 1995, p. 241.
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Although the initial premiss underlying GAn84 W.. .J essentially parity of
obligations between rich and poor tradlno nations, the concept of
giving preferential treatment to dsvelopln, ntrles existed from the
start. It gain$d prominence in the rnld- 1950's when a large number of
colonies approached independence. Two types of preferential
treatment can be distinguished. The first consists of a request for
preferential access to rich-country markets through tariff preterenoes.
Such preferences were already in effect, largely reflecting economic
relatlorisfilps built up by France and the ' ith their colonies. A
second form of preferential treatment C"" of exemptions from
GAn rules and mechanisms. Preferences were justified In various
ways. One argument was the so-called export pessimism. The fear
was that if developing countries relied upon exports for growth, their
supply of commodities would exceed what could be absorbed by the
world. The resulting predicted decline in the terms of trade were
considered to justify trade restrictions by developing countries • in
effect, they had to impose an optimal tariff to improve their terms of
trade.
Given their reliance on exports of commodities, export pessimism was
complemented by the view • persuasively argued by Preblsoh - that
devlJ!oping countries needed proteenon to achieve industrialisation and
economic development, and that a new world trade order was required
to break the 'vicious circle of under-development'", Developing
----,,----
Q~ Bernard Hoakrnan. op. cit. p. 52.
"GATT and UNCTAD were 1.·"lU:,·,':t1,," t, ,'y"J :l~¢;:~;$rival organisations, as tho two
entities have shtlilal' areas 01'ilitOrost. but l;llli0n.iCl grooUy in terms of thefr functions,
operanons and untierlylnn Ideology. Interestingly, they co-operate throllgh a jOint
vonhu'o, in Int~mationtll Trade Centre (t'l'C) v.hich provldoc oxport prometlon and
marko!ll"g asstetance and related training unci consulting s rvlces to doveloplng
countries",
05 Bernmd Hcekrnan. Op, cit. p,237
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countries, it was argued, suffered from foreign-exchange shortages
requiring protectionist pollcles to protect their balance of payments.
Some as an instrument of exploitation and selt-sufflclsncy also saw
tnternatlonal trade as beneficial. More generally, it was argued that
development strategies required freedom to pursue lrnport-substltutlon
policies.
The institutional expression of this line of thinking was embodied in the
creation of UNCTAD In 1964, and the formation of a political bloc of
developing countries in the United Nations called the "Group of 17".
One year later, in 1965, developing country demands for special status
in the multilateral trading system led to the adoption of a new Part IV
of the GATI. Part IV t"lefinednon-reciprocity for developing countries.
To a large extent the inclusion of Part JV can be seen as a reaction of
the GATT contracting parties to the creation of UNCTAD.
These analytical reflections provide a framework for discussing in ths
next Chapter the economic threats posed by the globe's scarce natural
resources and the sovereignty over them, which permitted the oil
producer countries to use it as an econorsto and diplomatic weapon
over the dependent consumers of that so important and strategic
source of energy.
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CHAPTER 2 : ECONOMIC THREATS
Economic threats am without doubt the trickiest and most difficult ones
to handle within the ,frameworl~of national security. If the State is
taken as the referent c.'b]ect,then economic security becomes part or
the national security agenda. Applying the idea of economic security
to the State raises many similar questions to those arising if the
referent object is the indiVidual. The simplest view is to equate security
with the economic conditions necessary for survival. If the economic
criteria for seourlty are ralsed beyond that, then complex issues arise
about the impact of reduced vulnerability an economic efficiency, and
thus in the long term about. the State's abHity to Improve, or even to
hold, its position in the international system.
2.1 Conflict over the I)lob,~)sscarce resources
The central problem with the ld~?l.uof economic s{)\)urity is that the
normal condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk,
aggressive competition and uncertali!1ty. Witt1 the vital collapse Of the
centrally planned eoonorrnes as an t'llternative to rnarket-bassd ones,
the market stands as the dominant mOd!!'1for sound economic
practice. The national security is In ot\S sense part of the physical
base. of the StateS(i. If one cannot determine the normal condition of
something, and does not know exactly W;~l:ltmeasures help or hinder
it, then it is hard to calculate what actions might pose threats to it.
eo Barry Suzan, Poop/e. Sttlles i1lIiI POQr.Now Yorl;, 10t"1. p.125
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What might seem a threat in the short term, like oil embargGes or
inflated prices, might turn out to be a boom in stimulating more rational
energy,priclng policies and mars energy~efficlent technological
developments over the long run.
Even if modern science and technology have given mankind a new
consciousness at share values and common problems, this situation
is no guar'antee of common interest or of a willingness to subordinate
seltish concerns to the larger gOOd. On the contrary, modern science
and technology may intensify the confllot with the globe's scarce
resources.
Tt\e maximisation of efforts to attain economic and welfare goals entails
the C'Jiversionat resources from national security. In a world of scarce
resources, where every benefit entails a cost, socetlea seldom, if ever,
choose guns or butter, at least aver the long run".
It is however more Important to inquire whether or not a unified
humt:lt1ityreally exlsts, Unfortunately, it does not. The modern "unified
world" has been a creation of the West which has sought to impose Its
values anel way of life on a recalcitrant set of diverse cultures. The
unity was shattered economically and ideologically by the Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia and by the triumph there (and, after World War HI
elsewhere) of a radically different mode of pot:!ical and economic
organisation. The modern revival of Islam and the revolt of other non-
western cultures against Westr;;rn values may point to an even grE>ater
schism ahead8a•
ll1 Robert Gilpin, War /)nd Gi101I[JOIn VVorlcf poritics. p.1H. Caml1rldoe. 1981.
en Robert GilpIn. Op. cit.
b9
Within the eoonornlo sector, then, economlo threats fall very largely
within the noundarles of normal conduct, and cannot easily or (.;leerly
be linked to the logic of national security. However when the
consequences of economic threat reach beyond the strictly economic
sector into the military and political spheres, then three somewhat
clearer national security issues emerge:-
(i) the link between ecommlo and military capability,
(2) the link between economy and the overall power of the State
within the international system, and
(3) the economlo threat to domestic stability.The linkages involved
are betwt::lEmeconomic capability on the one hand, and military
capability, power and soCia-political stability an the other.
The link between economic and military capability is quite ~\pecificand
well understood. A State". military capability rests not only on the
supply of key stratogiu materials like fuel and 9nergy resources, but
l;llso on possession of an industrial base cal,able of supporting the
armed forces. When strategic materials must be obtained outside the
State, threats to security of supply can be cl~lssifled as a national
security issue. Threats to such filter quite quickly through into military
capabiiity, and can thus almost be seen in the same light as military
tl1reat'll°o,
00 William J. P~rry, USA Socrt:ltory of Defenco. Dofonr.;o in an Ago of Hope. Foreign
Affoirs. USA, 1096: "In tho post·Cold War security or vlrcnmont, US Wates)! for
managing m:mfllct rests of'! threo baslo lines of dofoncc. 1110first 11Mof dofenco is IQ
prevent threats from or,1orging; tho socond is to deter ttreats that do emerge; and
tho third, if provwUon and deterrence fOil, is to dofoot tho throat using military fo!ce.".
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In a crude, direct way, such vulnerabiliili~SgivE:rise to '::Jarsof extortion
where States use their econcmic cdvantaqes to extract political
concessions. The oil pOlitics of the 1970's raised fears of this type of
threat to considerf;1ble heights. -lowever, such fears are generally
offset by the abundant mechanisms 01 competitive supply that exist In
a global market, South Africa's option was the use of alternative
products and technologies available in its OIJl .country,
Except in rare cases, the diversity of the system tends tv offer
alternative suppliers and rna!kets an opportunity to underc: • attempts
to use economic levers for specific political purpcses. Even the rather
well placed and well orqanlsed oll cartel was defeated qUite ql.::ckly In
this way. Nevertheless, tho risk of such vulnel'abHities may create a
n~tional security ratione-11efar avoiding exoesslvo or asymmetrical
cepenosnctes that might offer political opportunltlss for the use of
economlc pressure.
Economic threats do resemble an attack on the Stat~),in the sense that
conscious external actions by others result in materlal ioec, strain on
various institutions of the State, and even subst~ntial damage to the
health and longevity of the population. The pClrnllel with a rnilitary
attack cannot be sustained, however, because while a l\liHtary attack
crosses a clear boundary between peaceful and aggressive l::ah~viaUl',
an economic "attack' does not. Aggressive behaviour is normal in
economic affairs, and risk of losses are part (.)f the price that has to be
paid to gain access to opportunity for gain, Prom this persp9Cltlv91
econome threats are self inflicted in as Inuch as a olloice is made to
~drticipate in a pattern of produotlon and exchange in which such nsi~e
~lrt:endemic, though ther€1is no escape here from the paint that many
countries have precious little choice about whether to participate or not
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Nevertheless, developments which have recently occurred have had
a major impact on the way policy makers are required to interpret a
St1te's security concerns. In other words, contemporary forces have
tended to ensure that the military dimension of security is, in many
cases, submeroed by other, non-military factors, which impir,ge on the
survival of political communities. This, it should be noted, is a very
different proposition from that which Implies that because "military
sl-)curity"may be relating relatively less :ignificant1y, the concern with
"national security" itself Is diminishing. Rather, a tar more complex
security environment in which the military dlmanson Is jO:1tted by a
range of other factors confronts policy makers. Of course, given tnt)
diversity of actors in the international system, it is dangerous to
generalise because each is likely to have its own specific
circumstances producing a distinctivesecurity agenda. However, even
where the military dimension remains very significant (as it does for
many States in the ~4lddle East, for example) other non-military
elements in the security equation cannot be ignored90• There are two
key elements in the processes surrounding the redefinition of security:
the nature of the issues involved and the means by which security is
GCll..ght. 1he security implications of the two issues are Indicati,,\;)of the
broadening security agenda. Clearly, the threat to the West's oil
Supplies produced by the OPEC price rises of the 1970's elevated
security of oil supplies to the top of national concerns Unlike the
more traditional military aspects of security, which focus on external
threats, many current issues touching on national security emphasise
------. --.------------
90 Brian HOCking.Op. dt. p. 137.
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the growing linl~ages between the domestic and international realms.
Enhanced scenornlc expectations on the part of national populations
that frequently cannot be met from within a State's own resources may
create demands on governments which, if not satisfied, can produce
internal instability, and thus increase lnseourlty".
In the non-military sphere, problems relating to management of the
Earth's resources and to environmental pollution can only be dealt with
on a collective basis. This does not mean that collective initiatives will
l')s forthcoming ar.d that individual action by government is irrelevant
to the management of the contemporary agenda. What it does mean,
10that the pattern of interactions between the actors influencing and
inflLlenc~d by that agenda, is more varied than in earlier periods.
2.2 Sovereignty over natural resourcas
The economic order created at the end of the Second World War92 had
been blfilt an the principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment
of all countries in matters of trade and economic relations. Here too,
experience was to show that "no matter how valid the principle of the
most-tavcursd nation may be in the trade relations among equals, it is
not an acceptable and adequate concept for trade among countries
with highly unequal economic power"1I3.
91 Ibid. p. 139
92 W. Arthur Lewis. The Evolution of tile International Economic Order. Princeton,
19'78. p.27
93 Raul Prebisch. Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for liltematlonal Economic
Relations.Harvard, 1977.
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The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was
asserted in the early fifties in order to justify abrogation, or alteration
of terms of concessions, secured by foreign companies, by which they
were granted extensive rights to extract petroleum or minerals
underlying the territories of host States. These concessions were
perceived to be "inequitable" as being markedly more advantageous
to the foreig.l concessionaire than to the host State, or as having been
granted as a result of duress or undue influence.
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources
emerged in the early fifties as the process of decolcnisatlon got under-
way, and newly independent States felt it necessary to re-appraise and
alter "inequi~able" legal arrangements, in the form of concessions)
inherited from the colonial period under which foreign investors (mostly
transnational corporations wit~l their headquarters in the metropolitan
country) were exploiting their natural resources. While permanent
sovereignty over natural resources is now recognised as a fundamental
principle of lntematlonat law, the definition of its precise scope and
implications remain a juristic task of some Importance. This is not only
because it is a principle that is undergoing progressive development,
but also because It continues to be a seminal source from which rules
can be derived to safeguard the interests of developing countries in
relation to the utilisation of their natural resources.
A nation with unusually abundant natural resources for its size, as
South Africa in this case, however, can enjoy high national income
despite a positlon in the 'factor-driven stage, though it Is not likely to be.
sustainable indefinitely. Good examples would be Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, which may enjoy high income per capita for decades because
of an abundance of oil. Eventually, however, dependence of natural
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resources will leave a nation vulnerable to depletion, new foreign
sources, or technologioal changes that reduce or eliminate resource
needs. Abundant natural resources also create more subtle
problems".
Around 25 per cent of world trade involve the import and export of
primary products. Many of the world's poore-r countries are heavily
dependent upon such exports for their foreign exchange earnings.
However, the export of natural resources often involves environmental
and, sometimes, social costs which do not figure in the natlo, .al
accounting systems",
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 11as
been enunciated and reaffirmed in a series of resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly, culminating in its incorporation in the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3281 in December 1974).
As early as 1952, it was recognised in the United Nations General
Assembly resolution 626 of 2'1 December 1952 that "the right of the
peoples to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is
inherent in their sovereignty". The draft Human Rights Covenants
proposed by the Human Rights Commission in January 1955 atflrrned,
in paragraph 3 of Article 1, that "The right of peoples to self-
determination shall also lneiude permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and reaources. In no case may a people be 'deprived
of its own means of subsistence on the grounds of any right that may
be claimed by other States".
94 Michael E Porter. The C&lilpetitive Advantage of Nations. London, 1990, p.564.
95 Kevin Watkins. the Oxfam Poverty Report. Oxford, 199$. p. 118.
65
The text proposed by the Human Rights Commission was modified by
the Third Cc. . 'ittees otthe United Nations General Assembly, so that
a "right" was incorporated in the first Article of the United Nations
Covenants on Human Rights in the following terms: "The peonies
may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic oc-operatlon based up to the princlple of mutual
benefit and international law. In no case maya people be deprived of
its own means of subsistence ."96.
For developing countries the prlnclple at permanent sovereignty was
important because it provided a basis on which they could claim to
alter "inequitable" legal arrangements under which foreign investors
enjoyed rights to exploit natural resources found within the'lr territories.
Such alteration could be effected through an exercise of :
(a) the right to nationalise, that is, to acquire the rights enjoyed by
the foreign investor, or
(b) the right to alter certain terms of the arrangements (or to
repudiate an agreement entered into with the foreign investor).
The Declaration also provided guidelines on the basis of which
developing countries proceeded to establish new legal frameworksjor
natural resources' development, which are a manifest improvement on
the old framework of traditional concessions, Under the traditional
concesslons, the State was a mere tax-collector receiving certain
modest financial payments, while the ownership of the minerals or
96 Kamal Hossain. Legal A.spectsof tile New International economic Order. london,
198U.
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other resources stood vested in the foreign investor as did control over
operations; thus, all critical decisions, such as those relating to the
place and extent of exploration and development and pcllcies relating
to production, pricing and marketing were left to be determined by the
concessionaire.
The new frameworks have not only ensured more substantial financial
payments, but have reserved for the State, ownership of the resources I
and incorporated mechanisms which are aimed at developing national
capabilities and securing effective control over operations,
For the developed countries and transnational corporations engaged
in natural resources development, the new developments are seen as
reducing their freedom of action (that is freedom from control by host
governments over their operations) and as threatening the stability o'f
contractual arrangements. They retain a preference for arrangements
in which host governments seek to maximise financial returns rather
than control over operations, They also assert the importance oj'
maintaining staoility ot contractual relations and in case of
natlonallsatlon, of paying to the affected party prompt, adequate arid
eff6Qtive compensation.
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as
elaborated in the 1962 Declaration, contains certain guidelines on the
basis of which new types of arrangements fOi' development of natural
resources have been developed. Paraqraph 6 of this Declaration
provides that international co-operation for development of natural
resources in developing countries, whether in the form of public or
private capital foreign investment, should be such as to further their
lndependent national. development and should be based upon respect
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for permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.
It is to be recalled that the, heated controversy arising out of the
sudden, major increase in the price of crude all announced by the oil
exporters late in 1973 and the mounting spirit of confrontation that
followed, rnanlfested, for exarnpie, in the Washington meeting of the
big oil consumers in March 1974, and was the immediatecause of the
call for the Sixth SpeciE~1Session of the United Nations General
Assembly on raw materials and development. The primary aim of that
Special Session held in April i974 was, of course, to air the collective
gril'Nances of the developing countries and to put forward their own
counterclaims. Another aimwas to defuse the tension and pu; an end
to mutual recriminations with a view to introducing a new and more
balanced formula for future international economic co-operation,
generally acceptable to the various corn, onents of the world
cornmunlty".
The Sixth Session did contribute significantly towards the subsequent
relaxation of tension and the subsidence of mounting confrontation.
Unfortunately, neither that Session nor any of the international
meetings which have been convened in its wake, notably the
Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC) - the so-
caned Nortn-south Conference - havo been successful in forgin\;
conclusively a concrete and mutually acceptable formula tor future
economic co-operation.
Qne important aspect Ofthat global debate has been the question of
state sovereigr~~yover natural resources. This was logical enough.
97 Kama; Hossain. Op. cit. p. 208.
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After all, it was petroleum, the natural resource par excellence, which
kindled the big controversy in the first place. Thus both the
Declaration of the Establishment of a New lnternanonal Economic
Order (resolution 320"1) and the Programme of Action thereon
(resolution 3202) reaffirm the crucial place of natural resources, and
the manner in which they ought to be developed and disposed of both
for the benefit of the producing countries and in the interests of the
world community at large.
The battle for economic self-determination and permanent sovereignty
over natural resources was fought simultaneously in the post-World
War II era on two fronts: Concrete political and economic action by
some of the developing nations individually or collectively, and the
theoretical refinement of the underlying legal concepts and principles
within the United Nations system.
Without going as far as ascribing to the UnitedNations resolutions on
sever eignty over natural resources a "cause and effect" impact on
subsequent major events in the developing countries, such as the
major oil exporters, It is not to be denied that these resolutions were
for them a rich source of inspiration, selt-confldence and miyal
support".
Unfortunately most, if not all, of these countries ere ill.A l:IOleto meet
the enormous costs of petroleum exploration on their own.
Consequently, the task has been, and will have to continue to be ..
carried out with outside assistance. This assistance can be sought
98 Kamal Hossain. Op. cit. p, 210.
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either from the international private sector, the international public
sector, bilateral arrangementswith other countries or a combination of
two or more of the above.
2.3 Collective Security System
In recent years, theorists of international relations have tended to
stress the moderating and stabilising influences of contemporary
developments on the behaviour of States, especially the increasing
economic interdependence among nations and the destructiveness of
modern weapons. These important developments have encouraged
many individualsto believethat peaceful evolution has replacedmilitary
conflict as the principle means of adjusting relatlons among nation-
states In the contemporary world. This assumption has been
accompanied by a belief that economic and welfare goals have
triumphed over the traditional power and security objectives of States.
Thus, many believe that the opportunity for peaceful economic
intercourse and the constraints imposed by modem destructivewarfare
has served to decrease the probability of a major warg9,
On 3i January 1992, the United Nations' Security Council met for the
first time at the level of heads of State of Government. The "cold war"
had ended. It was a time of hope and change and of rising
expectations for ~and of ~the United Nations. The members of the
Council asked the Secretary GenElralto prepare an "analysis and
recommendations on ways of strengthel'ling and making,more efficient
within the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capacity of the
99 RObert Gilpin. Op..cit. p.6
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United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for
peace-keeplnq?", Five months later, in June 1992, the Secretary
General submitted his report entitled "An Agenda for Peace,,101. It
dealt with the three problems the Council had requested the Secretary
Genural to consider, to which he added the related concept of post-
conflict peace building. It also touched on peace enforcement.
In suhmlttlnq their recommendations on how to improve the
Organisation's capacity to maintain peace and security, he said that
the search for improved mechanisms and techniques would bo of little
significance unless the new spirit of commonality that had emerged, of
which the $>ummitwas such.a clear manifestation, was "propelled by
the will to take the hard decisions dsmancad by this time of
opportunlty"!".
then, the United Nations developed a range of instruments for
controlling and resolving conflicts between and within States. The
most important of these are preventive diplomacy and peacemaking;
peace-keeplnq; peace building; disarmament; sanctions; and peace
enforcement. The first three can be employed only with the consent
of the parties to the conflict Sanctions and enforcement, on ths other
hand, are coercive measures and thus, by definition, do not require the
consent of tr~;;)arty concerned. Disarmament can take place on an
agreed b;,:;:~i , or in the context of coercive action under Chapter VII of
the United Nations oharter'".
100 United Nations documents $/23 500: p.115
Inlted Nations documents A147/277·S/24111: p.39
,,:",Itros Boutros-Ghail. ,m A::onde for Peace. Para. 6, 1995.
a !hld. p:12
7"1
The validity of the concept of post-conflict peace building has received
wide recognition. The measures it can use - and there are many - can
also support preventive diplomacy. Demilitt,risation, the control of
small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems,
the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and
economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in
healing the wounds after conflict has occurred.
At the conclusion of the 3046th meeting of the Security Council, held a'
the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 in
connection with the item entitled "The responsibility of the Security
Council in the maintenance of internationai peace and security", the
President of the Security Council issued his statement on behalf of the
members of the Council. He stated that "the absence of war and
military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international
peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the
economic, soclal, humanitarian and ecological fields have become
threats to peace and security. The United States membership as a
whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the
highest priority to the solution of these matters"?".
The members of the Council reaffirmed their comrritment to the
"collective security system" of the Charter to deal with threats to peace
and to reverse acts of aggression 105,
104 United Nations documents 8/23500. 31 January 1997.
105 Boutros Boutros-Ghali. op, cit. p.117.
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Another source of instability arises from changes in States' eapabllltles
that have little to do wlth trle acqulsltlon of new territories or allies
(which may be opposed by other members of the system). Scholars
concerned with the rise and dec~!ine of system leaders and their
challengers have focused on the differentia' growth of power among
the great powers, as dealt with in Chapter 1.4. This means there can
be system changes without great wars as occurred with the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the movement from bipolarity to the present
system. The differential growth of power can come from "imperial
over-stretch" to use Paul Kennedy'l3.term, or from a variety of domestic
conditions affecting economic growth ,and/or internal stability. High
levels of civil conflict, or even revolution, can seriously weaken a State.
Rapid economlc growth can increase a State's oapability even Without
a conscious declslon by its leaders to increase the State's power in the
international system. Technological innovation may occur faster in one
State that in another - affecting production, creating new means of
exploiting resources, or producing a potent new weapon. Thus,
economic and military capabilities may shift significantly. A variety of
economic, technological or socio-cultural changes may lead to the
breakdown of one system and the emergence of another.
Another kind of risk stems directly from both the ditferential growth of
power and the frequent trials of strength that test new power
relationsblps.
Such confllots are an integral part of the balance-of-power system, as
dealt with in Chapter 4. When a major power is eliminated, it may be
very hard to find another State capable of filling the gap. Some big
States will continue to grow despite the efforts of others to restrain
them. Thus there are elements in any system that tend to eliminate
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sor.,e major powers and to strengthen others. making precarious the
malntenance ',r the sensitive balance required in the !Clng run'".
Thl~ ~lmwing dependence 01 .;;rergy still led to the impltsrnentaticn ,of
conservation p,:lIiOleS,offering incentivt:lz for the develot nent of energy
alternatves, in an attempt to reduce the demand land ~,t!mule:t·
production.
However. the e:UCC\9SS of th('f:'~ measures depends largely on th~~
opportunity I'Df it'a irnplementat:.:m and on the availability of energy
resources in the country,
ThE' access to determined resources such as c,H, Imposed new and
important obligations an tile external and defence policies. However
if the Industrialised countries depend on the exporting countries, they
daterrfl!ne two fundamental logistio requirements: the transport and
refining of oil. Flcgarding production. it is controlled by the policies of
OPEC countrles, but net in aM absolute manner. The transpcrtation is
contrtllled by the developeo countries taking into account that the
majority of the 011wells are found i. ,1e it"\~eriorof the United States,
Canada, Europe and Russia, and Which are not controlled by the
OPEC members.
The princIpal anergy consumer countries' capaclty of processing Is
sufficient to supply their energy needs. In regan'" ~Jthe markets, these
are concentrete« in the industrialised countries. The maintaining of
freedom of sea tra~ic constitutes a bl~J~erImperative to all the maotlme
10(i Bruce Russett Op. cit, p. 108.
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countries, especially Iran and Iraq, whose supply of oil to Europe is
compromised by the implementation of a power in the area of the
Ortnuz cltrait.
As the relations of dependence increase between producer and
consumer countries, the relationship between security and energy
policies of the consumer countries worsen.
This worsening occurs mainly from the growing energy needs of the
industrialised countries and the increase of political instability In the
producing countries. Any energy policy has connecting links with the
reasons and dimensions of objectives to be achieved by the producing
countries, as well as with the threats that are faced by the depending
countrles, In the same way! one needs to consider the available
defence to .face the crisis created by the provision zones, mainly in
relation to their military and economio capacity in relation to the
international balance-of-power,
2.4 OPEC and the "Petro-Jihad"
Until the mid-1980's! the objectives of the dependent Eastern countries
Joined for the creation of a new peace zone in the Middle East, In an
attempt to create a co-operation space as free as possible ot e}lternal
ihfluences, although receptive to the construcnve participation of the
We$tern powers. In the creation of a peace zone, or In the
oonstrucnon of a co-operaton space, they aimed to support a political
zone of regional security with the intention of maintaining the constant
flow of oil to meet the energy needs of the United States and its allies.
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AS Richard Nixon wrote.-
"The United States has become increasingly dependent on oil
as a source of energy, and increasingly dependent on imports
as a source of oil. Oil now supplies nearly 60 per cent of our
energy, and while we depended on imports for a third of our oil
in 1973, we now import half of it. Further, Canada was one of
our leading suppliers in 1973; five years later the OPEC
provided more than 80 POf cent of our imports. The United
States, once the world's principal supplier of oil, has become
the largest purchaser from OPEC, taking a fifth of its Oil"lot.
The construction and maintaining of security policies depends not only
on the definition of objectives that must be kept, but also on the type
of threats that relate to the objectives.
The. utilisation of the economic weapon as a form of pressure against
industrlalaed countries, combined with threats originating by terrorism
and subversion, could act in a destabilising manner in the economies
and energy po!icies of the dependent countries.
However, the strateglo changes that occurred in tile last years were
promising since the USSR did not constitute an alternative to the
West's po!ltical and economic support to the radical countries of the
Middle East.
What relates to the countries of radical ter.denoes (iran nnd Iraq) were
expansionist policies and the war llaving consumed a great part of the
107 The Real War. London, 1980. p.74
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GNP, showing budget constraints that lirnited their acquisition of
sophisticated and distraoting materials, able to threaten in a direct
conflict, the territorial European and American space.
If that factor is favourable to the industrialised powers dependent and
military present in the Gulf, the same cannot be said about the
guarantee of stability of the regimes that support that presence at the
moment. The existence barely consolidated in power, of some royal
families of the Middle East, united with a climate of social agitation and
rebellion towards what it considered to be the perpetuation of the
colonial European presence and the intervening presence of North
America, to which one can add the effects that the economic boycott
starts producing, I;vill in the near future weaken the stability of the
r .qlmes of the oil producing countries which would compromise and
hamper the normal supply of provisions to the industrialised countries,
in an energy crisis situation.
However even In the realm of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the
nuclear age is potentially a disservice to Islam. It is oil rather than
uranium ore which has recently glve: I lslam a new economic leverage
in the world system. OPEC is primarily a Muslim organisation in
composition and Arab-led. The world has sometimes witnessed a kind
of "petrc-jlbad" ..as during tl"'e Arab oil embargo In 1973108• However,
wiil the world vitness nuclearlsed "jihad" in the near future? In the
short term) tile prospects are fraught with difficulties. The producing
countries will try to inttlnsify its production together with an insertion in
the oil industry transport sector) assuring the acquisition of the whole
loa Ali A Maz(ui. Ths Politf::al Culturo cf War and Nuclear Proliferation: A Third World
Pe.rspective. Hugh C Oyer, The Study of internal/anal Relations: Tile Stale of the Art.
London, 1989. p.157
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logical sys srn of rupply, necessary to a more efficient and profitable
control of 1,S exports. Even though some areas have been
demarcated, the Middle East would remain as the preferential area of
supply. The developed countries wiil try to rc.,uce their levels of
dependency on Eastern oil, searching for alternative sources of energy
such as natural gas, coal and nuclear energy out of the OPEC sphere,
as done by South Africa by increasing the production of its ell-from-
coal and launching new technologies developed by its own know-how,
as dealt with in Chapter 6. Tho defence of alternative routes, ports and
terminals are stilt aspects to be considered within the geopolitical
sphere and energy resources.
In the political and strategic domain, the economic weapon and the
religious factor is ethnic, seeming to confirm its efficiency and impact,
characterising the majority of the actual conflicts to a regional level,
mainly in the midst Of less developed countries, but who possess
resources of highly economic and strategic value for the industrialised
countries in today's world.
In the next chapter, I continue my analysis on the importance of natural
resources mainly 011, and which represents an irnpnrtant and strategic
source of energy, of more and more importance whether for industry
or for national security.
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CHAPTER 3 : WHY OIL?
Despite the enormous Importance of technology in the modern world,
any attempt to examine it tends to be obfuscated by the sheer
complexity of the subject One of the most important changes of this
century was the dlscovs o<ploitation and use of petroleum. Oil fuels
not only increased the versatility and convenience of the internal
combustion engine, they also made it mobile because a supply of
petrol (gasoline), paraffine (kerosene) or diesel oil couid be easily
carried in a tank to supply the eng ina. Everywhere: the reasons for the
shift to oil were the same. Energy cJerived from oil was cleaner and
less expensive than coal. The result was an astonishing expansion in
the production of this prlme mover, which has deeply affected modern
technological civilisation and its permanent search for new sources of
liquid fuels, and increased the struggle for oil. In the light of its major
importance and manifold uses, petroleum has acquired great
geopolitical significance. Petr()leum deposits are widely scattered
throughout the world, but most production comes from a relatively
small number of geographical areas. Ironically, Europe although
abundantly endowed with coal, has the smallest petroleum reserves of
any maJor land mass. The United States, Russia and possibly China,
on the other hand, have plentifLl' resources of both coal and petroleum.
The countries of the Middle East surrounding the Persian Gulf are now
collectively, the largest source of supply for the world markets,
3.1 The increasing needs of energy sources
The idea of technological revolution helps to define and explain one of
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the most important phenomena ('If modern life. This is the fact thc:.twe
in the twentieth century, live in a process of profound and continuing
change, which is different from the cyclical change of the seasons or
the natural processes of ageing. It is rather, a change in the
conditions of life; life has become a process of permanent
transmutatlon, and this makes it increasingly difficult to understand
what life WEl.S like at times - most of the past experience of humankind -
when such change was not endemic. This process of change has
been driven by innovations in sources of power, in menufacturing
techniques and in the means of transport and communications - in a
word, by technology. To be sure, the process of technological change
has been going on for a very long tWI1S, since the first man and woman
struggled to take Advantage of their environment, and has acquired
growing momentum over mt.l1y millennia. However, in the last three
centuries, it h~s accelerated in an unprecedented manner, and the
consequent changes in social and human conditions have been so far-
reaching that the world process justly deserves to be regarded as one
of technological revolution.
It was not easy in the nineteenth century to understand how a steam
engine worked, and however dextrous contemporary secretaries may
be in handling their personal computers" few of them have much
comprehension of how they operate. The proprieties Of electricity,
nuclear energy and complicated chemical reactions have been brought
under human control, but even scientists familiar with these concepts
find it difficult to express them in terms, which the lay person can
understand.
In the nineteenth century, new machines began to appear everywhere
in large numbers. Though they became more and more complicated
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than earlier ones, they often '!lmed easier to use. They were to be
seen everywhere in Europe and North America, on the streets of major
cities (cars, trams and bicycles) in factories (looms, lathes, drills) in
offices and shops (cash registers, typewriters). They transformed life
in many waY3. First and most obvious, they enormously increased tne
value of labour: with their aid a worker could produce much more
quickly. This was an essential contribution to the huge growth in the
output of wealth of the age. The results could even be sefi;:l in the
countryside. Soon after the nineteenth century began, English
$gricultural machinery was being shown at Euroj)r3sn fairs, and tJy the
middle of the century steam was being used to drive machinery and
drag ploughs. 20 000 mechanlcal reapers on German farms in 1980
had become over 300 000 by 1907. Many Similar figures can be cited.
By 1910, the patrol-driven tractor had made its appearance.
Even more obvious than agricultural improvement, JT1anUUlctl,.lring
rested on the coming of better, cheaper, more ingenious machines.
They directly provided the tools needed to mal<. things ~ lathes and
other machine-tools, drop-hammers, blast-furnaces, boot-making
machinery and a thousand and one other examples can be Cited -
whioh saved labour in other ways less directly connected with
manufacturing itself. The electric trams and underground trains, tor
example, which were by "! 914 telking millions of people in many cities
to work, were conserving enerfJYthat would have been used fifty years
earlier in walking long distances, as well as helping to shorten the time
that had to be spent eaming a living.
Even in the home the effects of machines were very great. The supply
of gas for cooking (from looal gasworks) enormously reduced the
trouble and expense involved in getting fuel into and around the house.
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Piped water (from r.~ntre! uvaterwoiks) was available in millions of
homes by 19'14 and the effect of this can easily be grasped by anyone
who has seen the procession of village women in parts of Southern
Europe to the local stream or well to draw what they needed for their
domestic tasks (in Asia or Africa, of course, the sight is even more
common). The sewing machine actually changed the production of
goods in the home, but in the houses of the American and European
rich, other household machinery were to be found - the first "vacuum"
cleaners, electric "lifts", washing machines and at all levels of society
that find old standby which had taken so much effort out of drying and
pressing clothes, the mangle.
Just as it is hard to list chronologically the most lmpcrtant mechanical
lnnovations of the century because the interrelation between them all
is so complloated ana rapid, so it is difficult to trace the overall effects
of the coming of the machines, on the way work was organised and
how occupations were shaped though it can be done (at some length)
for any partlcular trade. A whole range of new tasks appeared.
"Engineer" was an old word, but its meaning was extended much
further in the nineteenth century. Specialisation appeared within
engineering, in construction, in electrical work, in ships and chemicals.
Institutions of technical education had appeared in many countries to
give advanced lnstruotlon in engineering and award qualifications
widely regarded as the equlvalent of university degrees; some
universities began to teach the subjects. Engineers regarded
themselves as a profession and were usually organised into
professional bodies which looked after their concerns.
"Mechanic" was another word which came to have a new meaning: a
craftsman apeclallslnq In the handling of m.achlnery. The number of
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such skilled workers grew at a hugh rate in industrialised countries.
Mechanics teo, were becoming specialised by the end of this period
and their trade qualifications were increasingly defined by standards
set by apprenticeship rule'} and national certificates. However,
"mechanic" is a very vague term - as is "machinist", another which
reflected the technical change of the era - and new applications of the
word were emerging all the time. Boiler-makers, artificers, tool-makers,
Jig-setters, mechanical draughtsman, were all needed ;,1 greater and
greater numbers and all ot them did more and more specialised jobs
as time passed. It is not true then to say that industrialisation and
mechanisation decreased the variety and individuality of trades; it
killed off many handicrafts but increased the number of special skills
needed in many ways. On the other hand, it also required large
numbers of unskilled workers who were at best, machine-tenders and
whose work was very dull and unstimulating.
Changes on this scale were bound to affect ideas and outlooks. Not
only did many more people begin to believe that machines might be
made to do almost anything, given suttlclent time and trouble (and this
meant that the universe looked much less mysterious and
unrnanaqeable), but many people saw technical progress as proof that
Europsar, ~·..,illsationwas on the right track and moving in the right
dlreotlon. J\ :t:iW Ioien did not think so and said so loudly and often.
However, most people before 1914 found the evldence of their own
eyes convincing. Visibly, tasks that had once been enormously
laborious had come to be carried out much more easily. Goods,
whicll had once been luxuries, had become common-place. Outside
the rich world, the social benefits of technology appeared as railways
pushed into Africa and Asia, taking with them other benefits - better
pumps, wells, communications and medicines. Somehow, the world's
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leading civilisation had at last come to take machines for granted and
to treat them as an indispensable part of progress. This was an
enormous change in humanity's outlook.
The railways and the steamships could not, however, create new
industrial entities such as Germany, Russia and the United States,
without creating new industrial rivalries and therefore as a result nf the
ro.liway era, there is an increased struggle among nations to control tne
raw material producing areas and the markets of the world. There was
a new stimulus to acquire colonies and spheres of influence 109.
New machines required new power. Tile consumption of energy rose
after 1801 at unprecedented fates. Eighteenth-century improvements
to the steam engine made it possible for most of the new power
nseded in the nineteenth century to be found from steam. Although
ra1t.;yav!'7 in some parts of the world were wood-fired, they increased the
~ fa I' coal, too. A world output already of 800 million tons a
" 1900 went up to more than 1300 million by 19"13 (nine-tenths
15 came from Europe and the 'Jnited States). Other sources of
~r had also become available. With the discovery that electricity
. .i be generated ~ the prinCiple of the dyn~tlTJowas discovered by
Faraday in i831 • the demand for coal (to run g~)nerators) was to nse
agalr\, but a new way of tapping running water in "hydra-electric"
schemes was also made available, and with it a further extension of
energy resources.
109 L.C,A Knowles. The Industriaf and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain urging
the Nineteenth Century. London. 1933. p.197.
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Vegetable and animal oils had long been used for lighting when the
refining of petroleum (first commercially produced in pennsylvania in
;859) opened the way to the use of mineral oils for, first lighting (in the
form of paraffin lamps) and then for fuel. Oil and petrol in turn made
possible the internal combustion engine ~one in which the energy from
the fuel is not utilised by turning water into steam to drive a piston, but
In which the explosion of the fuel inside a cylinder itself drives a piston.
From this was to stem not only the motor-oar but small, portable
engines for all kinds of work, oil turbines for use in ships at sea and in
power generation, and eventually engines power ful and light enough
to be used in aircrafts. With this increase, world oil production- most
of it in the United States - jumped from 5.75 million barrels in 1871 to
407.5 million in 1914. This implied not merely building of new
wells, but a huge refining lndustry and the necessary transport
arrangements tor moving oil to where it was needed. Rapid increases
in energy usage in general and petn.leurn in particular, are primary
post-World War II phenomena. In 1950, when wo.id population stood
roughly at 2,5 billion people, world energy consumption was 2,5 billion
tons of coal-equlva'et t energy. Population lncreased rapidly during the
next quarter-century, but energy use increased almost twice as fast.
By 1979 the world's 4,4 billion people were consuming 8,7 billion tons
of coat-equivaent energy. This increase was closely tied to the
unprecedented level of economic growth that the world experienced.
From 1950 to 1973, the world economy expanded at a rate at 4 per
oent annually, spurred by the 7 per cent growth in world ali output
during this period, on a per-capite basis, this meant that the amount
of oil available increased from an average of '1,5barrels per person in
1950 to over 5,3 barrels in 1973. Rapidly rising population made oil
the world's principal source of commercial energy.
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Little more than a century ago, fuel-wood was the principal energy
source. t.\s the mechanical revolution altered the nature of
transportation, work, and leisure. coal began to replace fuel-wood.
Early if I Lhetwentieth century, coal became the dominant source of
energy throughout the world. By '19i 3 it accounted for 75 per cent of
global energy consumption.
NGW technological developments, particularly the internal combustion
engine, spurred the shift from coal to oil and, somewhat less so,
natural gas. The United States, well endowed with petroleum
resources, led the development of of-based technologies, above all in
the automotive and petrochemical industries. Although oil accounted
for loss than a third of world energy production in 1950, by "1965 it
equaled ccel production. In the next decade it rapidly outpaced coal
as the main energy source.
Everywhere the reasons tor the shift to oil were the same. Energy
derived from coal (and gas) was cleaner and less expensive than coal.
(The cost of once inexpensive coal also rose in response to labour
demands for higher wages, rules to protect the environment and more
co<;tlysafety standards). The unprecedented growth of population in
the twentieth century, aswell as the growing affluence of at least a part
of the world, resulted in an unprecedented demand on the world
,·eSOl.tr(19S.The most important deveioprnere In terms of resources in
the twentieth century 11,15 been a change in the nature and sources Of
primary energy. In tile nineteenth century coal became the most
Important source of energy in industrialising nations, larg'1iy raplacing
wood, charcoal, wind and water power. In tile twentieth century coal
has been largelY,though notwhoHy, displaced by new energy sources,
espf;1ciallypetroleum and natural gas. Alihough petroleum was first
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cornrnerclally produced in the nineteenth century, it was then used
mainly for illumination and secondly as a lubricant. The development
of internal combustion engines at the end of the nineteenth century
greatly extended its possit>!litles, and it also competed with coal and
water-power in the production at electricity and with the former for
space heating. In the second half of the twentieth century, it acquired
new importance as a raw material for the production of synthetics and
plastics.
3.2 South African searching for petroleum
South Africa does not produce crude ol! but refines Imported crude oil,
locally produced gas and svnthetlc oil from coa1110•
The first oil company was established in Cape Town in 1884 to import
refined oil products. Today the country processes close to 20 million
tons of crude annually and uses 23 million tons of liquid fuels, 45 per
cent of which is petrol and 26 per cent diesel. As a result of South
Africa's abundant resources of cheap coal, liquid fuels provide orllY
about 21 per cent of the country's energy requh vi nents.
South Africa is a world leader in synthetic fuel technology. Liquid
hydrocarbons have been synthesised from coal since t 955. Past
decisions of the Government to invest in synfuel projects were largely
based on strategic cnnslderatlons. Synthetic oil is refined to
hydrocarbon fuels at three sasol refineries, with a total capacity of 4,5
million tons annually,
South Africa's search for petroleum began a 10119 time ago. Small oil
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occurrences in the Kama System, mainly associated with igneous
rocks, has often been mentioned in literature from as early as 1889.
Oil-impregnated sand-stones of th~ Middle EcCi:l Stage were
encountered in coal prospecting boreholes in the Dannhauser area
prior to '1925. These early discoveries led to sporadic prospecting by
local syndicates since the beginning of the century. Some of their
activitles included a deep borehole (1 548m) at Dubbelde Vlei,
.: Carnarvon District, a 690m hole on Doornkraal near Elandslaagte and
a number of shallow holes in the Dannhauser area. The Cretaceous
System was tested by drilling a 1 036m hole at Swartkops, Port
Elizabeth, in '1908. In 1914, Cunninghati1 Craig carried out the fl~st
general evaluation to establlsn South Africa's potential for oil and
suggested the exploration of the northern flank of the Cape Folded
Belt. f.·ollowinghis recomrrendatlons, the area was mapped in 1917,
and all the sva'lable data on oil in South Africa was summarised in
1921. Several of the oil occurrences around Lesothowere invostigated
in 1935 as well as the potential for oil around Bethlehem and Kesten,
north of Lesotho in '1937. The first fairly extensive oil exploration
proqramrns was embarked upon by the Geological Survey in 1940.
The northern flank of the Cape Folded Belt was mapped, seven deep
oles were drilled in that area and a number of shallow ones at Barkly
East and in the Orange Free State.
The oil discovered in mineworkings and coal explorsfton holes in the
Dannhauser areawas Investigatedby the GeologicalSurvey by means
of 19 holes from 1953 to 1951 and 1964 to 1967.
110 See Figure 1
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A systematic Investigatk/,1of South Africa' oil potential both on-shore
and off-short commenced in ';965, with the creation of the Southern Oil
Exploration CQ~poration, a prlvate but state-financed company, later
named Soekor t1 1. Concessions on-shore were granted to various
companies, which did a smEiliamount of exploration work. The most
systematic exploration on-shore was carried out by soekor itself, by
the Soekor E ano P (formerly Zululand Oil Exploration Co.) and by the
Geological Survey. Off-shore areas were sub-leased by soekor to
International e,i! exploration companies.
Prospecting by these concerns were oarrled out in accordance with
modern scientific principles and techniques of oil exploration. Drilling
was preceded by the measurements of stratigraphic profiles, structural
mapping and geophysical work to locate the best structures In the
most favourable parts of the Karoo, Cape and Cretaceous basins,
The results .:Jbtainedin the Karco by drilling were disappointing. The
degree of diagenesis proved to be too high for oil to be present even
in rocks of the Karoo System. sand-etones had very poor reservoir
properties. The high diagmesis is confirmed by the presence of
pseudocoal whioh is generally considered to be a metamorphic end
product of oil.
Oil was found in four; "'lreholer3north of Utrecht while prospeoting for
_.... --.--.-,..------------~-.........------
11 seeker Is a 100 per cent subsidiary of the Central Energy Fund (CEF). The main
huslness of Soekor and its \:lubsldlary Soakor E and P is the co-ordination, promotion
and undertaking of oil and gas exploration activities in tha Republic of South AfrIca
and to exploit a ny oll and gas fioid.\ which are discovered. Before 1 April 190e
Soekof was financed b~1means of urents and thereafter all "'ctivitles of the compMy
hove bean financed by means of loans. CEF and tllO Control (;norgy Fund. Annual
Fimllicl:lI statements for 1994·96 p. 59.
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coal during the period 1052 to 1958. In trrElEl of the holes, the oll-
bearing sand-stones had a thickness less than 1,Om; in the fourth,
parts of a 27m thick sand-stone bed were found to be oil-
lrnprepnated.The oil occurs at different strategic levels and is not
structurally controlled. A somewhat more promising occurrence was
reported from a hole drilled on Jakhal::::draai. Here, about 24m of
sand-stone was fairly well saturated with oil, with an additional 10m
exhibiting traces of oil. Tht-l oll-bearlng sand-stone, with good porosity
and fair permeability, lies in the upper part of a closed structure.
Pressure, however, is low and consequently oil production will be
difficult, if not impossible.
011 WaS discovered in 'wo boreholes in tight sand-stones in the Algoa
Basin, a short dlstance above the Colchester Member and in fractures
In this member. 1'h(3 gray marine shales of the Sundays River
Formation were ccr.stdered poor source rocks Inr oil and were
probably Immature at least In their upper sections, whlle the dark gray
shales of the Colchester Member seemed to be the obvious source of
the oil basin.
Altogether, 8 holes had been drilled to test the Mesozoic rocks of
Zululand aner a fairly extensive geophysical exploration programme.
Sand-stones with good reservoir properties occurred but were not
abundant. The shales in most of the boreholes were rather poor
source rocks and appeared to be immature, except in tne deepest part
of the basin,
By the and of 19721 sufficient exploration work and drilling had been
done to Indicate that only a few areas, namely Port Elizabeth, Northern
Kwazulu Natal and the north-eastern Free State, held any promise.
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coal during the period 1952 to 1958. In three of the holes, the ell-
bearing sand-stones had a thickness less than 1,Om; in the fourth,
parts of a 27m thick sand-stone bed were found to be oil-
impregnated.The oil occurs at different strategic levels and is not
structurally controlled, A somewhat more promising occurrence was
reported from a hole drilled on Jakhalsdraai. Here, about 24m of
sand-stone was fairly well saturated with oil, with an additional 10m
exhibiting traces of oil. The oil-bearing sand-stone, with good porosity
and fair permeability, lies in the upper part of a closed structure.
Pressure, however, is low and consequently 011 production will be
difficult, if not impossible.
Oil was dlscovered in two boreholes in tight sand-stones in the Algoa
8asln, a short distance above the Colchester Member and in fractures
in this member. The gray marine shales of the Sundays River
Formation were considered poor source rocks for oil and were
probably lmman.re at least in their upper sections, while the dark gray
shales of the Colchester Member seemed to be the obvious source of
the oil basin.
Altogether, 8 holes had been drilled to test the Mesozoic rocks of
Zl,iluland after a fairly extensive geophysical exploratior programme.
Sand-stones with good reservoir properties occurred but were not
abundant. The shales in most of the boreholes were rather poor
source rocks and appeared to be immature, except in the deepest part
of the basin.
By the end of 1972, sufficlent exploration work and drilling had. been
done to indicate that only a few areas, namely Port Elizabeth, Northern
Kwazulu Natal and the north-eastern Free State, held any promise.
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Intensive exploration of these areas followed. A few discoveries were
made, and by the end of 1978, however, it was evident that in each
case there would be technical difficulties involved in production, and
that reserveswere insufficient. :twas, accordingly, decided that further
exploration on land was not warranted and Soekor then focused its
attention on the off-shore areas. Since then, a number of mainly
locally-based private operators have secured exploration concessions
on land and continued the search in the Karoo and Cretaceous basins .
.With reference to the off-shore exploration during the early stages,
exploration was conducted by foreign companies who had obtained
off-Shore sub-leases from soekor. The first woll in South Africc:tn
waters, drilled in 1969 by the Superior Group, discovered gas off
Plettenberg 8ay. A major gas discovery Was made in 1974 by the
Chevron Group off the mouth of the Orange River, in Namibian waters.
The extent of the gas at Plettenberg Bay was considered too small to
warrant exploitation at that time, whilst tile evaluation of the Orange
River occurrence was hampered by political developments in Namibia.
Soekor drilled Its first off-shore well in 1973 and has been responsible
for all off-shore drilling since '1976. In 1978, a well in the Mossel Bay
area provided the first real proof of the presence of oil off the South
African coast, and by the end of 1980 several 011 and gas deposits had
been encountered off both the south and west costs. Drillingwas thus
concentrated in these promising areas, but in particular, off the south
coast. Initially,however, the lack of adequate porosity and permeability
in the sand-stone reservoirs remained a barrier to major discoveries.
In December 1980. one other well yielded the best results up to that
date: 56 million cubic feet of gas and 1200 barrels of condensate per
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day. This we!!, approximately 90 km south of Mossel Bay,
subsequently proved to be the discovery well for the Mossel Bay gas-
field and was later to be complemented by the discovery of another,
30 km to the west of the first gas·field discovered, A third, discovered
approximately 65 krn south west of the first gas·field discovered, has
reserves of 13,4 to 19 million barrels. These fields were to form the
nucleus of the reserves for the Measel Bay Gas Project.
3.3 International searching for liquid fuels
The pnnolpal objection to oil was its cost • anywhere from four to
twelve times that of coal in Britain around 1900. Yet the price of
petroleum products fell rapidly as new sources of supply were opened
up and the Industry perfected its methods of refining and techniques
ot distribution 112.
The earliest commercially practical oil engines were probably those
used in RUssia from the 18i'0's to burn ostatkl waste from distillation
of Baku crude in the manufacture of kerosene and lamp oil. Practically
all the steam power in RusSia, both for factories and navigation of the
inland seas and rivers, was being raised c. "1910from ostatki fuel. In
the West however, in spite of widespread and successful
experimentation with oil engines, petroleum did not really catch on until
the opening of the Borneo (1898) and Texas flelds (Splndletop Well,
112 David S. Landes. The Unbound Prometheus. Cambridge, 1969. p.281
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1901) made available oil especially suited by chemical composition to
serve as fuel. Shortly thereafter ('1902) the Hamburg-American Line
adopted petroleum in place of coal on Its new liners and was followed
by one after another of the great steamship companies. At the same
time, the navies of the great European powers began the process of
conversion: Italy installed an air burner as early as 1890; Britain
began in 1903 with vessels operating in waters near sources of
petroleum - the Far East parttcularly - but within a decade built a world-
wide storage network that permitted the use of liquid fuel through the
fleet113•
Gas engines were able to compete successfully with steam power for
many small and medium duties in the closing decades of the
nineteenth century because of the widespread availability of coal gas
and the practical advantage of not needing the elaborate boiler plant
for raising steam which was indispensable to the steam engine. There
was, however, no realistic posslbiHty of competing with steam for
locomotive purposes because of the fixed nature of the gas supply.
This situation was revolutionised by the introduction of an alternative
fuel for the internal combustion erl~ine - oil and its derivatives.
Natural blturnen and other oils from vegetables and animals had long
been exploited for. the illuminating properties in lamps, but tilE:
development of the internal combustion engine opened up a vast new
market for them, and the systematic exploitation of 011 reserves, with a
giant industry devoted to refinin~Jthe products of the oil wells, became
essential features of twentieth century industrialisation.
113 Op. cit. p. 282
93
One of the most important ct. •., "'S in the area was the discovery,
exploitation, and use of petroleum. The process began in the Russlar.-
ruled parts of the Middle East, where the first drilling for oil took place
in the Apsheron Peninsula as far back as 1842. The development of
the oil industry in Russia Azerbaijan was roughly contemporary with
American development in PennsyLanla. The fimt refinery was built in
Baku in t863, and a pipeline constructed from the Apsheron oil fields
to Baku in "1877-78. By the eve of.the Russian Revolution, the Baku oil
~swere providing 95 per cent of all Russia's oil. Further South, in
"' ,..7 still independent Iranian and Ottoman lands, European and
American businessmen were making the first attempts to obtain
concessions. At the beginning of the twentieth century ("1901) the first
major concession was granted by the Shah of Iran Muzzafir al-Dln to
a 8ritish businessman called William f<nox [" Amy.
The D'Arcy concession granted him oil rights in the entire country
except for five Northern Provinces. In exchange, the Iranian
government was to receive i6 per cent of the company's annual
profits. This proved to be a costly surrender of Iran's resources. Oil
was discovered in commercial quantities in 1908, and in 1914 the
British government became the maJOI'shareholder in the company
holding the concesslon. Iran's vast oil reserves were placed at the
disposal of Brltaln, and the preservation of British control over Iran oil
became a central factor in Britain's Middle Eastern policy. The D'Arcy
concession was acquired by the subsequently created Anglo-Persian
(latQf renamed Anglo-Iranian) all Company. This was the first of a
senes of similar arrangements whereby concessionary companies,
most of them British, French, Dutch and American, exploited the oil of
the Middle East under royalty agreements with Middle Eastern
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governments. First in Iran, then in Iraq, later in Arabia and elsewhere,
great new oil fields were opened up, and the Middle East became one
of the major oil-producing areas of the world'".
As the former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan
has written:-
"In the Middle East, Britain was still a great power. In Iraq, as
in Libya, we maintain considerable forces and hold important air
bases. Our influence was supreme in Transjordan. In Egypt,
by the treaLYof 1936, we controlled the Canal zone. The Sudan
was still under our authority. The Americans showed no
jealousy of our strength and prestige through the area. On the
contrary, they were ready enough to leave Britain to look after
this part of the world"!".
And further :
"In March 1951, the Prime Minister of Iran was assassinated,
and in May the new government announced the nationalisation
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which supplied about 25 per
cent of Britiu~l oil, \ jd the seizure of the Abadan, the biggest
refinery in the world. In .July King Abdullah of Jordan was
assassinated and a year later came the overthrow of King
Farouk of egypt, with all that it was to entail for the future of the
114 Bernard Lewis. The Middle East. London, 1995. p. 352
115 Tides of Fortune: 1945·1955. London. 1969. p.140
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Suez Canal. If the troubles of tho Middle East were to prove a
source of persistent difficulty and even danger during this
period, in the F?~ East our problems were relatively less
acute"!",
On the eve of World War I, the Majlis remained suspended, and Iran
was governed by a conservative group of ministers whose actions
were closelY monitored by Britain and Russia. In addition, thp
Northern and Southern halves of the country were under foreign
military occupation. The occupying powers dealt with tribal leaders
and local merchants in their spheres of influence without any
consideration for the government in Tehran. Iran had gained a
constitution and elhulnated the authority of the Qajar Shahs, but in the
process it had become divided against itself. Not only did the coalition
of bazaarls, ularna, and reformers break down under the pressures of
governing, but the objective that had b~ought them together in the first
place - the reduction of foreign presence in Iran ~had been thwarted.
Tne casting aside of tradltlonal instltutlons, no matte, how desirable it
rnight appear, was a painful process that did not alw~ys produce the
intended results.
Iran, which had not undergone as intense a transformation as the
Ottoman Empire, nevertheless a.perlencsd a constitutional revolution
that had the same larger objective aa the Young Turk revolt: to
preserve the State from Internal collapse and extern~; aggress,on.
However, within Iran, the forces t~vouring a constitution had very
different ideas about what the constitution was supposed to achieve in
116 Op. cit. p. 150
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terms of the domestic social and political order. For the ulaman and
the bazaaris, the new regime Wi:1S to reduce European economic
activity and preserve their customary position in the social hierarchy
but the European-inspired reformers hoped for l:1 more thurough
transformation that would lead to the introduction of secular laws and
a strong legislative assembly,
Once the constitution was proclaimed, the differences among the
coalition members burst into the open and made effective governance
impossible, Moreover, the central State and the lrmed forces were so
weak and the treasury so depleted that neither a royal regime nor a
constitutional one could exert authority within the country. As the
situation IrJ Iran deteriorated, Britain and Russia atteil~pted to keep
order in their zones of influence by occupying them. This was the first
(::>f severs' twentieth century violations of Iran's sovereignty by outside
powers, and it contributed to the growth of the intense Iranian
resentment against foreign intervention.
In neneral, Raza.Shah'S efforts to free Iran from the economic bondage
In which the Qajars had placed it were successful. However, bl"il'lg
one foreign enterprise he was unable to control the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AlOe) which functioned as a virtual State within a Sta~e il1
the Persian Gulf Province of Kl1uzistan. The company's influence was
made all the greater because it was by far the largest industrial
employer in tho country, with over 30 000 Iranian workers on Its
payroll. The Shah endeavoured to renegotiate the famous l')'Arcy
concession of 1901, but the company showed no inclin~1tlonto offar
nlnjo!' revisions, After four years of embittered discussions, the parties
Si~"lP.d a new agreement in 1933 that provided Iran with a modest
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increase in the annual royalty payments (from 16 per cent to 20 per
cent of the company's world-wide profits) and the guarantee of a
minimum annual payment of 750 000 Pounds. In return, Iran agreed
to extend the concession from 1961, when it was originally due to
expire, to i993. This agreement did little to improve Iran's economic
gain from its oil resources or to advance its claims to sovereignty over
them; it was to become the source of acrimonious disputes between
Iran and Britain in the years after World War 11117.
3.4 The struggle for oil by great powers
....rltaln's continued dominance in the oil-producing region and her
ongoing influence in the South Were sources of annoyance to Reza
Shah, and he tried to counter them by cultIVating diplomatic and
commercial ties with Germany. During the late 1930's Germany
became Iran's largest trading partner, and German technicians and
agents were active throughout the country. When World War II began,
Iran proclaimed its neutrality, but Reze Shah's known pro-German
sympathies caused the Soviet Union and Britain to view Iran with
suspicion. With the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, Iran
once again became a pawn in the hostilities between outside powers.
In order to keep a supply corridor open to the Soviet Union, the British
----------~------------------
111 The exploration of minerai resources in particular of petroleumhas been the target
of many o\:lreemenls, In the case of petroleum, multiple intergovernmental
agreements can be found, in which the States share petroleum exploration rights In
determined territories. In its many times mentioned the San Rerno agreement of 291h
April 1920. between Gloat Britain and France for the splitting of Middle East
petrole!im, The agreement for the splitting of petroleum resources in the Middle East
between the United States and Great Britain of 8th August 1944. and the chenged on
24thSeptember 1045, has not been ratified,
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and the Soviets invaded Iran in August. The pampered Iranian army
quickly collapsed, the government surrendered on the day after the
invasion, and on September 16, 1941, Reza Shah made a desperate
attempt to preserve the Pahlavi dynasty by abdicating in favour of his
son, Muhammad Reza. The former Shah then left Iran under British
supervision, eventually settling in South Africa, where he died in 1944.
Iran entered World War II just as it had World War I ~partiti .ied and
occupied by outside powers.
As the war of 1939approached, the British had to suppress a full-s~ale
Arab rising, but In dealing with it they put an absolute lknit on the
number of Jews to be allowed into Palestine in future. British relations
with Arab Stateswere more and more important to the Britishwho now
also had a new interest: the flow of oil from Iraq, delivered by pipeline
across Translordan and Palestine to Haifa. Attempts to be even-
handed were doomed to failure.
In the 1930's, war became an increasing possibility. All powers were
aware of the danger of war and continuously increased armament
expenditure on the one hand, and developed diplomatic measures to
avoid conflict on the other, Recourse to the discredited policy of
appeasement by Britain and France, was an elaborate exercise to
avoid fighting. Although it cannot be claimed that the war ~Iac;lsimply
economic causes, there is little doubt that the unstable International
economic environment, the economic rivalry of the i930's, contributed
to the coming conflict1'l8, Imports of vital raw materials redUced the
capacity to Import consul •.er goods, expenditures had to be paid for
--------------~------.~-----------------
111\ Roger Muntlng. Crisis, Recovery and War. New York, 1901.
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through taxation or loans and they were very expensive.
Appeasement was thus an understandable policy, though one
discredited by history. In the 1930's Britain and France could not
negotiate from a position of strength, though it later became clear that
they had greatly over-estimated German military power. It is evident
that before 1939 there was a real and growing fear of war and of
German military might in Europe. To what extent there was an
economic cause of war is a contentious issue, but there is no doubt
that there were some economic factors behind German expansion and,
ultimFltely, war. With the collapse of the already fragile lnternetlonal
economy in the 1930's all European nations were faced with economic
difficulties. There was a desperate need to secure markets and
sources ui supply. While there was a rational mutual interest in
international trade tilere was a widespread political pursult of trade
minimisation. Yet no nation could be perfectly self-sufficient. Britain
needed to import a large proportion of foodstuffs and raw materials,
even France was a net food rnporter and virtually dependent on
imported ensrgy. Germany and Itaiy, desplte their efforts, remained
dependent on a margin of food imports. High-grade iron ore, bauxite,
copper, tunasten, as well as oH, lJineral fi\1rtilir.:ers.~rlda host of other
vitul Ingredients of a modern economy were Imp~rted from beyond
Europe, In the inter-war years, Britain ~md FrF;incebetween them
"controlled" almost a tl"ltrdof tne world. Imperial possession and allies
became increasingly Important as tr~~djngpartners in the 1930's. There
were specific and particular areas of conflict I"lver resouroos such as
oll, German and Italy, were particularly vulnerable in this respect'".
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8ritain and France had the most influence in the Middle East; there
was a fear that German expansion might cut off 8ritish and French
supplies from that quarter. For Germany, trading deals with Europe
~\J ...pecially the Balkans and the USSR) were essential to provide
foodstuffs, raw materials and oil (from Romania and the USSR). This
was also consistent with the revival of the Mitte/europe concept, newly
manifested In Hitler's Imperial aims120•
War brought a crisis. The 8ritish government was not the only one
restricting the entry of Jews who fled from the German extermination
programme but Itwas the government ruilng Paiestins,the place where
many of them wanted to go, and to which it was easy for other
countries to say they should go, Zionist terrorism was now added to
Arab violsnce. American pressure mounted, because Jewish votes
were important to American politicians. Vlotory made things worse.
The Russians took up the Zionist cause, seeing in it a way of making
trouble for a Cold Wal' opponent, and of extending their Influence in the
area.
The 8ritish took tt16 matter to the United Nations, whh::11agrslbd on a
planpf partition (both 'the United States and Russia voted for it); the
Arabs would not accept. Violence mounted. Finally. the 8ritlsh
announced that they would give up Palestine. They left on 15 May
1948. th~ day after a new nation StateI Israel, had been prcclalmsd by
the .. ' '':>. Almost at once, Egypt attacked it and its Arab neighbours,
who claimed to protect Palestinian Arabs. ISI'Bel survived and won.
---------------_._-----
1tO H()ger MUOtillg. Op. cit. p.230.
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Yet victory left her surrounded by defeated but revengeful enemies,
who now had the additional grievance - af which they made much
useful propaqanda- an exodus of 700 000 Paleatinlan Arabs who fled
from Israel rather than live under Jewish rule. The Jews appeared to
be persecutors in their turn, though many Palestinian Arabs returned
to Israel in 1949.
In the next few years, three big upheavals changtld the Arab position
in almost every respect except its continuing hostility to Israel. One
Was. the worsening of the Cold War. Russia had long been dabbling
in the politics of the area; now the United States joir.ed in. The
second WaS a dramatic rise in 'the consumptlon of oil by the major
industrial nations and in its producnon (largely from vast new oil fields
discovered in the Persian Gulf, Arabia and Libya). The third great
change was a more corop'lcated and drawn-out political upheaval,
which removed colonial domination from the Islamic world and
replaced many traditio'il:dist lsla-nlc monarchs with more radical and
revolutionary mgimes.
During and after the Second World War, Britain was the victim of a self-
evaluation, which incited her titlsmies and depressed her own people.
Her lumbElIjingand flailing in distress were those of a "troubled giant".
There were genuine problems for a country of limited manpower
defending a vast and vulnerab'e empire, for "the firr-ltIndustriatlnation"
to keep up with the need to ~nnovate and tor a commerclell world·
leader adjusting from absolute supremacy to relative superlorlty. Early
industrialisation had bequeathed uprtvsr shipyards, with steelyards over
expiring ones. Commitment to heavy industries of the "heroic age"
could not easily be reversed nor the extempcrlsed warklntl practices
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Of an experimental era revised. Weakness In key fields of relatively late
csveloprnent, like electrical engineering and chemicals, were only
slowly and imperfectly overcome. Oil· an increasingly important
source of energy ~ was in short supply from dangerously exposed
sources. Yet British Industry's recuperative and adaptive powers were
amply demonstrated in the crisis of the 1930's and retreat was not the
result of a long decline ~ except itl self-system • but the sudden
consequence of the peculiar circumstances of the Second World War,
which over-taxed the resources of a still-mighty power'",
The 1950's wa~i a revolutionary decade. The French had to give up
independence of Morocco and Tunisia. The Egyptian king was
overthrown in 1952. In 1954 s. full-scale rebelUon began against the
European settlers of FrF.lnoh Algeria " of whom there were over 6
million. The British had already withdrawn their garrison fron , SUF}Z
when a "strong man" who had emerged in Egypt, Gamel Abde, I "iSSeI',
seemed to be the anti-imperialist, reforming leader for whom the Arabs
had waited, The British, Prench and Israelis conspired to overthrow
him in tr1e 1956 Suez adventure, the last fling of old-style imperialism.
It failed (though the Egyptians suffered a disastrous defeat) and his
prestige rose even hlgher122•
121 Felipe Fornandez.Armesto. fvW/ellnium. London, 1995. p. 509
122 Harold MacmIU::1n.Tides of Fortune: 1945·1955. Londor;, 1969. p. R59.
Nasser was subs !quently to claim that the failure of this negotlat!on Was one of the
reasons for the seizure of thl! CatH"I. This allegation was manifestly false. Unhappily,
as in the case of the arms deal, he fall to the wlias of Soviet diplomacy, which
encouraged him In his arnblttousand dangerous dream of Arab Imperialism. Certalrly
both Brltisl1 and American sovernments used all their efforts to conclude this
agreement on reasonable an:! even ijenarous terms. Nasser's was a political and not
a financial decision.
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Algeria finally became independent in 1962, after dreadful suffering;
Libya (already independent and rid of its king) began jockeying with
Syr'ia, Eg; ":)t and Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Arab world. By
way of redressing the balance, the Egyptian and Jordanlan
governments got ready to attack Israel, However, in 1967, the Israelis
struck first, inflicting a third major defeat on Arab armies. Victory gave
them more easily defended frontiers, wh:ch they announced they would
keep and so make a fourth war almost inevitable. It came in i973.
This time Israel's enemies struck at a time disadvantageous to Israel;
the industrial world was having to take mom account of the most
powerful of the Arab States, the small but immensely rich oil-producers,
whose decision to raise the prices of their \~IIcreated an international
economic crisis almost overnight. As the world lJegan to fear an
economic slump !ike that of the 1930's, it looked as If Israel might not
forever be able'to rely on the fjuilt felt in Europe and the Unit~d States
about Hitler's treatment of European Jews.
Meanwhile, in the r=ar East, Japan had in 1940 used the
embarrassments of Great Britain and France to occupy Indo-China and
obtain a closure of the Surma Road along which supplies had been
sent to the Chinese.
Nothil1g in Japanese history is adequately explained as imitation and
there were plenty of reasons impelling imperialism from within Japan.
The country had the resources at horne to start industrialising, but not
to continue it Indefinitely, Mainland ASia had, among other attractions,
coal and ironto replace Japan's dwindling supplies. Oil was the object
of the fateful decision to invade lndonesle and therefore to take on the
United States In the Second World War. Imperialism was ~. route of
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escape from poverty and vulnerability - the poverty of the Japanese
hinterland, vulnerability to the embargoes of enemies123.
The United States·regarded this extenslon of Axis power into South
East Asia as intolerable, and put severe economic pressure on Japan,
whose trade and supplies depended entirely on maritime
communications. It was this conflict that led to war between the two
countries1:44. The drastic appllcatlon of economic sanctions in July
1941 brought to a head the internal crisis in Japanese politics.
Conservative elements were shocked anG the moderate leaders
scared. The domestic prestige of the Japanese Army as a
constitutional factor in shaping Japanese policy was already involved.
However, the embargoes which th~1United States, Great Bl'itain and
Holland had enforced cut orf all supplies of all to Japan on which the
Navy. and indeed the whole war-power of Japan, depended. The
Japanese Navy was at once forced to live on its reserves, and at the
outbreak of the Pacificwar, had in fact consumed four out of eighteen
monthS'supply1lS, There was much sympathy 'for China in the USA,
and soon American citlzens WCJr9 forbidden to supply goads of
strategic importance ~oil, above all ~to Japan. The American Pacific
fleet was moved from its CZIUfornianbase to Pearl.Harbour, Hawall,
Opinion in Tokyo, was long divided about what to do. Finally, in the
autumn of 1941, the Japanese government decided to go to war with
the United States. Intelligence lnteroeots meant that by the end of
November, Roosevelt knew that war was coming.
----------- --------- ----,
123 Felipe F£i>tnandez.Armesto. Millennium. London, 1995. p. 595.
124 Eric Hcbsbawm. Age of £Extremes. London. 1994. p, 40.
125 WinslOt'1 Chu~chill. TllO Socond World War Vol III. Londc.,l, 1950. p. 521.
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On the other side, throughout the late 1940's, Iranian Mosaddiq's
impassioned campaign against continued foreign interference in Iran
and his waming about the dangers of abandoning democracy for royal
dictatorship attracted widespread support. In 1949, several political
parties and interested groups, joined together under Mosaddiq's
leaders~(lp by elements from both the tradltlonal and the modern
middle classes that were united in their opposition to foreign influence
and to an increase in the powers of the monarchy. The diversity of the
National Front· it contained ulama who advocated a greater roll fur the
shariah and Western educated professionals who pushed f0r new
measures of secularisation ~made it difficult for Mosaddiq to satisfy the
demands of one faction of the coalltlon without offending the other.
However, on the question of national sovereignty, the members of the
organisation agreed.
The issue that propelled Mosaddlq and the National Front to polltioal
prominence was the control of the Iranian oil industry by the British
dominated Anglo~lranian Oil Company. By the late 1940's the AlOe
had built up such a massive presence throuqhoiu the country that it
was practically a State within a State. Not only did the AlOe build its
own company town at Abadan, site of the world's largest oil refinery,
but it also supplied its own municipal services, built its own roads and
airport, and negotiated its own security arrangements with
neighbouring tribes. Management and clerical POSitions were in the
hands of foreigners, and Iranians were err.ployed only as labourers.
Although the AlOe was a private enterprise, the British government
owned the majority of Its stock; Iranians viewed the company as just
another manifestation of British influence in the country.
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The Iranian governme'lt was displeased with the terms of the
concession Reza Shah signed with the Aloe in i933 and in the lat'"'
1940's negotiated revisions. In 1950, the revisions were submitted to
the Majlis, where they met with the determined opposition of Mosaddiq
and the National Front deputies. Branding the Aloe as an ann of the
British government, Mosaddiq called for the cancellation of the
concession and the nationalisation of the Iranian Oil industry, Over the
course of the next several months, Mosaddiq and his aliies organised
demonstrations and gave speeches to wi~ public opinion to their side.
One of the ulama members of the National Front equated the oil issue
with the very essence of Iran's being, urging "serious Muslims and
patriotic cltlzens to fight against the enemies of Islam and Iran by
joining the nationalisation struggle". In 1951, amidst the wave of
popular enthusiasm generated by the National Front's campaign, the
Majlls took two dramatic steps: It passed legislation nationalising the
oil industry, and it invited Mosaddiq to become Prime Minister.
Although Mosaddiq was asked to assume prime rnlnistersblp because
of his stance on the nationalisation of oil, his tumultuous term in office
(May 1951· August 1953) was devoted to much more than the dispute
between Iran and the AlOe; it was also devoted to a struggle for the
political future of Iran.
In response to the passage of the oil nationalisation law, the AlOe
called for a world-wide boycott of Iranian oil. Tile British government
quickly became a party to the crisis by endorsing the boycott,
reinforcing its naval forces in the Persian Gulf, and imposing economic
sanctions on Iran. When the United States Joined the boycott in 1952,
Iran was effectively preventec .rorn selling its oil on the International
market, and the country was plunged into a financial orlsls by the
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almost total loss of oil revenues. Despite the €'conomlc hardsnips
created by the embargo, Mosaddiq refused to compromise on the
nancnallsatlun issue, and in Octet er 1952, Iran's confrontation wltn the
AlOe and Britain produced a domestic as wall as an lnternatlona
crisis.
During the period '1951 to 1~
an attempt to recover national
to royal autocracy. His OV~I\•.
which he wac r:'tJposed. The coup "-
of royal dictatorship and an intensification til "I,
in the domestic affairs of Iran,
allised Iranian society in
1tablish an alternative
~h of the forces to
ab~utthe return
...,(!:~tesintcrfel'snce
The oil dispute, which had given Mosadciq his poutlcal platform, was
quickly settled by an arrangement that gave Irmn A 5t1per cent share
af tile profits from petroleum. Iranian all rapidly recovered its place in
the Internationol market and provided the governlhent with ever"
increasing revenues. The Shah also undertook to Improve Iran's
standing Vv'lththe Western powers. Diplomatic relatiol1s with Britain
were restored tTl 1954, and the Shah proQlaimed his commitment to the
.Wfjstern alliance and to a program of economic development on the
Wl'stern model. Such diplomatic loyalty and economic emulation
would. he hoped, result in substantial Intl 'ions at United States ald.
The Shah was not disappointed on that score; between 1953 and
1963, the Ul1;tedNations provided Iran with $500 million in military aid.
Af" H'1rold Macmillan wrote: "After the change of government in the
UnitGd States !;.It the beginning of 1953, when it became clear that the
new Republican administ~ation was not prepared to underwrite tile
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Iranian economy, MosaddiC1'sprestige begcll1 to W.lnl ,l\lthou~~flhi3
tenacious grip of power was sufficiont to drive tho Shah ini.~)temporary
exile in August 1953. he was arrestQd by the army l)ef::Jre ti~e 1l1(Jt')th
was out, and his successors negotiated on agreemept with the British
oil interests, in whic'l') the Americans were closflly involv0d"120.
Tne total control that Western-owned compallic8 maintained over the
production, mart<eting anCipricing of Mid'dlcl Eastern oil was a constant
remlnder of the I'ogion's contInuing dependonce on the Wes~ and a
constant irritant to Arab nationafru(s. In Iraq each of H\t;,rqjgime~ that
ru!~d aftor tho revolution i' 1958 attempted to acquir\1lcontrol of the
COlJntry'S petroleum resources from the fomign ..ownad lraq Putrot.lmm
Company (IPC). lPC was a consortium of several Western companies.
8ritILdn having the largest ~hare; it complotoly d~rnjnated £Ill aspects
of the Iraqi petroleum Industry in the years atter World War 11and
showed little inclination to relinquish its powor, Howevflr, In 1972. ihs
Sa'th regime, frustrated with IPC'S unyielding stanos, proclaimed the
nE\ticmslistltion lif the company. 'This was on event of major pOlitical
fmc! O~~I.?"1omicirnportanmJ, Por one thing, it was for and away the
most popular measure that the regime had ~aken and contl'ibutod
surJstantially to itD acceptance. From em economical pel'spectivo, tt19
nationalisotkm of lPC brougt')t benefits to Iraq th, it could not havo boon
foresocn at tho time. The government gall led COlltrol of lraq's oil
resources on tho ov~ of thf) momentous price rovolution ttlat
flccomponied the 1~rr3Arab·lsraeli WOt'. For example, Iraq's 1968 oil
revenues amounted to $476 million; in 1HaO tile figure was $26
billionm"
1;;10 Op. cit. I). 350
1:'1 Willi om L CI(lVol::l7ld, 00, l1it.
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The long-term stability of world oil prices is striking. During World
Wars I a!1d ti, each produced sm'1Uincrements in the price of oil, but
essentially it remained stable. As the price of other commodities as
well as manufactured goods il1creac·;;tl, oil became relatively cheaper.
It therefore made good economic sense to use it in large quantities.
As a result, the peak year of world oil consumption since the first well
was drille(j in the middle ot the nineteenth century; 1979 over 31 000
galloons of petroleum f:very second. The United Nations alone
consumed more than a fourth of this amount'", Not until the onset of
the first OPEC Oil shock wa~ this upward consumption trend
interrupted.
In the mid·1970's, the 6U wrs$tled with serious problems brought
about by tho Arab use of the "oil weapon" and a prolonged recession.
Europe depends on Middle East for about 60 per cent of its oil, and
when thE';Ar1b countries slowed down oil production and picl<tld the
Netherlands as a target for a cumplett:l boycott, significant centrifugal
pressures were put on the EU. Each member State scrambled In a
rather unseemly fashion to make separate deals with the Arabs, and
the EU took no Nfectiva steps, at least officially, to help Holland in its
time of need. The recesslon exacerbat0d several already serious
problems and, combined with the ~mergycrlsls, seutneo entirely (or so
it Beamed) the plans the I:U had to launch a monetary union, based
on a common currency for all members by 1980. Tness problems
were so grave, that it seemed pcssible that the community might be
faced with total dissolution.
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As the world's largest energy consumer'", the United States must
have been highly sensitive to the vulnerability caused by its growing
import dependence on foreign oil supplies. The United States used
almost as much oil as it did in 1973, but Imported 4e,6 per cent of it,
up from 37,2 per cent in 1973. At the time of the embargo, 5.3 per
cent of the oil used in the United States came from Arab members of
the OPEC; in 1993 it reached 11,6 per cent.
Growing depenoencs on 011imports from the politically volatile Middle
East is cause tar special US concern for several reasons-
, (1) Greater reliance on oil from foreign sources magnifies the
potential impacts of import curtailments on US oil supplies and
the economy;
(2) oil imports contribute to US balance-of-payments deficits, and
as ail imports (and/or prices) rise, more US export earnings
must be allocated to paying for oil i'ather than oeitoted to
domestic consumption. In 1990, the blll for oil imports
amounted to $65 billion, more than halt of the US' $101 billion
balance-ot-payments deficit;
(3) the threat (:>f petential economic and social dislocations that
could accompany major tJiI suppll' ')1' prir;e disruptions coult!
constrain US policy-makers in fCliE:ign "fairs, national security
and military matters where oil SUPI~;'t1;:,might be affected; and
1~O Soo Figure 2
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(4) the ready availability of cheap lmpcrted oil in the United States
is a powerful llnanclal disincentive for oil-saving lnvestments in
efficiency and alternative energy sources or the development or
high-cost domestic oil.
Unlike Japan and most Western European countrtes that are highly
dependent on oil imports and where oil is heavily taxed, US oil prices
are comparatively low and do not fully reflec;t many of the external
costs of t~iILISe. Among the most notable of these externalities are, for
example, the environmental damage from production, oil spills, and
emissions from refining and combustion, and the costs of maintaining
and deploying military forces to protect supplies. The defence costs
in particular have applied disproportionately to the United States
relative to European countries and Japan.
In light of these considerations, it is nat surprising that the United
States has seen a strang Hnl<between 011 and nGtional security. This
Is, in an economicaUy interdependent global marketplace, a global
issue
Th~ United States produces most of the minerals used by its indust. y,
but the Department of State hes noted that industry "depends on
foreign suppliers to meet some or all of its needs for more than 20 of
the 80 strategic and critical (non~fuel) minerals included in national
defence stockpiles". M::'lny of those minerals are located in the Third
World, and the United Stat(?simports large quantities of oil from some
Third World countries 130. Could U)is need be the explanation tor
130 Soc Figure :3
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rl6o"imperialistic policies? Perhaps, but there is room for doubt.
Consider first the relationship between the United States and Tilird
World suppliers of the most orltlcal natural resource, oil, in the 1970's.
Despite some efforts to stem the tide, the United States became
increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern oil throughout most of the
1910's. Yet the United States did not abandon Israel, attack any
Middle Eastern country, or (as far as we know) destabilise or arranga
the overthrow of any Middle Eastern government. In fact, the
experience of the '1970's would suggest that increased reliance by the
Uniterl States on Tbird World resources for raw materials will not
strengthen the nee-imperialist tendencies of the former but, rather will
Improve the bargaining power and relative economic standing '1f the
latter.
It is true thm.lgh. that the Persian Gulf War In I~YdO"91 gave this
particular cornroversy contemporary significance. That war may be
plausibly lnterproted as an imperlalistio war to ensure secure supplles
(.)f oil. But it is difticult to argLJ9 that the war was really about "cheap
gm3" and a war fought in the interests of the oll companies at one and
the same time. "he oil companies do not have an interest in cheap
gas. In fact, chances are tl1at if Saddam Hussein had est;ablished
control over a large percel'lt~geoHM oil reserves in the world and had
succeeded in hU<lng the prlce of oil significantly, most of the oil
companies of the world would have benefited.
In the second quarter of '1990, according to estimates of the
International t:nergy Agenr.Yl world production excoeded demand by
as much as 2,8 MeO. In othel' words, there was a massive build"up
of stockplles: ihoao held by tho Unite:d States government and the
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governments of other major lndustrlalissd countries, as well as those
held by private companies, were at an all-tlme high131, In June 1990,
prices were back to the low levels of l:388132.
At this stage it '''';1S seen in London and Wal:lhington as a show of
farce to influence the OPECmeeting assembling In Geneva an 26 ,July
1990 with Iraq demanding a price rise from $18 to $25 a barrel. Sritish
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd put down a mild diplomatic marker:
''We would deplore any threat or use of force", President Bush's
spokesman, Martin Fitzwater, chimed in with: "All disputes should be
handled through peaceful rneans", There was no emphatio warning to
make it clear to {3addamHussein that the West would not tolerate any
aggression against Kuwait. Neither that nor the offer at the OPEC
meeting of a price rise to $2'1 a barrel was enough to satisfy Saddam
Hussein. The last chance of a settlement ended with Iraq walking out
of talks with Kuwait in Jeddah on 1 August133•
Then, in August, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait triggered an oil crisis. By
October 1990, cruds oil prices had risen from about $18 to between
$35 and $40 a barrel. The cut-off of Iraqi and Kuwait oil shipments
removed some 4 MBD from world exports, and tile resulting rise in
prices was aggravated by speculative buying which, according to one
estimate, added about 2 MBD to dernand'", In response to the rising
prices, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and others
announced that they were stepping up production to full capaoity. The
1~,1Oil and Gas ,Iew'wl. pp. 41·43 . Petroleum Economist, May 1989. p, 143.
132 Petm/eam Economist, Apllt 1990, pp. 130·131.
133 John Dickie. Insido tllO Foreign Office. London, 1992. p. ~83
134 Tile Now York Times, August 12, 1990.
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motivation was economic: to ellmlnars budgetary and balance of
payment deficits ;ibly even pile up some surpluses): and, at the
same time, to pu, a damper on price escalation, which some
producers fear will repeat the '1980's scenario of a boom followed by
a severe bust'",
The surplus problem is linked to the objective of increasing and
stabilising the flow of (,ppitat and aid to the Third World, and avoiding
the re-ernerqeno type of debt problems that were experienced
in the 1980's with U II" ....onssquent series of write-otts and reschedulir1g.
LI:.'(.lvingthe OP;;'C surpluses to be recycled to developing countries by
the banking system turned out to be a major disaster, aggravated by
the subsequent rise in interest rates (wh!~h was itself a consequence
of the inflationary aftects of the oil price boom)136, The balance of
payment surpluses of the OPEC countries became a majur factor in
the world economy, and higher Interest rates accentuated developing
countries' debt problems.
An it happened, when the United States and its allies launched an air
attack against Iraq, and Hussein proved he couid not disable Saudi <:.>il
wells, the International price of oil dropped $'10 in one day, the largest
singl~ drop on record.
In any Case, while on is certainly an tmportant exception to this rule, the
United States and the entire industrialised world have become
dr?~~~k;,;'iiV1('85" dspendent on raw materials from the Third World in
recent years, By 'ie86, raw material prices were at their lowest levels,
-,------.---"------.--~-
135 Eliyahu Kanovsky. Wily til€! 01.1Crisi8 Won't Last. p. 88; orbls. Winter 1991.
136 Jonathsn MiC'hle, Managing lhe Global Economy. O)(tord, 1995. p.293,
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relative to the prices of manufactured goods and services, in history.
The main reason for this fall was quite clear. Production of food, raw
materials, and 011increased rapIdly in the 1980's, so it is fairly safe to
say that foodstuffs and raw materials are in permanent over-supply.
This over-supply has brought about an "uncoupling" of industrial
economies and industrial growth frorr. the suppliers of raw materials.
lndustrial production is ste.adily switching away from heavily material-
intensive products and processes. In brief, even if reliance on primary
products from developing oountrlea has been an important factor
sh::.ping neo-lmperiallstlc policies since the Second World War (and the
fate of oil producers in the '1970'S, at least, casts some doubt on this
notion), that reliance has apparently decreased substant'slly, and its
impact on the foreign policies of the United States and other
industrialised countries can reasonably be expected to decrease
accordingly.
In the next Chapter, I analyze how the transfer of supplying control to
the countries oil the Middle East surrouncling tt1e Persian Gulf occurred
in so big a manner that allowed them to use that power as e
economic and dlplornatle weapon over the dependent consumer
countries.
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CHAPTER 4: BALANCE OF POWER : FROM THE "SEVEN
SISTERS" TO OPEC
Abundant, low-cost oil was the energy source that fuelled the post-war
recovery of Europe and Japan and assured the economic prominence
of the United states'". With the rise of gasoline.fuelled automobiles
and dlesel-powered trains and the mounting use of oil to supply energy
for industry, economies that had previously been based an coal
became dependent on oil. This transformation was based on the
assumption that nil would always be readily available and moderatt3ly
priced. During the late 1960's and early 1970'S, the assumption was
born out as the industrial States enjoyed a period of rapid economlo
growth made possible by an ever-increasing supply of cheap oll.
HO"~(.Ner•.the industrial world's avid consumption of oil made it more
dependent on Middle Eflstern countries' petroleum producers. The
most successful effort of these countries to alter their dependent
relationship with the North was the common action of OPEC
(Organisation of PetroleumExporting Countries) in seizing control over
the world's oil markets!", By aoting together in a producer cartel, the
Southern oil-exporting States were Elule to Increase not only their
economic rewards but also their political power.
4.1 The oligopoly of the "seven sisters" cartel
For most of me twentieth century, the International oil system has been
controiied by a producer cartel. Until '19'73, that cartel consisted 0,' an
m $(>cFigure 6
isa Morris A Adelman. Tile World Markot BQltimoi~. 1972.
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oligopoly of international oil companles'". The "seven sisters" • five
American (Standard Oil of New Jersey, now known as Exxon;
Standard Oil of California, now known as Chevron; Gulf, now part of
Chevron; Mobil; and Texaco). one British (British Petroleum) and one
Anglo-Dutch (Royal Dutch..Shell)· further gained control of their
domestic oil Industries throuqh vertical integration, that is, by
controlling Cl.lf supply, 'Ifansportation, refining and marketing operations
as well as by controlling the technology for exploration and refining.
In the late nineteenth century, the oil companies then In exlstence
bsqan to move abroad and obtain control of foreign supplies on
extremely favourable terms. After World War I, the seven formed joint
ventures to explore ';...~[foreign 011 field, ano eventually in the 1920'$
began to divide up sources of supply by explicit agreements. They
were thus able to divide markets, fix world prices and discrimii'jCl.te
against outsiders.
Northern political dominance of the oil-producing regions, the Middle
East, Indonesia and Latin America, facilitated the activities of the oil
companies. Governments provided a favourable political and military
envlronrnent and actively supported the oil companies owned by their
nationals.
In bargaining with the oil companies, the less-developed countries were
confronted by an oil oligopoly supported by powerful northern
governments as well as by uncertainty about the success of oil
l3D Anthony sarnpeen, Tim 8()von Sistors: 1110Great Oil Companies and (flo World
tl1fW made. N(,w Yatic 1975.
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exploration and the availabilityof alternative sources of supply. It is not
surprising that the "sevensisters" obtained conoesslon agreements that
gave them control over the production and sale of much of the world's
oil in return for the payment of a small fixed royalty to their host
governments 140.
Beginning in the late 1920's and continuing through the years of the
great depression In the 1930's, ~IIprices tumbled despite the efforts of
the "seven sisters" to stablllse markets. At that time, the United States
was the largest producer in the world and exported oil to Europe and
elsewhere. Efforts at government level (incll.lding not only the US
Federal Govl:'rnmentbu, also more significantly, the largest producer
State, Texas) succeeded where the "seven sisters" had not in
l'egulatlng production in order to create a price floor. As a result, the
Texas Railroad conmlsslon emerged as the single most significant
political force in the international oil industry.
Cncnges in this system began to emerge in the decade following
World War II. 11'1 the 1950"$,relatively inexpensive imported oll becarne
the primary source of energy for the developed world. Western
Europe and Japan, with no all supplies of their own, became ~ignificant
importers of oll, In 1950) US oil consumption out-dlstanced its vast
domestic produntion, and the United States became a nat Importer of
oil. In the host countries, growing nationalism combined with the great
success of oil exploration, lad to dissatisfaction with concession
agreements and to more aggressive policies. During this time, the
host governments succeeded in revising con~"'psslon agreements
----,_,-----
140 Franklin Tugwell. TIle Politics of all in venezua« Stanford, 1975.
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negotiated before the War. They redefined the basi& for royalty
payments and l'TIposed an income tax on foreign oil operations.
'fhey also established what at the time was considered a revolutionary
principle: the new foyalti-es and taxes combined would yield a fifty-fifty
divibion ot profits "~9tWGOnthe companies and their respective host
governments. As a result, profits acorulng to zst governmerts
increased significantly. The p!:Jr-bar<alpayment to StlUt!i ArElb!~ for
example, rose from $0,17 in 194E,to $0,80 in 1956·1967.
Nonetheless, the "S0W:>11sisters" alt~ known as the majors, cantln:"lo.:J
to dominate the system, By controlling Ellmost aU the world's all
reserves outside the Communist States (ag. prcdnctlon at the well·
haat:l, refining and transportation and ITk.d<eting) they were qblo to
mBnt~gethe price of oil.
Tho "seven sisters" mt'aint!::linedoornrol, in part. by preventing iI icurslone
by competitors. TI19 maJol's blocked 1,ltl1"'H'ct'mpOIII£;)S from ontel'lng
upstream operations Qut"ide North America ~Mt j'.l, erud(~ oil
exploration and proCluctlon, by lacl·;il1g in concession i;lgreoments w!th
many oil·rirh areas sr.::.!by tho long lead times required for finding Elnd
dc-!veloping oil In tm'rihJly L1rlclaimed b, the mojO! ,., Olltsiders wr.re
also deterred from competing with tho "s~)Ven sisters" downstl'ooml that
is, In refining, transcortetlcn ard marl~eting Ope,l:tiion~ Not having
thai! OWl') crude oil supplies, lndependerlc r6finers had to lJl:r~!1~' 'oil
from the n1tljoJ;'s,who WAt'e else th&lr competitors However, the
majors deliborately took their profits at tho IAss-c:ompetitlv,l and lowsl'Q
taxed upstream lovel by charging a high price for etutl0 l~iI (IS
compared with the final product. The t'lmall profits for t q Istream
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operatlons discouraged new entrants.
The management of the price of 011 was facilitated by the highly
inelastic demand for oil. As there are no readily available substitutes
and because it is difficult to decrease consumption, an increase in the
price does not greatly decrease tile demand for oil in the short term.
Thus, if companies could maintain a higher price for oil, they would not
lose sale volumes and so would reap high profits.
Thus, in the 1950's and 1960's, the "seven sisters" controlled supply
by keeping out compentors and by a series of co-operative ventures:
Joint production and refining arrangements, long-term purchase and
supply agreements, joint ownership of pipelines, and some Joint
marketing outside the United States. They also refrained from price
competition. Pricemanagement by the majors was designed to keep
the pnce of oil economically attractive but also low enough to
discourage competing forms of energy like nuclear energy. Developed
countries' governmonts did not oppose this mice management. The
Europeans added a tax on petroleum in order to protect their dornestlc
coal industry, because lower oil priced wouid have Increased oil
consumption at the expense of the politically powetiul coal companies
and coal miners. Inthe UnitedStates, higher oil prices were supported
by the domestic oil industry which needed protection from lower
international prices to survive and, as we shall discuss, eventually
cbtslned that protection.
Finally, the dominance of the "seven sisters" was backed by political
intervention. One extreme example occurred in the early 1950's when
the government ot Iran sought a new agreement with the Anglo.lranlan
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Oil Company, a predecessor of B"itish Petroleum, and nationalised the
company's assets in lran, as analyzed in Chapter 3. The British
government became actively involved in the negotiations, imposed an
economic embargo on Iran, and threatened military intervention. After
trylr Ig unsuccessfully to mediate between Britain and Iran, the United
States worked with opposition parties and the Shah to over-throw the
Iranian government. A new concession was soon negotiated under
which the US companies replaced Anglo-Iranian.
However, as OPEC would later ::liscover, it is difficult to maintain a
producer cartel in the long term. Over time, changes in the
international oil industry, the oil-producing States. and the oil-
consuming developed countries, undermined the domlnance of the
"seven sisters". The entrance of new players weakened the
oligopolistic structure of the international oll industry. Oornpetitlon
increased both upefream, as new players sought concessions to
explore for and produce crude oil. and downstream, as rnor e refineries
were built and competition grew in markets for refined oil. Staring in
the mid-1950's, companlee previously not active internationally,
obtained and successfully developed concessions in existing and new
oil-producing regions such as Aigerifil, Libya and Nigeria. In 1952. the
seven majors produced 90 pet' cent of Crude oil outside North America
and the Communist countries, and by 1968 they still produced 75 per
cent.
As new production by new producers came on line, the "seven sisters"
were no longer able to restrict supply and maintain the price of oil at
the old level. By the end of the 1950's, production increases out-
distanced the growth in consumption. United States quotas on the
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import ot foreign oil aggravated the problem. Quotes were imposed
in 1958 ostensibly for national security reasons: to protect US market
from lower-priced foreign oil in order to ensure domestic production
and national self-sufficiency. In fact, quotas also helped dorrrsstlc US
producers that could 1'10t have survived without protection. The quotas
effectively cut 'off the US market for the absorption of the new supplies
produced abroad. As a result, in 1959 and 1960, the international oil
companies lowered the posted price of oil, the office price used to
calculate taxes. This act was to be a key catalyst for producer
government action against the oil companies.
4.2 Oil concessions govarned by international or municipal
law
It has sometimes been suggested that individuals (or companies) can
aCI~u;,'e rights under international law by making agreements with
states (or international organisations) containing a provision that the
afJreement shOL'd be governed by international law. This suggestion
has given ; 'se to considerable controversy, especially in conneouon
with oil concessions. Since the quadrupling of the price of oil in t 973,
oil producing States have been in a strong bargaining position, and oil
concessions granted since 1973 are generally governed by the law of
the State granting the concession. However, before 1973, the oil
companies were in a stronger bargaining position, and were often
reluctant to allow their oil concessions to be governed by the law of the
Siate granting the concession. On the other hand, the State granting
the concession might have felt humiliated if it had allowed the
concession to be governed by the law of a foreign country. The
obvious answer was for the State and the company to agre~ that the
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concession be governed by international law or (more commonly) by
general principles of law. Ganen:!1principles of law are a source of
international law, but some writers have suggested that general
principles of law also constitute a legal system in their own right,
dlstlncffrorn municipal law and from lnternatlonal law'".
4.3 The rise of OPEC
Ohanges in the oil-producing States also weakened the power of the
,bn company cartel. In addition to changing elite attitudes, improved
skills and less uncertainty, the emergence of new competitors was
vitally important in increasing the bargaining power of the host
governmert.s. In negotiations with the oil companies, producer States
obtained larger percentages of earnings and provisions for
relinquishing unexploited parts of concessions. As a result, the oll-
producing governments, especially large producers such as Libya and
Saudi Arabia, increased their earnings and began to accumulate
significant foreign exchange reserves. Monetary reserves strengthened
the hand of the oil producers by enabling them to absorb any short-
term loss of earnings from an embargo or production reduction
designed to increase the price of oil or to obtain other concessions.
At the same time, host govt.rnments began to co-operate with eac;\
other. Infuriated by the price cuts of 1959 and 1960142 that reduc~Jd
th='r tax receipts, five Of the major petroleum-exporting countries -Iran,
141 Michael AkehurM. Op. cit. p. 74
142 See t:!9ure (3
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Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Ar " i:a and Venezuela - met in 1960 to discuss
unilateral action by the oil companies. At that meeting, the five decided
to found the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to
protect the price of oil and the revenues of their governments 143. A
parallel group, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC) composed solely of Arab oil exporters, was created in 1968.
The impulse behind the formation of the two organisations was a
desire on the part of the member States to assert control of the most
valuable natural resource. For the Middle Eastern States in particular,
the issue was independence. OPEC was founded in the Nasser era,
and one of the principal goals of Nasserism was to break out of the
constraints of post-war neo-colonialism that found the Western powers
still manipulating the diplomatic and economic affairs of the Arab world.
OPEC's immediate objective WFl.S to utilise the collective-bargaining
power of its member States to pressure the Western oil companies to
increase oil prices. However, as long as the world's supply of oil was
plentiful, OPEC had limited success in its efforts to change the policies '
and attitudes of tile oil companies.
In its first decade, OPEC expanded from five to thirteen members, who
accounted for 85 per cent of the world's oil exports. Initially, the new
organisation had little success. OPEC's influence depended on the
ability of its members to co-operate to reduce production and thus
force a price increase. Although OPEC tried, it was unable to agree
on production reduction schemes. Nevertheless, the individual oil-
producing States succeeded in increasing their revenues. The posted
price of oil was never again lowered and the oll-produclnq States
143 Zuhayr Mikdashi. The Community of Oil Exporting Countries : A Study in
Government Co-operation. New York. 1972.
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gradually expanded their experience in co-operation. However, it was
not until the 1970's when other conditions became favourable, that
OPEC became an effective tool of the producer States.
OPEC, formed in 1960, has evolved over the last 35 years with a
number of successes and setbacks. By choosing to establish much
higher prices in the 1970's, OPEC producers had to trade-off
significant volumes of future production. Prior to 1973, world oil
demand had been growing by 7.5 pnr cent per annum for more than
two decades and OPEC production was increasing at a rate of around
10 per cent per annum .. Plans were in place for OPEC countries to
significantly expand capacity and production du~ing the 19'70's, but
OPEC's decision to quadruple oil prices in 1973/74, greatly reduced
the growth in demand for its oil, and hence the necessity for capacity
expansion. The first set of price increases were absorbed relatively
easily by the market - notwithstanding disruptions and recession - and
by the tate 1970'S it appeared that OPEC oil production might be
growing again. OPEC production in 1979 was only slightly above the
1973 level, as growtl1 in demand of some 4 per cent per annum was
nearly all being met by increases in non-OPEC supply!". The sec ..md
set of price increases in 1979j80 were much more severe than the first
and led to OPEC's output being cut in half by 1985. OPEC (and
others) thought demand and supply to be more inelastic than in fact
proved to be the case. In addition to the impact from the second price
shock, many of the adjustments induced by the first price shock had
not yet been completed when prices rose again in 1979145. As history
144 See Figure - W,;rld Crude Oil Proouctlon 1950·1994
145 Michael Rauscher. OPEC and the Price of Petroleum. Berlio, 1987.
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has shown, the price levels were far too high for OPEC to sustain,
although at the time most market participants and observers thought
that not only would prices be maintained, but they would "forever" rise
to astonlshlnq heights 146.
Since the second major oil price increase, OPEC production has been
well below its former peak and its 1995 quota is still 20 per cent below
this level. OPEC has been adjusting to its 1979/90 strategy for 15
years and the process \'\IlII continue for some years to come. World oil
demand on average has I.~rown by less then i per cent per annum
since the first price shook, down substantially from pre- i973 rates of
growth. Much of the lost demand is permanent And. will not be
reversed by lower prices 147. High oil prices have 'so resulted in
greater volumes of cornpetlrq supplies - both oil and non-oil fuels.
Even if one contends that at some point the lost OPEC production will
be required, it is deferred so tar into the future that the present value
is essentially zerc'".
P'~""""""·"·"'·'·'·,'''···' .. ' .,_',.~",~ ... ,"""'-
OPEC is a diverse group of countries with large differ;;:,nces in
population, per capita income, current accounts, debts, culture, etc.
Within the Gulf there have been two wars between certain OPEC
members in the last 15 years 149. Otten there are conflicting differences
among countries on pll~u objectives. Wh!le all countries desire higher
revenues, those with limited oil reserves desire higher price presently,
while large reserve holders (which also desire higher revenues) have
-----~,~-------
14G The World Bank Review and Ollt!ool( for tile World Oil MarKet. WashIngton,
1995 p.60
147 Dermot Gately. En( . Journal. VoL 14. No.4. 1993
148 The World Bank. Op. cit. p,61
149 The World Bank. Op. cit. p.63
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an interest in preserving a longer term market for their major resource,
i.e to maintaln and hopefully expand market share. Countries with
large populations and budgetary difficulties have a tendency to favour
higher prices at the expense of present and future volumes. The
conflicting objectives make it next to impossible for the cartel to
maximise long term revenues for the group - even if such optimal path
were known. Thus OPEC should not be thought of as a Joint profit
maximisation monopolist.
Often OPEC is portrayed as having several sub-groups, eg" revenue
maximisers, out-put maximisers, and a cartel core. In the past, the
cartel core has included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates,
Qatar and Libya. These countrIes were grouped because of their
common characteristics of large reserves, low populations and barren
desert topography. This same group has also been labelled the "low
absorbers" when grouping countries according to expenditure
requirements. Sometimes OPEC is broken into Gulf and non-Gulf1so
countries. Increasingly, the future cartel core is depicted as me large
reserve-holders - Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates and Venezuela. The other O?EC countries have smaller
reserves and are thought to have less potential to significantly raise
their exports because of a number of economic and political factors.
However, the African member countries (with the exception perhaps of
Gabon) have the potential to significantly raise productive capacity, as
they are all geologically rich oil bearing regions. Peak production for
these three countries (not at the same point in time) was 6.8 rnb/d
versus 4.2 mb/d in 1994.
150 See Figure 7
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At first glance, the six reserve-rich OPEC countries seem less cohesive
on a number of economic, political and social grounds than the first
described cartel core. Nevertheless, these six countries account for
nearly two-thirds of the wold's reserves'", have high reserve-to-
production rations, and all except for Iran, have relatively low
populations. With the immense reserves of this cartel core, it would
appear that they could have formidable power over the oil markets.
Only with surplus capacity can it engineer a large price decline, but it
could restrict out-put at any time and send prices considerably higher,
as previous actions have shown in 1973/74, 1979/80 and to a degree
in 1990152,
Today, the dominant player in OPEC is Saudi Arabia and rlltiny
observers feel that the future of oil pricing developments will depend
on how the Saudi Arabian government plays its "oil cards". Only Saudi
Arabia has significant spare capacity at present aM thus it is able to
exert considerable authority within OPEC153• It was the cartel's swing
producer for more than three years but abandoned that role in i985
and has stated that it will no longer unilaterally defend the price of oil.
Since the collapse in oil prices, the Saudi share of OPEC out-put has
risen to near 1/3rd from about 15 per centum in mid-1985, nlthough
a portion of the gain was due to the United Nations embargo against
Iraqi exports. Saudi Arabia also maintains some 2 mb/d of surplus
capacity and is the only country with a sizeable surplus outside af Iraq.
Secause of its surplus capacity and dominant position within the
group, it can expert considerable influence on OPEC's oil production
151 See Figure B
152 M.A. Adelman. The Energy Journal. Vol. 11, No.4. 1990.
15:> See Figure 9
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policies. Power within OPEC has shifted over the years depending on
relative levels of production and other factors. The five largest OPEC
members all har! similar levels of out-put in 1970 - Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Venezuela. Libya and Kuwait - thus all had considerable lntluence on
OPEC pricing decisions in the early 1970'S154.Saudi Arabia was "only"
among the largest OPEC producera in 1970 with :;l 16 per cent share
of the groups' out- put. During the 1970's, the Saudis established
themselves as the dominant producer with its share of OPEC
production reaching 37 per cent in 1980. It was clearly the key player
during the 1980'S both in sustaining high oil prices through 1985 as
swing producer, and then by increasing market share and c'1ntributing
to the price collapse when the former policy failed. While it had
become the dominant producer today, a variety of unforeseen
developments could shift the balance of power over time.
OPEC countries are expected to continue to have significant influence
over the level ot oil prices into the foreseeable future. The organisation
may change membership or structure, or may even dissolve and later
reunite, butthere is great economic incentive to maintain the group (or
something similar) to secure higher oil revenues. The primary objective
of the organisation is wealth maximisation, which is achieved by
restricting out-put ,naintain prices well above the long run
competitive costs of production. However, the optimal price path is
elusive and often short-term gains outweigh long-term
conslderatlons 155.
154 Pc. , 0dr:ili I..lil anr; World Power, New York, 1986.
1('$ 0 lt ""p. CI, p. eJ,
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4.4 OPECbegins to its oii weapon
Finally, the Western consuming countries became vulnerable to the
treat of supply ihtprr'.lption or reduction. As oil became the primary
source of energy and as US supplies diminished156, the developed-
market economies became increasingly dependent on foreign oil,
especially from the Middle East and North Africa. By 1972, Western
Europe derived almost 60 per cent of its energy from oil, almost all of
which was imported. Oil from abroad supplied 73 per cent of Japan's
energy needs and 46 per cent of US energy came from oil, almost one-
third of which was imported. By 1972, 80 per cent of Western European
and Japanese oil imports came from the Middle East and North Africa,
By 1972, even the United States relied on the Middle East and North
Africa for 15 per cent of its oil imports. This economic vulnerability was
accentuated by declining political influence in the oil-producing region$
and by the absence of individual or joint energy policies to counter any
manipulation of supply.
In order to understand the extent to 'Nhich the ail embargo and the oil
price increases of 1973 changed the world's economy and catapulted
Saudi Arabia into prominence as a global financial power151, we must
156 See Figure 10
11,;7' As Henry Kissinger, in his book For tile Record, London, 1981: "Earlier in tilis
discussion (Februaty 3rd)we spoke of the dangers of the 1980's entirely in terms of East·
West re'ations. A fair assessment would show that the East-West problem is cu!rently
compllca;' , by historical processes in many parts of the world, including the Gulf and
Saudi Arabia, that fir" to some extent independent of 1I1eEast-West conlllct. In S!ludi
Arabia and the Gulf we now face two distinct problems. One is the growing perception
of the potential irrelevance of American power to the most likely d angers that these
countries face. They are bound to be concerned lest the United States, for a variety of
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review the arrangements that existed between the Saudis and the
foreign oil companies prior to 1973. The kingdom's first oil concession
Wt~S granted by Ibn Saud in 1933 to the Standard OJ! Company of
California (later reorganised as the Arabian American Oil Company
(ARAMCO)) which acquired the right to extract and transport whatever
petroleum WaS found withi!'1 its concesslon in exchange for the
construction of a refinery and the payment c-f ro)'alties to four gold
shillings per ton of crude oil. The terms of the concession were
immensely favourable to ARAMCO. Oil was dlscovered ir the Eastern
Province of Dhahran in i938, but major commercial prodi, ':tion did not
take place until after World War 11. During the 1950's, the concession
agreements were modified so that Saudi Arabia and most other
Middle Eastern oil producers received 50 per cent of the profits from
the foreign companies. However, the oil-producing countries had little
say in deteri nining prices or production levels. ARAMCO emerged as
a giant multlnanonal corporation that controlled not only the exploration
and extraction of Saudi oil, but also its refining, marketing and pricing.
As the world demand for oil rose, the Middle East came to supply an
ever-greater percentage of the demand. This was especially true for
Japan and Western Europe, areac':itha.t either had no oil of their own
or had oil that was extremely costly to extract (as in the case of the
North Sea reserves). As a result of this reliance on low-cost
petroleum, Saudi ArabIa supplied 21,6 per cent of Europe's oil
requirements in 1972. and 13 per cent of the world's total production
of crude oil in '1973. Even the Wilted States, a major producer and the
world's largest consumer of petroleum, became dependent on
imported oil. Saudi Arabia's share of US oil imports in 1973 was 8.1
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In these circumstances of growing European, JsPC'~'ese and US
dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum, a gradual restruoturlnq or
the industry started to take place. Led by demands from the Shah of
iran, prices began to edge upward in the late 1960's, and some of tria
oroducing countries attained partiRIcontrol over pricing and production
levels. Despite these change , the world was unprepared for the
decision of the Arab producers to deploy their oil weapon as an
instrurnent of diplomacy. In the midst of the Arab-Israeli War of
October 1973, the United States engaged in an extensive alr-lltt of
military supplies to Israel, and President Richard Nixon requested that
Oonqress approve a $2,2 billion appropriation for military assistance to
Israel. Saudi Arabia responded to these actions by declaring all
embargo on all 011 shipments to the United S~atesand the Netherlands
(the latter was targeted primarily because of Rotterdam's importance
as a port Of entry and distribution centre for oil destined for other parts
of Europe). In addition, the Saudis ~ ld other Arab oil producers
announced that they would out back litl 011 production and reduce the
amounts available to the consuming countries. These announcements
created panic and contuslon within the Industrial States. A scramble
to purchase non-Arab 011 took place, and prices began to rise. In
November i973, the political leverage of the oil -vespon became
apparent as the European Economic Oommunlty and Japan both
issuea statements affirming Palestinian rights and urying Israel's
withdrawal from the territories occupied In 1967. In the k'ilowing
,----~.--.-.
168 Nadar Safran. Saudi Arabia: Tile Ceaseless Quest for Security. Ithaca, 1988
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months, previously underpricedpetroleumbegan to find its true market
value. OPEC set the price at $1'1.65 per barrel effective i January,
1974; a year earlier the price had been $2.74. The effect of the price
increases on Saudi revenueswas dramatic. In the year preceding the
price hikes, the kingdom earned $6,4 billion in oil revenues; in the
fisoal year 1974-75, Saudi revenues sky-rocketed by 330 per cent to
$27,7 billion. During 1981, when oil prices peaked at $34 per barrel,
Saudi Arabia's oil revenues were an astounding $102 billion. The
kingdom was awash in funds.
The embargo 1973 set in motion a series of other significant
developments withi'l the petroleum industry, most notably the
increased participation by OPEC countries in the ownership of oil-
producing operations and their involvement in such downstream
activities such as refining, distributing and marketing. However, the
giant foreign oil companies did not disappear. The provided the
technology and expertise on which the producers still depended, and
their services were retainedthrough lease-backarrangementsand joint
ventures with the local national oil companies. A'RAMCO thus
remained a prominent factor in the national life of Saudi Arabia.
In the next chapter, I analyzehow this new cartel used its power as an
economic and diplomatic weapon by imposing oil embargoes to attain
politic~1goals. and how South Africa reacted to these threats.
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CHAPTER 5 : OIL AS A DIPLOMATIC WEAPON
Oil embargoes were imposed by the Arab petroleum exporting
countries in 1967 and 1973-74 against Western States that directly
aided Israel in its war with Arab adversaries. The scale and speed of
Israeli attacks on the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air bases in early
June '1967 led Cairo and Amman to accuse Washington and London
of direct participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. An emergency
meeting of the Arab petroleum exporting countries in Baghdad decided
to cut off oil supplies to the United States, Britain and West Germany,
but not France, which had condemned the Israeli action. The embargo
lasted until the end of August 1967 and led to the formatlon in January
1968 of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC)15~)as discussed in Chapter 4.
Later, in 1973, a number of Arab nations used once again an oil
embargo against the United States and its allies in an attempt to
influence United States policy with regard to lsrael'". The economic
and polltlcal impact of this move in the United States was immediate
and pronounced. Soon afterwards, the Middle Eastern members of
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC; were
successful in persuading that organisation to exploit its stt ategic
position as a cartel and dramatically increase the price of the 0.1 they
159 The ten OAPEC member countries are: Algeria, Saudi Arabia, 8;;:hrsin, Egypt,
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Katdr, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, and Syria
160 Alan Randall. Reso~lrces Economics 2nd ed, New York, 1987. p.305
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exported!". In 1979, following a. pollncal crisis in Iran (which reduced
oil exports from that country and led to a situation in which the spot-
market price for oil substantially exceeded the cartel price) and a
continued decline in the value of the United States dollar relative to
other currencies, the OPEC cartel significantly increased oil prices
8gain162•
The success of OPEC in quadrupling the price of petroleum was due
to a peculiar set of favourable circumstances. Both demand and
supply factors were ripe when the third Arab-Israeli War in '1973
caused Arabs to impose an embargo on the West and the Shah of iran
took advantage of the situation to raise the price of petroleum exports
drastically. During the months just prior to the out-break of the War,
demand for petroleum and other commodities had increased greatly
while accelerating inflation had reduced the real price of oil. On the
supply side, there was no longer an excess capacity available which
the West could tap into to compensate "or the Nab-induced shortfall.
In fact, one can argue that the energy crisis actually began earlier,
whim the United States began fJII production from its domestic oil
fields, thus losing its excess capacity and relinquishing to the OPEC
cartel, effective control over the world petroleum market.
Within the \.Iontext of the diplomacy of the Arab-lsraell conflict, the use
of the oil weapon prompted the governments of Western Europe and
1I'll The producers assoclatioos constltute a form of action on prices. Under the
lnlernatlcnal rights the legitimacy of such associations has many times been
questioned. In the United States. for example, the Trade Act of 3111 January, 1975,
considers Illicit the cartels of the producers of raw materials and allows the North
American adrnlnlstrption the adoption of measures agaInst member States of such
agreements like, for example, their non-admission to the system ....: generalised
preferences.
162 See Figure 6
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Japan to look more favourably on the Arab cause and forced United
States pollcy-makers to face up to the growing United States
de~endency on imported oil
5.1 A new powerful factor
Since the First World War, oil as a source of energy had become more
and more important for industry and war. Most mechanised weapons
and vehicles were drh/en by oil; consequently, countries that possessed
considerable deposits of oil had acquired an influence in internatlonal
affairs which in some cases could be attributed primarily, if not
exclusively, to that possession. The emergence of oil as an
indispensable raw rnateriel brought about a shift in the relative power of
the politically leading nations. The former Soviet Union had become
more powerful since it had been self-sufficient in this respect. Japan
had grown c')nsiderably weaker as it had been completely lacking in oil
deposits1~
Aside from its location as the land bridge of three continents, the Near
East was strategically important because of the oil deposits of the
Arabian Pcninsula1G4• Control over them traditionally had been an
important factor in the distribution Of power, in the sense that wluaver
was able to add them to its other sources of raw materials added that
1El3lians J. Morgenthau. PailfUls among Nations. 6th ed. New York. 1978. p. 133.
164 SaG Figura 11
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much strength to its own resources and deprived its competitors
proportionally. It is for this reason that Great Britain, the United States
and, for a time, France, embarked in the Near East upon what has
aptly been called "oil dip' cy": that is, the establishment of spheres
of influence giving them e",,(usive access to the oil deposits in certain
regions,
Yet oil is no longer one of many raw materials important ln the
measurement of a nation's power, It is now a material factor whose
very possession threatens to over-turn centuries-old patterns of
International politics, The oil embargo by the oil-producing States in
th.s winter of 1973-74, together with the drastic rise in the price ot oil,
suddenly clarified certain basic aspects of world politics which we
might have understood theoretically, but which were brought home in
earnest by the drastic change in power relations brought on by the
new poftlcs of oil.
A cartel was a powerful tendency to undermine ltse~f, and its
maintenance requires the existence of a large producer with excess
capacity that can instil discipline; such a leader can strongly influence
world prices through increases or decreases in the aggregate supply.
By 1973, this pivotal position had shifted from the Uni~edStates and its
petroleum companies to the King of Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the
Saudis dominated world energy markets for over a decade; by
increasing or decreasing their production, they maintained the cartel
and influenced the world price. They thus operated the cartel to their
own'118tional advantage and that of at least some other producers.
In the early 1980's Saudi influence over the cartel was undermined and
i38
OPEC's fortunes were dramatically reversed. The success of
conservation measures, the entry of new non"OPEC producers,
especially Mexico and Great Britain, and global recession, greatly
reduced world demand for petroleum. At the same time, total
production Was increased as individual producers tried to prevent a fall
in thelr total oil revenues. The consequent decline in oil prices from a
previous high in 11'1$n:ngH of $35 or more a barrel to a low of less than
$12 in the summer of 1986, caused the Saudis to increase production
significantly to force a collapse in the price and thereby to re-establish
their influence over the cartel. Although the oansequences of this
"price war" were undecided, projections suggl~:5ted that the world
demand for petroleum would ag:::,:11overtake supply sometime in the
early 1990's. If and when this occurred, Saudi Arabia would regain Its
domination over the cartel and would once again strongly influence ~he
price of petroleum and world energy.
Although commodity cartels have had varying degrees of success in
raising or maintaining prices, there does not appear to be any other
commodity in a situation similar to that of petroleum.
Over-estimatlon by developing countries of their ability to manipulate
raw material prices, following the model of the oil cartel, hE'S been one
of the causes of the recent failure of the North-south dialogue165•
However, oil is a special case. It is unlikely that even the most
imaginative schemes could alter the long-term market prospects for
any other commodity. One basic reason is that tile industrialised
countries, particularly the United States, Canada, Australla and the
105 H'-1nry Kissinger. For the Record. 1977. Op. cit. p. 33
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Soviet Union, are themselves major producers of commodities like iron
ore, nickel, copper, cotton and sugar. In addition, there are
technologicai possibilities for substitution, which make it difficult to
assert in other cornr.iodltles the kind of control over supply and price,
which the oil cartel enjoys166.
Substitutions for almost all other commodities are readily available, and
tile wqrld demand for many commodities has declined due to dramatic
reduaAions i'l the resource content of manutactured goods. With the
exception of a few metals, the United States or one of its allies can
produce the commodities. However, more importantly, no single
producer like Saudi Arabia exists that can control the supply and
hence the price, Finally, although cartels may benefit certain less
developed countries (as happened with petroleum), they do so only at
the expense of most other LCD's. For many reasons, cartels in scarce
commodities do not eppear to provide a promising method for
improving the lost of the less developed countries.
Traditionally, a fUllctior-:;1 relationship has existed between political,
military and economic power, That is to say, polltlcal power has been
throughout history, a function of military and ~ in recent times more
particularly - of economic power. Take for instance the expansion of
Europe into what later became the colonial areas of the Westmn
Hemisphere, Africa and Asia. That expansion was primarily due to a
technological gap between the colonial powers and the colonised
nations. In other words, the conquest of India by Great Britain (greatly
inferior in manpower and in many other aspects of national power) was
18S 0 't 33p. CI. p.
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largely made possible hy Great Britain's possession of a high
technology which, when transformed into military power; the Indian
States could not reslst'".
Those relationships of a functional nature between technology and
economic power, on the one hand, and polltlcal and military POW€;t, on
the other, have been disturbed - one might even say destroyed. by
the recent use of oil as a political weapon. Measured in terms of
natural resources, they have nothing but sand and oil. However, it is
the oil, which seemingly overnight has made it those small plots on the
map which we call States, important and even powerful factors in world
politics. In other words, a State which has nothing to go on by way of
power, which k~ lanking in all the elements which traditionally have
gone into the making of a national power, suddenly becomes a
powerful factor in world politics because it has one important asset -
oll, This is indeed an event which is of revolutionary importance for
world politics.
A State which is powerless in all other respects, which is not a major
force in terms of traditional power, can exert enormous· and under
certain conditions even decisive - power over nations which have all
the implements of power at their disposal except one- deposits of oil.
Thus a nation like Japan, one of the foremost Industrial nations Of the
world and potentially a great power, is completely dependent upon the
supply of oil from abroad. If for some reason tile oil-producing nations
were to impose a total embargo upon Japan, they could destroy her
political, economic and social fabric, and if they were to combine that
167 Ibid. P 134.
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threat of a total embargo with political conditions, they could impose
their 'Nill upon Japan. They could reduce Japan to the status of satellite,
a dependency of the oil-producing nations.
5.2 Oil revenues for political ends
Since the 1967 war, OAPEC at a serie~:,of Arab conferences held to
determine future policy, a new philosophy towards the use of oil as a
means of achieving desired ends began to emerge. In brief, the new
policy was to make deliberate use of revenues from exported oil to
provide the financial base for the achievement of political ends. The
scope of this new policy - emerging not only from the growth in total
exports, but also from the growth in revenue per barrel166, which rose
from about 30 cents in 1946 to about $1 by 1970 - is clear. In 1972, the
Middle East (including Libya and Algeria but exciliding Iran) exported
over 5000 million barrels of oil and secured some $5,000 million in
revenues. The small monthly payments of approximately $5 million
being made by two of the major Arab oil-producing nations (Kuwait and
Saudi Arabla) to Egypt while the Suez Canal is closed, and to Jordan for
an indef~·,it0"" ';od, to help "Vitn the costs of the Palestine refugees and
the loss \'ll L , 'll;est-bank region to Israel, was a first small indication of
the POS~U)tmlt;S which exist for using oj! revenues for political ends16S.
100See Figur€ 6
169Peter~. Odell. ai/ andWo/1d P(lwer. 3n1., ed, Middlesex,1974.p. 174
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The farmer Egyptian Minister af Fareign Affairs, Mahamed Heikal
argued that no. problem in the Middle East area invalving war and
peace could be salved without an active participation of the twa super-
powers, but that there was no need far the Arab-Israel problem to
become polarised between the farmer Soviet Unian and the United
States. While Egyptians had to. accept that the interests af Arne, .ca
and Israel, Heikal wrote, were closely linked, Egyptians should always
strive to ensure that they did nat become completely identified with
each otner, "We must work to preserve a gap between the interests
and palicies of the two countries, and in that gap we should find room
to manoeuvre and to bring pressure on Israel. The assets on which
we could caunt for the achievement of these ends include our ability
to wage a lirnlted war, our close relations with the Soviet Union (always
provided they are kept properly infarmed at our intentions) the oil
~n and the solidarity of other Arab countries"17O.
ire now appeared to be a chance that oil revenues alone wQuld be
ed to achieve the geo-political aims of the Arab group of States, with
.) main results. Firstly, there would be a flow of oil from the area
unaffected by political crisis, as the praducing countries increasil':gly
attached more importance to ensuring the cantinuation of revenues
from all rather than use oil as a political weapan. Secondly, as a result
af the economic and political advantages that oil revenues could buy,
there would be an Arab Middle East with greater internal cohesion and
a more significant geo-palitical potential among the blocs af the world
in the later part of the twentieth century'".
170 The Roar;! to Ramadan. London. 1975. p, 115
171 Peter Radell. Op. cit. p. 175
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By 1973 Egypt had almost become the laughing stock of the Arab
world. They claimed to be the lead,."r and protector of the Arabs, but
gave no lead to their own people and showed themselves unable to
protect their own territory. We asked others, Mohamed Helkal wrote,
to use their oil weapon but showed Ill) sign of using our own
weapons'",
The symbiotic relationship amon!::1bank creditor, L.OC borrower and
advanced country exporters, worked effectively throughout much of the
1970's. The market was praised for its successful recycling ot petro-
dollars. Then came the second oil crisis in 1979, t: ecession of the
late Carter Administration and the even deeper recession of the first
years of the Reagan Administration. The Reagan "revolution" in
economic policy toll owed these dlsturbinn events. The world economy
and America'S role in it was dramatically trenstormed,
The massive American budget deficit and accompanying restrictive
monetary policy had a profound impact on LOC debtors. The United
States was forced to raise interest rates to finance its unprecedented
budget deficit; this Siphoned off the world's capita!. In addition to
raising. global interest rates and service charges, American policies
induced a world recession that decreased debtor earnings on their
commodity exports. The un-anticipated reversal in interest payments
placed the debtors in an impossible position; the rise of protectionism
against their manufactured goods aggravated their plight by decreasing
their export earnings. The debtors suddenly found themselves caught
__ .._. ~ _ __i
172Mohamed Hell,,! The Road to Ramadan. London, 1975. p.205
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between increased interest payments due tc the "crowding out"
phenomenon caused by the American budget deficIt and decreased
prices for their cLlmmodity and other exports due to the global
recession. The world "debt crisis had arrived.
American officials played a key role in the transformation of wand
financial markets, most notably on two occasions. The first was in
1971when Nixonclosed the "gold window". No longer was it possible
to redeem dollars for gold. For non-Americans this meant that they
had to keep their dollars on deposit somewhere in the world or convert
them into some other currency. The second event carne eight years
later, in 1979, when Paul Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, tried to fight inflation in the United States by cutting the money
supply. He used the standard tool, charging substantlally higher
interest rates to commercial banks to obtain dollars:from the Federal
Reserve. Since the dollar was the reserve currency for the world,
however, the Fedhad unwittingly raised interest rates everywhere, and
both interest rates and exchange rates began fluctuating widely. The
bUYing,selling and lending of monetary products world-wide became
businesses in themselves. Most of it had little or nothing to do with
lnvestmen eitherproduction or commerce. (However, as exchange
rates became more volatile, hedging became almost a necessity for
some transitional businesses). Foreign banks of the world saw that
they could reap quick profits in commissions, fees and interest L1Y
"recycling" tens ot billions of 'petro-donars" from the coffers of Kuwait
and SaudiArw)ia to the governments and their business associates in
poor countries.
In brief, the combination of the massive OPEC financial surplus, the
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over-eagerness of the lnternatlonal private banks (frequently abetted
by their governments) to recycle that surplus, and the multitude of
capital-hungry economies in Eastern Europe and the Third World
proved to be a dangerous mixture. This curious alliance of capitalist
bankers hoping to profit from the accumulated OPEC surplus and the
govemments of less developed and East European countries 5..,eking
unrestricted financial support for state-directed programs of rapid
economic growth brought the capitalist world to the brink of financial
disaster. Although the tale Is complicated and its conclusion not as yet
unfolded, it is clear that the debt problem introduced a novel and
unstable element into thE')post-war international financial system.
The shift by the United States to i\ more restrictive monetary policy in
1979, the spread of global re-esslon and the energy conservation
efforts of the advanced economies, produced a third oil shock; a
major decline in revenues for oil exporters like Algeria, Nigeria and
Mexico. Those countries had sunk heavily Into debt to finance
development projects, subsidise food imports and expand welfare
programs. With the drop in ail revenues, they found themselves
unable to finance their debt burden.
The global recession, the rise In real interest rates due to the drop in
the rate of inflation, and the declining terms of trade for the exports of
debtor economies producer: a global debt problem and a severe threat
to the integrity of the international financial system. TI1e market was
unable to manage the escalating onsls. In 1982, with the Mexican
economy $86 billion in debt and on the verge of default, optimism gave
way to deep pssslmlsm, Drastic and immediate action was clearly
required.
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5.3 The implementation and first use of the "oil weapon"
In October 1973, the Egyptian armies swarmed over the Suez Canal.
In the new few days of fighting, they and the Syrians to the north
dramatically reversed the current of the previous decades and proved
that Arabs could hold their own with lsrae' in open battle. In the still
more critical weeks that followed, oil for the first time was used as a
political weapon by the Arab powers. Yet these events were only the
culmination of a lang and patient process of negotiations and
reconstruction which had gone on since the crushing defeat of the
Arabs In the June War of 1967113,
President Sadat ordered a meeting of the Egyptian National Security
Council- a polltlcal body- on the 2nd October. At this meeting, in
Ramadan 174, the President explained that it might be necessary in the
near future to break the cease-fire. He was asked what sort of battle
he expected tv result and said he thought it would be a limited battle.
Some of triose present tried to get him to define more preCisely what
he meant by a "limited battle". The President WAS asked whether he
thought oil would become aweaponln the battle. . ,is answer was that
he did not think he could make any demands on the oil-producing
Arab States in advance but that once the fighting had started! any
Egyptian requests would find a ready -esponss'".
After the failure of the Unit~d States Security Council called by United
States President Nixon to meet, attention began to move to the
173 Ibid. p, 23.
174 The Ramadan is the month-long fast commemorating tho first revelation of the
Loran during \!.thlch devout Moslems neither eat nor drink during the hours of daylight.
175 Mohamed He!kal. Op. cit. p, 27
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question of the air-lift of arms to the combatants. The Israelis had
organised an air-lift from the first moment of the war, diverting as many
of their own civilian planes as they could to the United States where
they were enabled, with ~he express sanction of President Nixon, '(0
load up with arms and ammunition, When the Egyptians and Syrians
heard of this Israeli air-lift, they increased their pressure on the
Russians to organise a corresponding air-lift for themselves. Once this
Russian air-lift to the Arabs had started, trte Americans stepped up
their air-lift to Israel, making open use of American plans for this
purpose. There was however, a conflict between the State Department
and the Pentagon, with some fearing that if the United States rushed
to Israel all the arms that were being asked for (and the Israeli
demands tor, above all, antl-tank guns and missiles il~c.: become
urgent) there would be an adverse reactlon en the Arab side and even
the implementation of the much feared "all weapon"!".
During the oeober "1973Arab-lsraall War, OAPEC oil ministers met In
Kuwait on 16 October. The next day, in a gesture of sympathy with
Syria and Eqypt, reacting to United States Pres1dent RicharCl Nixon's
declslon to air-11ftweapons ta Israel on a massive scale, the Arab
member States of OPEC177 decided that "all Arab oil exporting
countries shall forthwith cut produetlor; by no less than 5 per cent of
the September produoton, and maintain the same rate of reduction
each month until the Israeli forces are fully withdrawn from all Arab
territories occupied during the [June] 1967 [Arab·ls,aell) War and the
---,~~,--.""""",__----------------....-
170 Ibid, p. 245
117 OPEC Is an organlsallon formed In 1960, as discussed In Chapter 4, and includes
the for,owing member States: t,lgerla, Saudi Arabia. United Arab Emlratos (UAI:),
equ<.1dor.Gabon, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran. KU'Nolt. Nigeria, Katar, L.ybla,and Venezuela,
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leqltlrnate rights of the Palestinian people are restored176", They
categorised the consumer countries as friendly, neutral or hostile to the
Arab cause, with friendly nations to be supplied at the saoterober level,
neutrals at a reduced level and hostile ones not at all. They also
confirmed the steep price rise decided earlier by OPEC. Saudi Arabia
ordered .~ 25 per cent cut in Its out-put, then running at 8 million
barrels a day, but Iraq ignored the OAPEC decision. Two days later,
Saudi Arabia suspended indefinitely all on shipments to the United
States. The reduction in the international supply of oil sent prices
soaring and caused the world community to reassess its previously
held assumptions that about petroleum production.
The October 1 '73War completely changed the 'face of the petroleum
industry and provided the oil-producing nations with a level of power
that was previously thought impossible for tli' 'T1 to achieve.
One consequence of the war was that the Arabs used the so-called "oil
weapon" for the first time. This was something that many people in the
Arab world had been demanding for a long time and which many
people in the West had been dreading. However, as will be seen, the
first application of it did little to harm those it was meant to harm, or
benefit those it was meant to benefit.
As the former Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Heikal
wrote:
"It was hoped that the oil-producing countries would co-operate
178 See Figura 10
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by putting pressure on the Americans, but should these hopes
not be realised it might become necessary to think of other
ways of exerting pressure.'?".
As Henry Kissinger stated to a request by the editors of the
Washington Post, published in the Washington Post on the 29th
November, 1979:
"In 1973~74, Iran was the only Middle East oil-producing country
that did not join the oil embargo against us; it continued to sel!
oil ,to the United States, to Israel, and to our other allies. Iran
kept its oil production at maximum oapaolty (thus helping
stab'llse the price) and never used all as a polnloal weapon.
The Shah was a source of assistance and encouragement to
the forces of moderation in the Middle East, Africa and Asia; he
used his own military power to ensure the security of the
Persian Gulf and to discourage adventures by radlcals. He
firmly supported the peace process that culminated in the
Egyptian-Israeli treaty; he was a defender of President Sadat
against rad!"<ll forces in the area. After his Initial advocacy of
higher prices in 1973, he used his Influence to keep the prices
steady so that the real price of oil actually declined over the
period from 1973 to 1978 (due to inflation).Jl18o.
Un!il<ethe June 1967 embargo. this only hurt the United States .<partly
because it was applied during autumn and winter when demand for
119 Op. cit. p, 36
180 For the Record: Selected Statements 1977-1980. london, 1981. p.253.
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heating oil was high, and partly because the United States had
become more dependent on Arab oil, as I dealt with in Chapter 4. The
OAPEC move reduced the annual United States gross domestic
product by $10·20 billion.
These oil embargoes, which might have become the Achilles heel of
the south African economy, and threatened a real crisis, was one for
which South Africa had plenty of time to prepare, Kuwait banned all
exports to South Africa in 1964, as part of an international bid to farce
South Africa to change; her policies, with very little effect on the
country's supplies. The OPEC added weight to the ban in the i973
embargo; but at that time South Africa could still obtain supplies from
Iran, and continued to import Iranian oil until the Iranian revolution of
1979 no longer made this possible. However, by this time, South
Africa possessed its own oll-tram-coal, as I wili deal with in the next
chapter.
The resolve of OAPEC members, especially of :SaudiArabia, began to
falter. Aware of the staunchly antlcommunist views of the Saudi
monarch, Falsal ibn Abdul Azlz, Edward Heath, Prime Minister of Britain
(which was not on the Arab oil embargo list) (~rgued publicly in late
December that any prolonged oil squeeze wOllld, by weakening the
West, strengthen communism. It did not take long for president Anwar
Sadat, working in conjunction with United states Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, to convince Faisal to end the ernbarqo, Falsal and
Sadat then prevailed upon other members of OAPEC to end the five-
month embargo on 18 March 1974 "as a token at Arab goodwill" to the
W~st ~ even though the Israelis had not withdrawn from anywhere in
the occupied Arab territories and the I(~gitimate rights of the Palestinian
Ij
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people had not been restor .ja,
As a consequence of the embargo, the first oil shock occurred in 1973-
1974, when, shortly after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the price of oil
increased fourfold as a result of that major Middle Eastern oil
producer's collective aotlon'". The second jump in world oil prices
produced by the oil-exporting countries occurred in 1979-1980 in the
wake of the revolution in Iran. Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait on August 2,
1990 precipitated the third shock. The next day, Friday, August 3, the
United States National Security Council met at the White House, The
United States President Sush indicated that he agreed with his national
security adviser. The participants discussed economic sanctlons, and
ways the administration might work with the allies and the United
Nations to erect a wall around Saddam to isolate him. They discussed
a CIA report arguing that the invasion posed a threat to the current
world order and that the long-term impact on the world economy could
be devastating. .$atJdam was bent on turning Iraq into an Arab super-
power M a balance to the United States, the former Soviet Union and
Japan. Control of.20 per cent \.. \116 world's oil would give him more
than enough leverage. Bush ordered the CIA to begin planning far a
covert operation that would destabilise the regime and, he hoped,
remove Saddam from power'",
On the 29th November, the United States Security Council met to vote
for an authorization to use force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If
it passed, the resolution would be the broadest authority for war it had
1e1 ..8ee Figure 6
IIl2 Bob WOOdward. The Commanders. New York, 1991. p.237
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granted since Korea in '1950. The resolution passed 12 to 2. Yemen
and Cuba were the two countries voting against it. China abstalned'".
As the former United States President Richard Nixon wrote: 184
"it became embarrassingly obvious that the consuming
countries had become so dependent on OPEC - and the OPEC
governments had assumed so commanding a position in oil
decisions - that in the short run, at least, the West was virtually
helpless in the face of whatever demands those governments
might choose to make. The control over Midwest oil had shifted
from the multinational companies to the host countries and
statesmanship and restraint on the part of Arab leaders
suddenly became the key to Western survival. Neither the oil
companies nor the Western governments could dictate terms to
the OPEC countries any longer. The best the Western nations
could do was try to persuade the producing nations that their
own lang-term interests were tied up With those of the West;
that if their actions wrecked the Western economies, or
destroyed the dollar, or so weakened the West that it could no
longer protect their interests as weh as its own, then those
actions would be ultimately self-deieatlng.".
The oil factor was a major incentive for Washington's intensive effort
to seek a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
183 Ibid. p. 333.
164 The Real War. London, 1980. p.81.
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These efforts were represented by Secretary of State Kissinger's 80-
called shuttle dipiomacyl0S In January 1974 Kissinger negotiated a
disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, and in
September 1975 he persuaded the two parties to sign a document
known as Sinai II, which provide for the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Western Sinai. United States peace-making was smoothed by
economic assistance. The special relationship between the United
States and Israel was reconfirmed during the negotiating sessions and
was reflected by an increase in United ~",t""" 'YJilitary aid from an
average annul sum of $400 million in the ,j 1971-1973 to an
average of $1,5 billion during 1974-1975. This amounted to 42 per
cent of Israel's annual defence spending. Egypt also reaped rewards
for its willingness to follow Kissinger's lead. The United States
contributed to the reconstruction of the Suez Canal, which reopened
in i975, and raised its economic assistance package to Cairo from
$8,5 million in 1974 to $750 milliQn by '1976.
5.4 Economic consequences of the oil embargoes
Although the domination of the world economy by multinational
corporations seemed assured in the 1960's as discussed in Chapter
4, the '1973-74 oil embargo by OPEC and the subsequent massive rise
in the price of petroleum demonstrated that nation-States had not lost
their capacity for counter-attack. Within a relatively short period of
time, the gigantic oil companies - previously ~hE..1 Jintessential
185 T/Je White House Years. London, 1988. p. 558.
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international corporations - had had rr " of their foreign subsidiaries
nationalised and had become subservient to States earlier considered
powerless and servile. World history records little equivalent
redistribution of wealth and power in such a short period.
In the United States, the close identification of corpoate interests and
national interest be~an to wane after the 19'/3 energy crisis.
Organised la~our and certain academic critics had long been
concerned about the implications of foreign investment for domestic
employment, the dlstrlbution of national income, and the competitive
position of the American economy. Such criticism became more
general at the time of the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, when
United States oil companies were viewed as aiding the Arab oil
embargo of Western countries. Subsequently, with the relative decline
of American industry and the onset of rn"''3sive trade deficits, high
unernployrnert, and chronic balance-of-payments difficulties, the belief
has spread that multinationals export United States jobs and decrease
United States exports. some critics hav') argued that multinationals
should be forced to invest in the American economy and to limit the
transfer of American technology to competitor economles'".
In all G7 courmles.!" long-term trends in unemployment since the War
show a distinct break around ',970. The increase in unemployment.
has been greatest in the major countries of the European Union, with
18e Robert Gilpin. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, '1987.
p. 244
187 The seven leading Industrialised First World nations" the United States, Canada,
Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and It<aly- who meet annually to discuss
global economic issues,
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Western Germany experiencing an almost eight-fold increase (from a
very low base). Of the major European countries, only Italy had a
relatively small proportionate increase in unemployment, but this was
from what was, for the 1960's, a high base. Canada and the United
States, both relatively high unemployment countries in the 1960'S have
also suffered "only" 50 per centum and 130 per cent increases in
average levels of unemptoyrnent'". "The year 1969 marked the first
trade deficit of the United States with Japan, and the nation 'fell behind
in its competition with Germany as well. As inflation climbed, so did
unemployment. By the earl) 1970's stagnation became a new
phenomenon. The Great American industrial machine, the source of
unprecedented politioal and economic might, was running down,
Government and consumers alike were spending Wildly, and inveslillg
little. America's competitiveness, especially v:-,;<a-vis Japan and its East
~sian neighbours, was eroding. In 1973, U,:~rapid rise in the price of
._ ,--
oil dictated by OPEC exacerbated the ,fficulties. Rather than facing
the reality of increasingly expensive energy, the government sought to
soften the blow. Its control of oil prices delayed the inevitable
adjustment by the automobile indllstr,{ and by the economy as a
whole. The country was still feeling the consequences of that exercise
in escapism as. late as the '1980's. Blrnultaneoualy, new perceptions
of the environment were forcing Americans to realise that they were
contaminating their' life-support system. Air and water, like oil, were
neither tree nor inexpensive. In response to the crisis and interest-
group pressures, government regulation proliferated. This was a
massive intervention in the free-enterprise system, but, because
Americans were so adverse to the concept of planning, the intervention
was fraqmented.",
168 George C Lodge. !deology and Nation,": Competitiveness. 1a87. p. 166.
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Japan's experenoe is exceptional, r.aving very low unemployment in
the 1960's, and from that low base suffering liei il~/,a 120 per cent
increase16S. The economic disruption visited upon the 1970's by oil
price shocks, together with the deflationary measures taken by G7
governml9nts in reaction to the oil price rise, might be thought to be
the source of the deterioration in G7 economic pertorrnance'". Not
only had the WElstern economies absorbed similar rises in raw material
prices at the time of the Korean War without similar slow-down, but
also the new high trend levels of unemployment were not notably
affected by the collapse in oil prices and other commodity prices. In
1986191
Many of the post-war favourable supply conditions had dramatically
changed by the 1980's, at lei;.ld as far as tl1t. advanced economies
were concerned. Not only did these economies no longer possess
inexpensive labour supplies, but In some cases they were forced to
import "gLIi.9st workers" or resort to the strategy of foreign direct
investment in low-wage economies. The global shortage of capital
raised real interest rates, thus depressing gl'Owth rates. On the
positive side, at least for importing countries, the world in the mid-
1980's hod a glut of petroleum'" and other commodities due in part
to conservation measures and reductions in the material content of
manufactured goods. This over-capacity I particularly in petroleum,
however, was also a consequence of the restrictive growth policies
180 Jonathan Michle. Managing tlla Global £!conomy. Oxford, 19913.p.271
100 The OECO ostimatod that 20 per cent of th~ loss in OECO real lncome we" duo
to the terms of trade effect of tho 011price rise, ch'd 80 par cent duo to tho concerted
donatiO;"; of the Western economies.
10! Jonathan Michie. Op. cit. p. 272.
102 Soe Figure 12
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pi.rsued by many ~overnments rather than being solely as a reversal
of the supply situation that had triggered the global recession in 197~1;
many governments had trade-efts of higher levels of unemployment
and lower rates of economic growth for reductions in tile rate I;f
inflatior and energy costs. With the continuing industrialisation of the
less developed countries, the world demand for petroleum could onee
again exceed supply sometime in the 1990's.
The most problematic aspect of supply conditions had been tne
change in the technological situation. Although important new
technological opportunities existed in computertaatlon, bio·technolcgy
and other advanced fields, it was highly doubtful that the would cause
a replication of the unprecedented post-war global rate of economic
qrowth, This unusual situation created elevated expectations of' an
ever-increasing standard of living and of expanding welfare programs
in many economies, which had made adjustment much more difficult.
Oil and politics· Of' more accurately, "petroleum and politlcs" because
gas is Involved too - have enormous potential to make eaoh other's job
more difficult. Daniel Yorgln reminds us in his recent book that oil is
a commodity "intimately intertwined with national strategies and global
politics and power"; and he goes on to s£~ythat:-
"Today, oil Is the only commodity whose doings ana
controversies are to be found regularly not nniy on the business
page but also on tha front page",103.
---...~~ --------~-----,
103 TIlO Prize: TlIO EpiC;Quest tor Oil, Money and Powor. London, 1991
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However, polltloalproblems, pressures and prioritiei~change over time.
The politics of oil in the '1990'd are VNY difffjrent from those ot
the1960's and 1970'. With hindsight, we can now see that the 1980's
was a decade of transition; suspicion and unease between "polities
and petroleum" giving way to a greater sense of lntsrdependence!".
Something else happened In the 1980's. Whether as a cause or a
consequence is not too important; but it Is clear that many
governments now feel that petroleum compani.t:lspose a far smaller
threat to the public interest than was once widely supposed. It is
beneficial that they should reach this conclusion, although tor thE::
Industry this is not all-qood news. The risks facing the community are
as great as ever - not least because We are now expected to assume
som~~ofthe risk formerly should ~red by governments106.
\.
A different kir'Jdof consequence occurred in 1973 when the Bretton
Woods196 system came to an end. In March, the decision was taken
to let exchange rates float. Then, the quadrupling of world energy
prices in the OPEC revolution dealt another blow to the system'". Its
impact on international balances of payment and on financial markets
confronted the dominant economic powers once again with the task
of realigning their ourrencles, 11'1contrast to the Smithsonian
......------------------------------------------
194 see Figures 4 and 5
198 Robert Horton. Oil and POlitics in tile 1990's in tll(~World Today. 19S2. p. 101
10a Created by the design of new International financIal machinery. This had been
under discussion slnce 1942, and agreement was reached at a UnIt......Na1lons
Conference at Bretton Woods in the summer of 1944 Two new Institutions, an
International Monetan' Fund (IMF) ~nd an International Bank for Reconstruction and
OevolopmtUl'lt (IBRD), were created. The chief purpose of the IMP were to maintain
exchange stability and to assist the establlshment of a multilateral system of
payments, unhampered by foreign exchange restrictions. The IBRD was ccrrcsmed
to facilit3te investment for productive purposes.
197 John Williorn$on. The Open Economy Ilnd tile WarfelEconomy: A Textbook in
Internotional Economics. New York, 198$
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Agreement however. in which the currency realignments !-Jadbeen
forced upon other countries by the United States and then negotiated
multilaterally, the key actor this time was West Germany, which refused
to continue to support the dollar. In effect, the United States and its
economic partners decided to abandon the post-war system of fixed
exchange rates in favour at one based on flexible rates. The refusal
of an important ally to allow American economic leadership led to the
abandonment of a key component of the Bretton Woods system.
Bretton Woods was, in truth, an extension of the United States
domestic financial system to the world, and the attempts at building an
enlightf)ned world financial government were compromised even in the
exceptional circumstances of the early post-war perlod'". First: the
early 1970's $aw progressive disintegration and the eventual
breakdown of the Br~)ttonWoods system: currency market turbulence
and exchange rate instability could thus be expected to persist until
floating was generalised and the markets learned and established new
rules of the game. Second, the inflationary experience fallowing the oil
price rises of the 197Q's had destablllsing influences for the
international monetary and financial system109•
The de faoto end of fixed eXChemf,;l8 rates and the Bretton '/veods
system was made de jure in 1976, at a meeting of the leading IMf'2~il
members held in Kingston, Jamaica. Tile Jamaica conrarence decided
as follt)ws:
_~_of~"""__ ' ""';~, _
1D{) Jonathan MichIe, Op. cit. p. 305
1CO Jonatha~)Michie, Op cit. p. 55
200 Intornatlonal Monetary Fund (IMF) lal an autcnomcue organlsaticm, affiliated since
1947 with the United Nations; ¢o-operotos c\ol:mlywith tll0 Intornational Bank for
Reconstruction and Oavolopment (IBRO); designed to faCIlitate int()lI1a'ional trade.
rocuee !nequltles In exchange and \itabllise currencies
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(1) floating exchange rates were legalised;
(2) the reserve role of gold was t -luced;
(3) IMF quotaswere increased,especially those of OPEC countries;
(4) funding for the lass developed countries was increased; and.
most Important,
(5) the determination of the par value of a currency became the
responsibility of the country itself.
Domestic autonomy ha{j triumphed over international rules; nations
disengaged from the requirements of a fixed-exchange system In order
to pursue one or another nationalobjective such as expanding exports,
stimulating economic activities, or preventing the importation of
inflationary pressures.
Now c:.lOn~iderih& suppiy side of the equation. Oil and natural gas
production in the United Statespeaked by 1970. Oil imports increased
rapidly, so that by 1977 imports amounted to more than 40 per cent
of all United States consumption. Early In the 1970's, there was
serious dlsousslon of massive imports of liquefied natural gas to the
United States. Elsewhere, the major pe .. 'c. .im exporters, many of
which were Middle Eastern countries and almost all of which had
relatively backward economies heavily reliant on the petroleum
indul:ltlY, were becoming increaslngiy aware th~t tholr reserves wore
finite and, in some cases, approaching exhaustion at current rates of
extraction.
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5.5 Increasing dependence of the oil consumers
Yet even as the Cold War division between east and West has lost its
significance, so economic progress is also erasing the division
between North and South that was once so intense. Today, producers
and consumers have a common interest in the technological advances
needed to keep oil environmentally as well as economically
competitive, The global energy supply system itself has become much
more flexible. Over the last two decades, both producers and
consum ..l,:'i have learned powerful lessons that reinforce their mutuality
of lnterests and recognition of inter-dependence. Those lessons in
themselves ar€)a form of security. They constItute a major element in
a framework that can help buffer whatever surprises may lie ahead.
In the middle of the 1970's the world entered what has been called the
Second Cold War. It coincided with a major change in the world
economy, the period of lonq-term crisis which was to chcraoterlse the
two decades beginning in 1973, and reached a climax in 1.:16 early
1980's. However, Initially till'; change in the economic: clima~a was not
much noticed by the players In the super-power game, except for the
sudden jump In energy prices brought about by tile successful coup
of tht':l oil-producers cartel, OPEC, one of several developments which
seemed to suggest a waake!"lin(1 of the international domination of the
United States. Both super-powers, in that time, were reasonably
happy abou' tne soundness of their economies. The United !States
was plainly less affected by the new economic slow-down than Europe;
the former Soviet Union - whom the gods they wish to destroy they
first make complacent - felt that everything was going its way. Leonid
Brezhnev, Khrushchev's successor, who presided over the tW19nty
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years of what Sovi,et reformers were to call "The era of stagnation",
seemed to have some cause for optimism, not least because the oil
crisis of 1f)73 had Just quadrupled the international market value of the
gigantic new deposlts of oil and natural gas which had been
discovered in the termer Soviet Union since the middle 1960's,
Yet, economlcs apart, two-year mter-related developments now
seemed to shift tt~e balaooe .of the super-powers. The first was what
looked like defeat and destabillsation in the United States, as that
country launched itself into a Im~ior war. The Vietnam War
demoralised and divided the nation, amid televised scenes of riot and
entl-war demonstrations; destroyed an American President; led to a
universally predicted defeat and retreat otr9r ten years (1965-1975);
and, what W8'S even more to the point, demonstrated the isolation of
the United States as not a single one of Amerlca's European allies sent
even nominal contingencies of troops to fight ah:mgslde the United
Stclte$ forces, Why the United States came to emb.·oil itself in a
doomed war against which both its allies, neutrals and even the former
SOjilietUnion had warned it, is almost impossible to understand except
as' part of that dense cloud of incomprehension, confusion and
paranoia through which the main actors in tbe Cold War tapped their
Wi~y,
"\:'$ if Vietnam was not enough to demonstrate America's isolation, the
iJ~~!3Yom Kippur War between israel, which the United States had
allowed to become its closest ally in .'(heMiddle East, and tile sovlet-
~juppfied forces of Egypt and Syria, made it even more evdent, When
a hard-pressed Israel, short of planes and ammunition, appealed to the
United States to rush supplies, the European allies, with the single
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exception of Portugal, refused even to allow United States planes to
use the United States air bases on their soil for this purpose (the
supplies reached Israel via the Portuguese Azores Islands). The
United States believed ~one does not quite see why ~that Its own vital
interests were at stake, Indeed, the United States Secretary of State,
Henry I<issingsr (whose President, Richard Nixon, was otherwise
engaged vainly tried to fend off impeachment) actually declared the
first nuclear alert since the Cuban missile crisis, an action characteristic
in its brutal insincerity of this able and cynical operator. This did not
sway America's allies who were far more concerned with their oil
supplies from the Middle East than with supporting some regional ploy
of the United States which Washington claimed unconvincingly to be
essential to the global struggle against communism; for through
OPEC, the Arab States of the Middle East had done what the> could
to impede support for Israel by cutting oil supplies and threatening all
embargoes. In dOing so, they discovered their ability to multiply the
world price of oil and the foreign ministries of the world could not fail
to notice that there was nothing the all-powerful United States did or
could immediately do about that.
The' oil embargo of 1973 was a momentous event for the States of the
Arabian Peninsula as well as for the world economy. Arab oil
producers discovered that their petroleum could be used as a
diplomatic weapon in the Arab·lsraeli conflict, and oil consumers were
brought to a sudden recognition of their growing dependence on
Middle Eastern oil. By withholding their oil from the market, the
producing States were given an opportunity to discover the true value
of their most precious resource. During the final months of 1973,
consuming countries were willing to pay several times the set price for
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non-Arab oil. When the Arab producers re-entered the market-place
in January 1974, they Joined with their OPEC partners to set the price
of a barrel ot oil at $i1,65, a dramatic increase from the $2.74 price of
a year earlier. Until 1982, the price of oil rose steadily, bringing
enormous wealth and enhanced status to the producing States.
011 revenues fuelled a development boom of unprecedented
proportions among the States of the Arabian Peninsula. Yet amid the
glittering material improvements and the disruptive social changes,
political power remained in the hands of the hereditary dynasties. The
dominant ruling families attempted to preserve their authority by
preventing the emergence of representative assemblies and mass
politics. They muted discontent by the skilful distribution of all income,
providing well-paying jobs for the.educated elite and generaL'Swelfare
systems for the population as a whole. This technique created
remarkable politica.l stability and assured the survival of the rul!ng
families. It did not however resolve problems, but merely postponed
them.
Each of the lmportinf:! countries reacted to the all embargoes in its own
way. Some, which imported almost all of the petroleum they used'2O\
made sure that the flJII price increase was reflected in the prices paid
by the users of refined petroleum products. The United States, a
significant importer that nevertheless produced more than half of its
<crude oil domestically, respcndsd rather schizophrenically. Public..
policy WaS confused because at the outset, there was broad
disagreement at the most baste levels of diagnosis: Was it a polltlcal
,-----------------.----~-
201 See Figure 12
165
problem or an eccnomlc problem, and if a political problem, was it a
problem for foreign or domestic policy?
During the early years of the "energy crisis", the politloal diagnosis
seemed to old. Reducing domestic consumption was the stated goal
of the fOi'eign po!ioy attack, with the objective of reducing the demand
for OPEC oil and thus undermining the cartel. To this purpose, speed
limits on the interstate highways were reduced from 70 to 55 miles per
hour, a rather crude method of reducing the total miles driven while
increasing the average number of miles per gallon of gasoline
consumed.
The dominant domestic political objective seemed to be distributional.
The negative impacts of the energy crisis on the welfare of ordinary
consumers were to be minimised, and red'strlbutlcn from citizens to
domestic oil producers was t.... je limited to politically acceptable levels.
Obviously. the foreign and domestic political objectives were in direct
conflict. If one wishes to reduce the quantity of onergy dema "ded as
a means of reduoing imports, it is counterproductive to protect the
ultimate consumers of energy from large price increases202• When
OPEC increased the price of 011 again in 1979, the second oil shock
helped throw the industrialised world into a recession. In 1982, it
brought the United States the deepest recession it had experienced
since World War II. Immediately thereafter, the United States entered
into the longest period of peace-time growth in its history. Low
Inflation and low unemployment accompanied this growth. However,
---_.-...-----_._-------,_,_. __.-
202 Alan Randall. cp, cit. 307
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in the middle and late 1980's, the United States also experienced large
federal budget deficits, huge balance-at-trade deficits and a burgeoning
national debt. According to some methods of acoountlnq, it Was
transformed from the world's largest creditor to the world's largest
debtor. Finally, in 1890, the long period of economic growth came to
an end as the United States entered into a recession, which, along with
the Persian Gulf War, threatened to create even larger federal budget
deficits203•
Oil demands, left stagnant or declining by the 1970's oil crisis, only
began to grow again after the 1986 price collapse. By 1989, world
consumption finally regained the previous record level of 1979, and is
continuing to grow204, Indeed, If Russia is excepted, world oil demand
is currently increasing at 1,8 per cent per year, even in the midst of a
weak global economy.
:Jowever, tile pattern of growth has changed. Demand is rather fiat in
North America and Western Europe, reflecting among ather things, the
growing use of more efficient automobiles. In these nations, the all
industry is preoccupied with the costs of staying in business. The US
oil industry is estimated to be facing $152 billion in costs and
investment over the next 20 years to meet environmental s~andards205.
Demand growth is elsewhere - reflecting economic advancement In the
developing world. The new prize is Asia. Economic "miracles",
sustained growth and rising incomes require energy, M~i1Y of these
2·)3 James Ute Ray. Global Politics. 6th ed. Eoston, 1995. p. 26f.)
204 (lee Figure 10
205 ~'ai;onal Petroleum Council. USPetroleum Refining: A Repwt to tIm US Secretary
of energy. Washington, i993.
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countries are swiftly applying higher envronrnental standards, but they
do not want to be impeded from striving for higtler standards. Over a
decade, Asia will require in excess of a trillion dollars of energy
investment to support economic growth2oa•
Oil demand will Increase by five million barrels or more. 8y early ;1
next decade, Asia will be consuming more oil than North Am-..t
This means a shift In the oil market's centre of gravity and the ASI~Il,
countries will come to play a bigger role in investment and oil trade,
commensurate with their stakes. Despite continued conservatlon,
global oil demand could be 15 to 20 per cent higher a decade from
now. The trend could, of course, be changed by the considerable
research and development efforts to find alternatives to oil, particularly
in transportation. Yet, as things are today, 011 is more than
economically competitive - something that would have seemed unlikely
in the era of the oll crlsls,
The years ahead will see an economic and envronmental competition
at'-long energy sources, a teohnologlcal horse race In which tens of
billions of dollars will be wagered. "1:"0 date, all is proving to be
environmentally competitive, keeping up with or even running ahead of
new standards, albeit with considerable Investment.
Natural gas, once the unwanted by-product of oil production, Is now
O;!~Sbiggest competitor and is becoming the pre-nun 1'1 fuel around the
world. A great deal of the financial resources of th~ "o'l and gas
industry" will aotually be going into natural gas. It Is an environmentally
206 Cambridge Energy Research Assoclatlons, Energy Investment to Meet As/n's
Economlr:: Growth. MA, 1993
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attractive fuel; some even call it the "politically correct" energy source.
A decade from now there is every likelihood of baing a vigorous and
diversified international trade in naturel gas. Natural gas Is not a
significant competitor in tranerJortatior, wham oil re1gr,s supreme.
Rather, the battle for rnerkets will be played out around the world in
elsctrlc generation, where the emphasls will \'3fY much be on
environmental attributes.
However, the;n1 is a question mark over oil supplies. An United States
emoarqo has excluded Iraq from the world market since it nNailed
Kuwait. As €I, result, Iraq has forgone more than $4(' billion of oil
earnings frcJI11',August1990 to 1993 At some point, however, Iraq will
meet United States requirements and will re-enter the world market
with substantial exports. When it does, prices could V/{~nsag for a
time.
As It is, OPEC countries continue to argue over quotas. Still. tho
market balance is very different from the conditions of a decade agel.
Even tal~in9 tho circumstances provC'iling in Iraq, the world eil market
is operating at about 92 per cent of production capacity, quite different
from the 1990's when it was down to 80 per cent. Today's market is
reminiscent of the balance in the 1970's on the eve of the fir~t oil
shock.
AlthoLlgh political considerations and producer-consumer relations are
very differant from the '1980'3, a tight oil market is vulnerablo to ahocks
in a way that an over-supplied market is not. ProjE:ctinginto the next
century, Ort(3 sees no shortage of potertlat crisis thnt could affect world
all supplies, with dangerous consequences. Future crisis could ~lrlse
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from tho Middle Ea:)t, as in tho past. Since the fall of ths Shah in 1979.
Ir:nn'n population has grown from 39 million people to mora than 60
million'~Ci7. Its pol1cies in the future are ur'Jsrtain. torn as they will be
between Islamic militancy, both at horne and abroad, and economic
self·interest. A number 0: other countries are feeling the pressure of
political Islam and social turbulence. However future crisis could also
ariso from events in other parts of the world such as some kind of
disruption in the former Soviet Union.
The embargo caused the cost of oil to soar and speeded up
negotiation;.; that enabled oil producers to acquire t,('ntrol of pricing
and marlt€)ting, As the price of oil increased prGlcipit\.'usly, dire
predictions were made about the collapse of the Western and
Japanese economiee. However, the industrialised nations were willing
to pay whatever' the market would bear. Access to oil, not its price,
became the ariving force behind the West'~ pcllcles toward the oil-
producing States. To ensuro access, the Wast, led by the United
stetss, sought to ShOl'S up the friendly monarchies that ruled most of
the major oU-producing States and preserve the politrcal status quo In
the Persian Guleoo.
Of the several new pOlitical forces to pmergo during this era, two may
be mentioned here. Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the
Gaze strip followin~J the 1967 was cantril! ,tod to the rise ('f Palestil1ian
organi,:;ations committed to the establishment of at": independent
Palestinian State. The activities of these organisations exercised a
201 Sw T:i[Juro 7
:JOO WilHam L. Cllwcland A History of Mariam Mfcldlo fIast. Oxford. 1994.
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major influence on Middle Eastern developments. A second factor, the
revival of IslAmic-based poJitl;,;ai activity, w().s not really new, but it
appeared with new tor:A, In the 'first two decades after World War II,
Western developing world fOI tha, matter, would become increasingly
secular as they became increasingly modern, Yet even as the role of
the ulama declined and the jurisdiction of 'ihe Shariah was leglsl~.\ted
out of existence, the Islamic senslbllltiss of the population as a whote
remained intact. When the lrnpor' ed Id9010g:e$ of the independence
era failed to bring economic well being to soolety at large, a current of
Islamic revivalism came into existence. Its most dramatic manifestation
was the Iranian revolution of 1979 ..but it was a persistent feature of t'1a
poHticallife of every Islamic country in the Middle East and shows little
sign of sbating200•
The overthrow of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran in early,1979,
partly caused by a strike in the lranlan ali industry, raised the price
from $14 to $28 a barrel within a few months. The outbreak of lran-
Iraq War in September 1980, resulting in extensive damage to both
countries' oil industries and a drop in their oil exports, led to higher
prlces during 1981 f reaching a spot-price peak of $41 a barrel but
st~' :lsing around $34 a barrel in the early 1980's. When, in res pam ,J
to the high price, world-wide demand for ail began to decline, Saudi
Arabia, the largest OPEC producer, curtailed its out-put sharply to
stabilise the price at $29 a barrel In 1984.
To meet the price-cutting challenge by non-OPEC Western producers
ruch as Britain and Norway, and to enlarqe OPEC'e, share of the
::00 William I•. Cleveland, Op. cit
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market and damage tran's war effort, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait began
to flood the oil market from December 1985, depr~s5;ngtna price from
$28 to less than $10 in July 1986. Then Saudi Arabia decided to
reverse the strategy, and in alliance with Iran, encouraged OPEO to
aim for $18 a barrel by cutting overall production. By and large this
aim was achieved, the dollar price rising to the lower 205 in the spring
of '1989. However, in early 199021°, once again for political reasons
(this time to put pressure on Iraq). I<uwait and the United Arab
Emirate:;'! over-produced and reduced the prios to $12 a barrel:;1'.
If a disruption occurs In a tight market a few years from new, perhaps
at a time of economic growth around the world, the effects could be
quite sharp, both as measured in inflation and recession and in terms
of raising h'1ternatione.ltensions.
Suett risks underline the continuing need to assure an adequate
"security margin" that can absorb such shocks. Moreover,considerable
new production Q;-lpacitywill have to be added to support a growing
world economy, but the timing of those additions is uncsrtaln, What
happens to oil prices, with all that they signify for the world economy.
depends very much on the ~elative timing of demand growth and
investment in new production capacity.
Where will the additional supplies come from? Not from the United
States, where oil production has fallen by a dramatic 25 per cent Since
1986 and is continuing to decline. Tl1e domestic US oil production
21() The oil prico noarly doubled between 1060 and t093. Taking into account the
600'plu<1 par cent inflation in tho Western nations I)f tho 24·momber OEOC during that
period, oil was one third cheaper in tho mid·1990'Q than n was in the Jato 1950's.
211 llilip Hiro, Dictionary of tho Middlo East. London, 1996.
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industry is deeply depressed and the US oil services Industry, which
is the global leader, is also under heavy economic pressure. US oil
imports are likely to continue rising in the years ahead. Some of it will
come from oil development that Is being encouraged by more open
investment polloles around the world. As Russia struggles to stem its
economic decline, at least two of the newly independent Republics,
Azerbaijan and Ka<:akhstan,will cecome important players in the world
oil market.
Much of the new supplies will come from the Middle East, in particular
from Saudi Arabia. In 1912 the Middle East provided 42 per cent of
world oil (excludind the former Soviet Union); by 1983 it had declined
to 27 per cent; touay It is 32 per cent, and will probably rise to 45 per
cent by 2003. This means that production capacity In the Middle East
will rise from '18,3 million barrels a day212to 28 mlliion barrels a. day.
tn light of the political and social forces in the region, and the potential
for yet another surprise or two in the decade ahead, security of supply
will be a continuing concern for importing countries, even as the
exporters continue to worry about "security of demand".
There is no single answer to these security questions. Rather, the best
bet for stability in a changing world arises from a global pattern of
investment and trade Inwh:oh security is enhanced by the diversity and
density of economic and political links and by the commonality of
interests to an environmental age.
"1~ .
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In the years ahead, relations between producers and consumers could
become strained again if, for instance, economic and demographic
pressures mount in the exporting countries, or if political instability
becomes pervasive, or if ideologies agall1 shift, or if changes take
place in the balance of power of the kind for whil"'l sac-tam Hussein
bids; or, for instance, if the exporting countries come '0 see the
implementation of the environmental agenda in developed co.mtriea as
an assault on their main source of national Income.
IfW8 ask who emerged victorious out of the first use of the oil weapon,
the answer must be the United States. Before 1973, we had been
thinking of a world In which the domination of the two super-powers,
the United States and the Soviet Union, was being challenged by the
newcomers, Western Europe, Japan and China. After 1973, the
challenge fror Western Europe and Japan faded out completely whlle
China rema .ed as much on the side-lines as ever. In the end, the
Americans Were to decide that th€:! best 011 price for them was one
somewhere between the pre-war price and the price ttl which they oll-
producing companies and countries had pushed it, so they stepped up
their attempts to bring Europe into lino with them. It will be an
unfortunate outcome for the Arabs if Europe Is taken over, where oil
18 concerned, by the American camp. However, whatever happens,
there can be no doubt that it was the two energy giants, the United
Str-"tes and, to a smaller degree, the former Soviet Union, which
stopped the war and formulated the peace - if peace is in fact ever to
come.
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CHAPTER 6: REACTION TO THE EMBARG ...-:5 IMPOSED
BY OIL PRODUCERS
THE SOUTH AFRICAN OP J ION : OIL-FROM-
COAL (CASE STUDY)
011embargoes imposed by Arab petroleum exporting countries in 1967
and 1973-1974 against dependent consumers caused little effect on
South Africa's supplies because at that time tl-> ,",.public could still
obtain supplies from Iran, and continued to in I~ 'i1ian oil until the
Iranian revolution of i979 no longer made this possltlle, as I discussed
in Chapter 6. The South African government knowing the country's
lack of crude oil, as discussed in Chapter 3, had begun to develop
pioneering techniques for the extraction of oil from coal, which South
Africa possessed in abundance, in order to prevent future embargoes
and economic threats with consequence to its security and
sovers'qnty .
This era of energy austerity was ushered in by the startling events of
1973, which marked a year of major changes in the worldwide
petroleum business. It was a year which saw:
(1) the privilege of posting market prices for crude oil pass from the
lnternatlonal ,;II companies to the Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and saw prices sky-rocket to
unprecedented levels;
(2) the Arab oil-producing countries cut back on production and
embargo oil shipments to 'unfriendly" countries;
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(3) control of their oil resources taken by a growing number of
producing countries; and
(4) production in non-communist areas increase by 9.5 per cent to
a record 45,8 million barrels per day, while crude oil output in
the United States declined by 2.8 per cent to 9.2 million barrels
per day.
In addition) '1973sawvaried activityworldwide in nearly every segment
Qf the industry - exploration, refining, marketing and pipelinlng. In
exploration, the big surge for hunting new oil reserves has taken
exploratlonlsts offshore. Increasesin the world prices of crude oil have
guaranteed the creation of a major, worldwide synthetic-fuel industry.
The price and demand for liquid petroleum and flowing natural gas -
as well as the determination of governments - has enhanced the
economics of synthetic fuel past the point of no return. Large,
commercial synfuel plants already are operating in South Africa and
Canada. Now large-scale plants are being planned in the United
States, Israel, and other all-importing countries with large coal and ell-
shale reserves. Meanwhile, the South African government began
production of oil from coal using the Lurgi process to make gas from
coal, an? its own process to convert the gas into liquid fuel.
Generating electricityfrom coal satisfiesthree quarters of south frica's
energy needs213, Most of the principal industrial centres are situated
near extensive coalfields. Nearlyall electricity is generated from coal,
213 See Figure 13.
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and some households, industries and mines also use coal as a direct
source of energy. Oil is used to a relatively limited extent by the
Industrial, mining and conversion sectors, mainly for transport
purposes and as a chemical feedstock214• South Africa is mainly
dependent upon imports for oil but the sasot oll-from-coal plants play
an important parf".
The 1973 crisis ushered in a new era in Sasol's progress, bringing an
expansion and development prograrrme which had long been planned,
but which was Implemented far sooner than initially expected. As a
result, South Afrioawas able to weather the 1973 debacle successfully.
The mid-seventies were a frustrating period for Anergy planners
throughout the world. Inflation and a IHCkof dynamism in the majority
of economies created financial problems for many planners who,
following the 1973 of! crisis} proposed gigantic ent3rgy projects to
replace petroleum. Many of these energy proposals held great
promise but vanished like the morning mist in the face of economic
and ecological realities.
The revolution in Iran and the resultant oil price explosion in ; 979 held
grave economic implications for the world. When Iranian oil was no
longel' available to South Africa, the country already had its first
synthetiC fUEl plant (Saso\One) and the second (SasolTwo) was under
construction. South Africa could therefore survive.
The South African government, industry and labour groups are
considering options for changing the regult'ltory frameworl< of the fuel
214 see Figure 1.
215 Stnndot'd BOIIK. An Economic Profilo of South AfncQ, 1995. Johannoaburg. p. 14.
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industry. Regulation in the past was guided by sanctions and the
resulting need to secure oil supplies by building stock-piles and
developing synfuel production (oil and gas from coal) as well as by
eitorts to make the investment environment for foreign companies
attractive enough to overcome the political disincentives.
South Africa disposed of their financing resources, technological
backgr'Jund and abundant raw materials,which could be used in order
to create its own alternative in case of foreign pressures and future
ernbarqoes,
In this chapter, 1analyze both the oil embargoes imposed on South
Africa and those economic and financial parameters which brought
about the *ltrategy developed and implemented by South Africa
between 1973 and 1993 to obtain liquid fuel from its own national
product, coal, in order to grant South African energy independence
and securlty of supply.
6.1 ()iI embargoes imposed on South Africa
Oil was South Africa's economy potential Achilles heel, for none had
been found in the Republlc2H,. In the case of oil eanctlons, a real crisis
threatened, but It was one for which the country had had plenty of time
to prepare. Kuwait banned 011exports to South Afrioa in 1964, with
very little affect on the country's supplies because at that time the
South Afrioan government had Invested in converting the country's
210 Sao Figure 14
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abundant supply of coal into oil (the sasot project) but it was still reliant
on imports which came mainly from Iran.
Rhodesia's Unilateral ueclsranon of Independence in November 1965
increased South Africa's difficulties on the international front, for without
wishing to appear to back white supremacy outs'de her borders, she
felt bound to ignore the instructions of the UnitM Nations Security
Council to impose economic sanctions on the territory, especially as
South Africa was itself beginning to feel the chill of an external arms
embargo. It was politically impossible to alienate the upstart
government of Rhodesia, to which the while South African government
felt drawn by ties of common interest. From the outset, therelore, the
South African government treated the dispute between Britain and the
Smith regime as a private. dispute, and recognised the Smith
government de facto but not de jure. It also refused to apply
sanctions on the grounds that it was opposed to such action in
principle. The ties between the South African government and the
Rhodesian government were drs,wn tighter in 1967 by the dispatch of
South African rJolice units to help combat guerrillas on the Zambesl
border. Two years later, a two-thirds majority In the United Nations
Security Council voted for the application of sanctions on South Africa
and Portug~llfor the assistance they had given to Rhodesia; but tile
United States and ttUl United Kingdom vetoed implementation, As
political confrontation developed between South Africa and the outside
world during the premiership of Verwoerdm and Vorstsr, so there grew
211 liondrik Verwoard. was telling the \/OriO In 1965 : "Our molto Is It" meintom white
supremacy for all time to come over our own people and our own country. by forco
If neeessary", John Vorster who followed. assured tho whlt& electorate that tho world
should know that In defending Itself whiM South Africa "will fight to tho end with 011
that Wf'J nave got" James amber Dnd John Burrott. f;'1Utfl AftlcQ's Foroi{}fI Policy.
Cambridge, 1990. p.2
a parallel threat of economic controntaner as part of an international
bid to force sotnh Africa to ohanQ6 her policies. The issues were
complex, as attempts by South Africa's critics to promote
disinvestment and various forms of "~II(ltions on the one hand, and
South Afrioa's retaliatory flaunting of her glob a! strategic position and
her pcsssselon of strategic minerals on the other, had side effects
which were not always anticipated.
In the years of sanctions that followed there were periods of cor-cern,
particulafl~Jwhen oil sanotlens weru imposed In December 1q@5and
the British blocl<aded the port of Seira in Mozambique, through which
most of Hhodesi{;"s oil h~ld passed. Fuel supplies from South Afrioa in
transit through MozarnbiC::jlIoon the "CFM" railway lines to Rl10desia
wera flowing at a reassuring rate during the most crucial period of
1966 and the months that followed. As Jorge Jardim, torrnsr
Portuguese Secretary ot mato for Commerce and Industry (1948-'1952)
wrcte:Z10
"76,614 tons (2,471 tanl<·c;ars) had gono through in these six
months of 1966".
ThA imposition of trade sanctions grew mto a 0ampaign at the United
Nations dl"lring the 1970'0 when South Africa refused to join the
boycott of RhqQosia, thus undermining the effectiveness of th£lt
campai(Jll. At first South Africa could rely on the vetoing of resolutions
demanding sanctions by one or more of lts trading partner~ with
permanent seats on the United Nations Seourity CounCil, nernely the
210 Sallctlons Doublo.Cross. Oil to R/lOdosia. Butawayo. 1079. p,87.
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United States, Britain and Prance, the only exception being the arms
embargo, which had the endorsement of every other member nation
by l'nid·1987. In 1981 the new socialist government in France began
to take a more ounltve line. However if a single event can be said to
have committed the international community to a general sanctions
policy, it was Borha's "Rubicon" speech of August 1985/ for the false
expectations whiCh it had aroused after the out-break of the
disturbances of ~l1at year, seen against the continuing deadlock in
South Wes't Africa and the unstable relations between South J!lfricaand
the Frontline States.
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) adaed its
weight to the ban in 1973.
All the Scandinavian countries, which hod banned new investment in
South Africa in 1979, placed restrictions on trade in 1986-87. The
European Community decided on both restrictive and positive
measures at Luxembourg in September 1985, and extended these to
a ban on new lnvestrnent and various imports after the failure of Sir
Geoffrey Howe's visit to South Africa in 1986, though they found
collective punitive sanctions ~Iardto bring together. The United States
Congress went much further by sweeping aside a relatively mUd
package proposed by President Reagan prior to enacting its
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. This banned new
lnva;:+mentin South Africa, loans to the South i.\fricangovernment, the
export 01 computers and oil, the importation of non-strategic minerals
and agricultural products from South Africa, as well as direct air travel
between the two countries. Further clauses threatened to deny
weapon sales to countries which continued to supply South Africa
i81
(which Israel took to heart in 1987 by deciding to cut back on the
extent of her scientific co-operation and renouncing new military
contracts) and threatened also to slap trade embargoes on countries
which took advantaqe of restrictions imposed on United States
nationals.
The Commonwealth was slower to act, but ended with the most
decisive package of all. At their meeting in the Bahamas in '1985 most
foreign ministers recommended the imposition of various trade and
financial restrictions. A committee appolnted at their Kusaka meeting
in February 1988, consisting of Canadian, Indian and Australian
experts, reported in August that the most targetable areas of the South
AfrlJan economy were trade credits, which were commonly converted
into medium-term loans. When the Oornmcnwealth leaders met again
at Kuala uimpur in Malaysi~ in October 1989, the entire gathering, with
the exception of the British representatives, was prepared to adopt a
ihree-wave plan to "ratchet uP" sanctions againist South Africa in a
manner calculated to make it very difficult lndeed for South Africa to
reject demands for the effe('.ltivedismantling ot apsrtheld. The first
wave envisaged the ending of all agricultural and manutactursd imports
from South Africa, and of selected mineral Imports excluding high-value
or strategic categories such as gold, diamonds, chrome and platinum,
and a start to the phasing-out of trade credits. The second phase,
should it prove necessary, would tighten oil and arms errbarqoea and
ban the export to South Africa of retired oil products, computers.
electronic anu telecommunications equipment. and stop technology
transfers, the export of key vehicle parts, all devices which promote
automation, and the recruitment of skilled personnel. In case a third
stage should be necessary, a decision was taken to investigate the
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possibility of sanctioning South African gold exports and third-country
products with significant South African content.
6.2 The South African coal availability
Coal is a south African major energy source; production has pioked
up since the late 1980'b and exports are benefiting from the fact that
the country no longer needs to give a "political" discount on overseas
sales because of sanctions. Proven reserves219 could yield more than
150 years' production and \"lXports22() reached a record 59,7m tons in
1995, helped by improved facilities at the ports of Maputo (in
Mozambique) and Richard's Bay.
In South Africa, the first recorded discoveries of coal were in I<wazulu
Natal and the Eastern Cape towards the middle of the last century.
Mining on a substantial scale, however, only began in 1810 when the
now dormant Molteno-Indwe coalfields in the Eastern Cape, from
where coal was transported by ox-wagon to Kimberley, Was exploited
in order to supply energy to the newly discovered Kimberley diamond
fields. in Mpumalanga, the Voortrekkers discovered coalfields, but
mining only commenced after the development of the Witwatersrand
gold deposits in the late "19th century. Concurrently with the great
expansion of the South African economy, there has been a
219 Soe Figure 15.
22() See Figure 16.
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concomitant increase in coal production since World War 11221, Coal
production rose from 500 kt in 1S90 to 2 Mt in 1990. By 1920, with an
out-put of 6,6 Mt per annum, the Mpumalanga coalfields comprised the
country's leading producers and it was in that year that the first
recorded export of coal occurred when approximately one ton was
exported. During most of the 1940's, production averaged about 20
Mt per annum, Coal out-put rose to about 30 Mt per annum at the
beginning of the 1950's, and at the same time, exports increased to 3
Mt per annum222,
After I•.•0 advent of Eskom's "captive colliery" policy, coal demand and
produrfton grew rapidly. The onset of the world energy crisis in 1973,
as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, created further interest in South
African coal, and rising demand saw out-put escalate to new heights.
During the 1970's, production rose from 60 r,,1t to 74 Mt, most of the
coal being used locally. Coal exports became important only later as
a consequence of the development of a new product called "low ash
blturnlnous", This beneficiated product eventually became acceptable
in the European market as steam and blend metallurgical coal. The
necessary Infrastructure for the large~scale exports of coal was created
with the establishment of the Richards Bay Coal Terminal and
associated raHway lines.
In all, the country has 18 prinCipal coalfields, spread over an area of
some 700 km frC'n North to South and 500 km from West to East.
221 Department of Mines. Geologloal Survey. Mineral Resources of the Republic of
South Afrion. Handbook 7 !;jlh ed, 1976, p. 289
l!n Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, Minerals Bureau, South Africa's
Mineral Industry: 1995/06. p. 49,
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The resources of mineable coat ;'1 situ were assessed at 81 274 million
tC"1$ by the Commission of Inquiry into Coal Resources of the Republic
of South Africa (Petrick Report, 1975). The resources of mineable coal
in situ represent only a portion Of the total coal in the ground and is
calculated from total coal by applying certain specifications. From this
quantity, 24891 million tons of high-grade steam coal and 3A51 million
tons of metallurgical coal could be obtained by washing. Resources
of mineable anthracitic coal in situ were estimated at 744 million tons
when washed223• The Commission also calculated that under the
economics and technology which applied in 1974, only 24915 million
tons of coal (apart from anthracite) or 31 per cent of the mineable coal
in situ would be extractable by underground mining. When the
extractable is prepared for the market, a further loss arlses from
transport and benefaction.
Generally, the rank of maturity of coal seams increase eastward, with
concomitant decrease in the number of seams and their thickness,
Compared with the great time-span during which coal of the Northern
hemisphere were laid down, mainly some 330 million years between
the Devonian and Cretaceous, South Africa's coal seams were
deposited essentially over only 56 million years between the Permian
and Triassic periods, and under very different conditions. The dense
tropical forests of Europe, China and North America were formed in
shallow ice-scoured basins and associated rivers, swamps and deitalo
systems in cool or temperate environments. Not surprisingly,
therefore, coals from the two hemispheres differ markedly in several
respects. Northern hemisphere coal is generally rich in vitrinite and
223 0 't sngp. CI. p. .;
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exlnite, and is, thus, more reactive and softer than the duraln-rlch types
common in the Southern hemisphere. Northern coal, by contrast, is
more triable and prone to spontaneous heating, richer in sulphur but
containing less ash than the coal i., the south224•
Most of South Africa's coal mining occurs in Mpumalanga, which
contributes some 82 per cent to the country's total production; the
Free State contributes 9 per cent, the Northern Province 6 per cent
anc KwaZulu Natal 3 per cent. As anthracitic coal deposits in the East
become more depleted, biturnincus coal from the central coalfields
(contributing 98,9 per cent in 1995(1will eventually make up all of South
Africa's coal production.
In 1992, coal was again a major contributor to foreign exchr 1ge
earnings22S• A total of 59,7 Mt, valued at R6 478,8 million, was shipped
to foreign consumers, representing an increase of 8,8 per cent and
34,1 per cent in terms of mass and value, respectively. This was the
result of increased economic activity in Asia, the United States and
Europe, which fuel!ed the demand for coal and strengthened prices226•
Economists are very cautious about the prospects for marketing coal
in Europe in the near-term future. Their concerns are based on the
recent appearance of a European Union White Paper advocating an
energy policy that requires a reliable but "clean" energy source to meet
the future needs of the European Union. As a result, natural gas is
224 Op, cit. p. 50
225 See Figure 3
226 DepartmAnt of Mineral and Energy Affairs. Annual Report, 1995. Johannesburg,
1996.
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seen as the logical substitute for hard coal iT! Europe, and
powerstatlons 81e therefore slowly shifting to gas. It is expected that
by the turn of the century, about 20 per cent of the European Union's
power utilities will e gas-based. On the other hand, it is also
antlclpated that with the removal of coal mine subsidies, many existing
.mnes in the region will close, which will result ill an increase in
demand for imported coal. However, whatever the outcome in Europe,
rapid economic growth is bound to raise power requirements in ASia,
thus creating alternatlve opportunities in South African coal exports.
6.3 Technological background to produce fuel-from-. oal
South Africa became a world leader in synthetic fuel technology.
Liquid bydrccarbons'" have been synthesised from coal since 1955 at
SasWlb~l[q In the Free State. Two more Sasol plants, Sasol Two in
1980 and Sasol Three in t 982 have since been completed at Secunda
in Mpumalanga. The Sasol plants also produce fuel gas228• Past
decisions of the government to invest in synfuel projects were largely
based on strategic considerations. However, decisions on future
synthetic fuel projects will be based on econorrno considerations229•
sasot produces synthetic oil (about 32 per cent of South Africa's
requrernents), gas and a host of other by-products (some i20) such
m See Figure 18
:(>28 See Figure 19
~;!9 Department of Minerai and Energy Affairs, Minerals Bureau. South Africa's
Mineral IndustlY, 1995196. 1996. p. 58
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as waxes, phenol, ammonia, explosives and sulphuric acid from coal.
The Fischer"Tropsch process used was originally developed overseas
but was lrnproved to the extent that South Africa is the first World
producer of these products from coal and gas230•
Synthetic oil is refined to hydrocarbon fuels at three refineries: Sasol
One at Sasolburg with a capacity of 4,5 million tons per annum and
Sasol Two and 'sasol Three at Secunda. Liquid fuel production at
Sasol One is to be phased out and the plant wi!! be converted to
produce ammonia, other chemicals and waxes'",
To the layman it may seem bewildering that petrol can be made from
coal. Actually, coal is similar to petrol in that both have the elements
carbon and hydrogen as constituents. The basic problem originally
was to combine hydrogen with G:iarbonby means of a chemical
reaction. In 1925 the work of Plscher ahcj Tropsch t1ad shown
conclusively that liquid hydrocarbons could be produced when
synthesis gas derived from coal WaS passed over a suitable catalvst,
and in Germany the Fisoher-Tropsch process was applied industrially
for some years, starting in 1936.
The South African Turbinate Mining and Refining Company (Satmar),
to some extent the cradle of the future Sasol, was established by
Anglovaal at about the same time as Boksburg. Satmar's motor spirit
was the first to be manufactured from entirely indigenous raw
materials.
230 Op cit. p.flO
231 Ibid. p. 59
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Anglovaal was determined to use this process in order to make oil out
of the coal. It lost no time in acquiring the right to an oil-from-coal
process developed in Germany, known by the names of the scientists
Fischer and Tropsch.
When the company acquired the Flscher-Tropsch rights it planned to
apply that process to the coal which occurred in association with
Ermelo oil shale. Progress on tl-,:S project was interrupted by the war,
but towards its end Anglovaal also came into the possession of the
rights to the American version of the process, However, as has been
related, it surrendered the oil-from-coal process because of devaluation
and the demands made on its capital resources by the developing
Orange Free State gold-fields.
It was Dr F MaY'er, later chairman of lscor, and a technical adviser to
the Department of Commerce, Industry and Mines, who wrote the
White Paper of ; 927 In which coal gasification and low temperature
carbonization were strongly recommended.
The utilisation of coal in South Africa for the manufacture of oil, gas
and petrochemicals began in 1950 with the estc..iJlishment of the South
African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation Limited (SASOL).
The oll-from-coal plant is based on the Flscher-Tropsch synthesis
process by means of which carbon monoxide and hydrogen are
catalytically combined to produce a range of hydrocarbons and
organic chernlcals. At Sasol two versions of the Flscher-Tropsch
synthesis are employed. For the lighter hydrocarbons such as liquid
petroleum gas, petrol and diesel oil, the moving catalyst synthesis is
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I rsed. For the medium to heavy hydrocarbons, from naphtha upward
to waxes, the stationary-catalyst synthesis is used. 80th processes
employ iron-based catalysts, produced in the Sasol plant. The coal as
mined is crushed to 6-50 mm size and pressure-qasifted with the aid
of steam and oxygen. Nter stringent purification, which is necessary
to avoid sulphur pOisoning of the catalyst, the gas is sent to the
synthesis sections232.
Various systems of coal gasificatiC''1have been developed and virtually
any coal can be gasified. Normally, higher temperatures lead to faster
reaction rates and thus greater throuqhpute - h~re a limiting factor may
be the ash fusion characteristics, as low ash fusion temperatures could
limit operating temperatures'".
Although the history of Sasol dates from September 1950, construction
of the plant could only start towards the middle of 1952, and the first
units were put into operation in 1954. 8y the end of 1955 all the main
construction work of sasol's first phase had been completed. It was
supervised by the Kellogg International Corporation (KIC) which had
by that time become one of the leading bunders of oil refineries and
chemical plants in the world. Most of the equipment came trom
Germany and USA; sma!ls'" quantities came from Brltaln, Switzerland,
Belgium and France. The South African industry supplied an
equivalent amount of structural and reinforced steel.
Sigma's relatively shallow coal, "150 metres below the surface, had a
high ash r ' 11and would be of little value on the open market.
:132 Mineral ResolJr(;tS Q~ thE' Republ[(; I)f Sou!h Africa. Op. clt, p.328
233 Op. cit. p. 328
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However it was suitable for pressure gasification and for steam
generation without any pr ,'-treatment beyond crushing and screening.
The minus ten-millimetre fraction Was to be pulverised for use in
boilers, and the ten-millimetre to fifty-millimetre was to be fed to the
gasifiers.
The first main unit of the Sasol works to be started up was the power
station, where the first boiler was fired on oil on the "15th June 1954.
This was only thirteen months after the building of the power station
had started. Once coal from Sigma could be brought to the surface,
the power station bofers switched over to coal burning. Also in the
second h81fof 1954 the first turbo-compressor in the oxygen plant was
started up, and in the following months, several air separation units
were commissioned.
The first synthesis reaction was achieved in "1955 and. by the end of
that year, cars were filling up with Sasol.
As a pioneering achievement it is one of South Africa's greatest
success stories, one which can largely be attributed to Dr Etienne
Rousseau, managing director for eighteen years. He said, after the
factory had been built "We at Sasol believe that we are engaged in the
most exciting and one of the most important technological
developments in South Africa".
Once could see how the sasol plant was originally envisaged through
a scale model, which was put up on view in the entrance hall of the
administration building. When actual construction began, provision
was made for the establishment of allied industries - or those, which
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were to make use of Sasol products - adjoining the plant. To start
with, the undertaking comprised a synthetic oil plant, a colliery, water
works, a power station, sewage and industrial waste dispOS81plant,
raHway siding, roads, administrative buildings, a village, housing for
Black miners and a township for those Blacks not errployed at the
mine.
At the Sigma Mine capital spending escalated from B3 611 260 at the
end of tbe 1954·55 financial year to Ri6 420 628 on 3,CJune 1H74.
From October 1953 until the mine was officially opened by Francis du
Tolt in September 1954, 66746 tons of coal had been raised. On the
11th of that month, the first coal was supplied to the power station and
on 19 November the gasifiers received their first 136 tons. By 1974
Sigma's annual out-put had increased to 4 537 000 tons.
From Sasol's inception, the objective-orientated management wanted
"to deliver the goods". So the main laboratory checked the quality of
raw materials and intermediate and final products at an early stage.
Coal and ash were tested, raw and pure synthesis gas, catalysts, tar,
gas liquor, ammonium sulphate, petrol, diesel oil and paraffin waxes,
as well as numerous solvents. Products aimed at were enormous
quantities of ammonia, creosote, tar, paraffin waxes of various types,
alcohol, a host of other chemicals and, of course, fuel. Sasol petrol
was to be of top-grade quality as it would be practically sulphur-free
and required no lead additive.
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6.4 Financial resourcea
The calls for economic sanctions and ernoarqoesagainst South Africa,
as I discussed previously, were ineffect:ve because those who
advocated them had few links with South Africa, while those that had,
opposed sanctions. Yet the government was not complacent. To
counter the sanctions threat it set out to increase self-reliance and
reduce the country's vulnerability Through the DefenceAmendment
Aot and the ForeignAffairs SpecialAccount, trade and Investmentwas
promoted and internationalpartnersshielded from adverse publicity by
suppressing information, Strategic minerals, including oil, were
stockpllsd, and strategic industries were promoted, such as the Iron
and Steel Corporation (ISCOR). sasol the coal to oil plants, and
Arrnscor the arms manufacturing company, The strongest economic
links were in Southern Africa and with the West. In the West the
traditlor.al links with Britain flourished, while trade with the United
Slati7S, the former West Germany and Japan expanded quickly. For
example, trade with Japan which had totalled about USD180min 1967
had risen spectacularly to more than U['lJi OOOm by 1973. The battle
over gold prices continued, but with a decline in the strength of the
dollar and increased demand for gold following the 1973~74c'l crisis,
SOIJth Africa erne,:;;ad in a strong position. GDkl remained South
Africa's single most lmportant export and its posltlon 3trenythened on
the free market. In 1971 the gold price, which hac been fixed at
USD35en ounce for forty years, was allowedto find Its own value. By
June 1972 it had reached USD60and by the end of 1974 j' stood at
USDi98. In 1973, 96 per cent of gold production, worm R1,'150m.!
was exported, Alongside gold, the produotlon of other minerals also
increased I'einforcing South Africa's links with Western industries.
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Alerted by the 197:3-74OPEC oil shock, there were overall concerns
about South Africa's minerals. Between 1970 and 1980, the world
trade in chrome doubled as industrial demand increased. There was
no easy substitute, and although supplies were plentiful in the main,
production areas (former Soviet Union and Southern Afrloa - Rhodesia
and South Africa) chrome had become "critical for Western
economies", South Africa was an attractive supplier because of its
relatively low labour costs, its investment in research, its reliability and
its sound infrastructure. Added to that, by 1977 the international
chrome market Was in confusion when the former Soviet Union
supplies became erratic and the United States repealed the Byrd
Amendment (by which the United States had continued to import
Rhodesian chrome). In that situation, South Africa, which in 1978
produced 35 per cent of the world's chrome and 52 per cent of
terroohro.ne, was of key importance. In 1977·78 South Africa supplied
50 per cent of the EE:C'schrome (70 per cent in Britain's case) and 48
per cent of the United State's.
The importance of South Africa as a producer of strategic minerals
became a ~uestion for the Westem powers of balancing current ease
Of access to minerals of unquestionable military and economic
importance, the obtC'ining of which from other sources would have
been possible, but not always easy and probably very expensive,
againa~the need to ensure continued access to South Africa's minerals
In the event of a change of regime at some later. dato, By common
agreement, the three key strategic minerals found in large quantities
and produced in South Africa, were chrome, manganese and platinum.
All had to d 0 with the production of high quality hardened, heat-
resistant steel, of special rnportanco for jet engines and the burning of
194
rocket fuels. In 1983 South Africa produced half the world's platinum,
36 per cent of the world's chrome and 22 per cent of the world's
manganese. These proportions were by any standards impressive,
especially when it is realised that 81 per cent of the world's reserves
of chrome and 78 per cent of manganese were considered to be
located in South Africa.
Despite its successes, South Africa could not escape the vagaries of
the international economy, and in her case problems were
compounded by political factors. That was underlined by the oil crisis.
The crisis, which started in 1973-74, with a sharp increase in prices,
deepened following the October 1973 Arab/Israeli wa., as discussed
in Chapter 5, when the Arab States cut 20 per cent of their production,
increased prices further, placed an embargo on "unfriendly" States and
supported and OAU call for a total embargo of the white "racist
regimes", Although Soutt1 Africa could meet many of her energy needs
from her own coal234 and hydro-electrlcal235 supplies, she had no
natural oil. Before the crlsls oil supplies had come f~om Iran (38 per
cent), Saudi Arabia (24 per cent), the Gulf States (20 per cent) and Iraq
(18 per cent) which Sasol produced 7 per cent. In 1973 oil accounted
for only 25 per cent of total energy requirements but it represented
more than 80 per cent of transport needs. There was, therefore, great
concern. The government reduced consumption by raising the price
of petrol, imposing speed limits) closing filling stations in the evenings
and weekends and calling for restraint, but the solution came irla new
agreement with Iran for increased sl!j:lpihss. While the cost of the
agreement was high, It was offset by the increasing price of South
234 See Figure 20
236 Se8 Figure 21
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Africa's own minerals as traders turned to gold as insurance against
fluctuation currencies, and Western industrialists, alerted by the oil
crisis to the vulnerab!lity of strategic materials, stocked minerals. in
January 1974 the Qovernment was able to announce that petrol
rationing would not be necessary.
Dr Dledertchs, the south African Minister of Finance's, 1974 New Year
economic survey was optimistic. He based it on the previous year's
growth - domestic product 6 per cent; gross national product 8 per
cent; and manufacturing production 9 per cent. He said that it would
be misleading to suggest that South Africa had not been affected by
adverse international developments because trade and investment
wes» so important to her economy, but four factors had helped to
overcome the problems - the recoqnltlon that South Africa stood lion
the threshold" of a new phase of prosperity; her limited reliance on oil
for energy needs; the favourable climate for her manufacturers and
exporters; and finally, Increased international demand for her natural
resources.
6.5 Political wm
The decisions taken in the fifties, resulting in today's technological
gain, rescued South Afr:ca from crisis and supported it through critical
periods of history. In August '1966, three weeks before the death of Dr
H.F Verwoerd, South Africa's sixth Prime Minister, the Cabinet took the
decision to establish the Natref Petroleum refinery, In which Sasol,
Total and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOO) would be,
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shareholders. This move had security as well as economic objectives,
and it was in keeping with action taken by governments of many
Western consumer countries, through which they <.lcquiredan loterest
in the oil industry. Shortly before World War I, the British government
on a proposal by Winston Churchill, created a precedent when it
obtained control of the Anglo Persian Company, later known as British
Petroleum. Subsequently France, and then Italy, took similar steps,
and the majority of consumer countries followed suit.
It was obvious that Sasol would be chosen to take the lead with the
establishment of the refinery on behalf of the government. In fact,
Sasol had initiated the venture and had paved the way to a satisfactory
agreement between the partners concerned. Its vice-chairman at the
time, Dr H.J Van Eck, was the first to advocate participation by Sasol
In the refining of natural petroleum, which he considered to be in the
interests of the country and the balanced development of the
organisption. Apart from its established interest and accumulated
know-how in the production of liquid and gaseous fuels from coal,
Sasol was instrumental in purchasing and stock-piling crude oil for
strategic purposes, and it also held half the shares In seeker, the
concern charged with the search for natural oil and gas.
The Shah of Iran had always indicated that his country, as an exporter
of petroleum, desired partlclpat!on in down-stream operations and that
it was prepared to make investments in consumer countries. South
Africa was prspareo to accept that offer. On the occasion of Sasol's
twenty~thlrd annual general meeting in September 1973, when an oil
crisis seemed inevitable, the chairman had cause to state,
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".... we at Sasol consider ourselves fortunate in already having
the National Iranian Oil Company as a partner and the main oil
supplier at the Natref refinery".
It is significant that the Iranian investment in Natref was one of the first
two down-stream ventures in a consumer country by a member of
OPEC. The Iranian decision to co-operate with sasol was taken six
years before the OPEC Participation Agreements and was proof of
excellent foresight.
In the eorly seventies the vond's energy policy-makers began to
appreciate that energy sources such as oil were indeed finite. Genuine
attempts to conserve oil and rever: to alternative forms at energy on
a large scale were expressed worldwide. Little came of this. By i975
oil provided more than half the world's energy needs and consumption
was increasing,
In "1973, when oil-related po'ltlos began to place the energy world in
jeopardy, two-thirds of the non-communist world obtained its oil from
the Middle East and Africa, and only 19 per cent came from America.
Cheap oil from the Middle East was a major cause of oil greed and the
abandonment of economic laws - the so-called "dlseconotny of plenty".
The growing dependence on oil made the highly developed oil-
importing countries an obvious economic arid political target for oil-
producing Middle Eastern countries. These politically unstable
countries were, for some time, in a position to open or strangle the oil
flo'l'; to the rest of the world voluntarily, thereby manipulating c prices.
As early as 1960 the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
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(OPEC) was founded, its primary aim being the negotiation of higher
oil revenues for its member countries.
Strife among its members meant that immediate success was not
forthcoming, and the oil price in 1970 was nearly the same as that of
1960. At the beginning of the seventies the members of OPEC settled
their differences and OPEC began to use oil as a political weapon.
Drastic price increases followed in rapid succession, shaking an
energy-greedy world to its foundation. In 1970 a barrel of oil still cost
$1,25. By 1973, it had risen to as high as $17.
In October 1973, the world was wrenched even further from its energy
Utopia. In the Middle East, the Yom Kippur war broke out between
Israel and Egypt - a war from which the lsr$~Hs were to emerge
victorious after just six days. The consequences onhe war, however,
were not as short-lived. The sympathy of the West\~rn countries lay
with Israel. The Middle Eastern oil countries, on the other hand, were
well disposed towards Egypt and used oil as a powerful international
weapon, by drastically reducIng production while at the same time
imposing boycotts on countries well disposed towards Israel. An
artificial oil shortage was created. The West had no option but to
accept phenomenal price increases.
8eing heavily dependent on imported crude oil from the Persian Gulf
for its transportation fuel, South Africa lost approximately R500 million
per annum due to the higher oil prices. Moreover, it seemed that there
was virtually no ceiling to further price Increases.
There were, however, factors that counted in South Africa's favour
199
which helped to counter the sl lock of the energy crisis. Firstly,
imported oil accounted for less than 25 per cent of the country's
energy needs; secondly, Natref, in which Iran had a share, had
already begun production in 1971, and thirdly, six of the b!g
international oil companies with access to sources of oil in many
countries had vested interests in South Africa.
However, tne greatest asset was coat As the sixth biggest producer
of coc~t'wlththe fifth largest reserves, South Africa's greatest strenqth
lay in/better utilisationof coal.
Ii
I
On "12November 1973, the South African public was literally stopped
in its tracks by the announcement of drastic fuel conservation
measures, including speed limits of 60km/h on the open road. In
sharp contrast to the speed limits, this era was one of unprecedented
acceleration in the development of the oil-tram-coal process. South
Africa might not have had its own oil resources, but it have its own
coal,resources.
On 5 December 1974, the SABe's News at Nine (from Durban)
featured Senator Ower; P.F Horwood, Minister of Economic Affairs,
announcing that "the Cabinet has decided that a second Sasol must
be built as soon as. possible to produce petrol, diesel and other
petroleum products from coal", and further, in. the same
announcement, that "the new plant, SasolTwo, will produce more than
ten time the amount of patrol and petroleum products than the existing
oil-tram-coalplant, andwill be one of the largest industrial projects ever
undertaken in South Africa. Based on current costs, the capital
require,nents, township development excluded, will exceed one billion
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Rand, and It will provide job opportunities for thousands of white and
non-white workers. The capital funds will mainly be acquired from the
following three sources: the Strategic Oil Fund, export credit facilities,
and monies appropriated by Parliament to tne value of approximately
one fifth of the total. The withdrawals from the Strategic Oil Fund will
make it necessary in due course to increase the existing levy on fuels".
To reduce South Africa's dependence on expensive imported crude oil,
a second plant, Sasol Two (tenfold the size of Sasol One) was
commissioned in the south-eastern Transvaal (now Mpumalanga)236.
Construction started in 1975 and the first oil was produced in 1980.
In the consumer countries the lack of progress towards greater
independence from imported nil was disappointing. This was
especially applicable to the industrial countries and to the bigger
consumer countries like the United States, in particular. Here oil
imports had increased from 35 per cent to 46 per cent of total
consumption. Very little came of the rnuch-dlscussed Carter energy
plan. The world's dependence on oil meant that it was still a powerful
polltlcal weapon. Oil imports were seen as South Africa's Achilles heel,
and a target on which radicals could focus their attacks. Oil boycotts
would not only hinder industry and transport, but could have a ripple
effect, causing disruption and unemployment.
In 1979 threats became reality for South Africa. The regime of the
Shah of Iran was overthrown by a revolution, Iran's oil production was
drastically reduced. The resultant oil shortage led to unheard-of prices
236 See Sasal Facts 1997. p. 4
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being asked- and paid - for oil sold on the open market. These prices
were sometimes substantially more than double the official price.
Since the new Iranian government refused to supply South Africa or
Israel with oil, South Africa could only satisfy part of its oil requirements
on term contracts at official prices. The bulk had to be obtained on
the open market, initiaily at high premiums.
If, as was generally predicted, the crude oil price would continue to rise
after the completion of South Africa's second synthetic fuel plant, Sasol
Two, the country would enjoy greatly increased savings in foreign
excnange. The profitability of the sasol project, and its strategic value
to the country, would also increase considerably. For sasol, therefore,
the crisis was actually an energy boost, causing it to undergo a total
transformation which would become evident later.
Between Christmas 1978 and New Year 1979, sasol Managing
Director, Mr Johannes A Stegmann ('1976·,987), was requested by the
Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr Chris Heunls, to submit a report on
the doubling of Sasol Two to the government. A provisional but
reliable report was ready on 5 January 1979. It covered all the
paran ,eh" ncluding costs of construction, economic justification for
the pr "Ie ,t and the overall financial scheme, as well as the timetable
for the project, the requirements and provision of staff and the effect
on the economy of South Afr!ca as a whole. This first brief report of
only a few pages contained the essential facts and recommendations
relating to the third synthetic fuel plant project. However, the decision
to proceed with the project was not taken before further thorough
studies had been undertaken.
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The Energy Policy Committee, then under the chairmanship of Piet
Pretorius of the Department of Planning, was to advise tne government
on all important energy matters. Minister Heunis' directive was that
this committee should investigate and submit recommendations on the
desirability of such a project. By the middle of January ie/a. the
committee submitted a concise but comprehensive report with a
strong, unanimous recommendation that the project proceed, Just five
weeks after the project had first been considered. the Cabinet was in
a position to take a deCision. The declslon was made a week later,
after the matter had been referred to a Cabinet committee. The
estimated final cost was R3 267 million. The expected construction
time, later improved upon. was 42 months. The accuracy of the data
was facilitated by the fact that the Sasol Three project would be a
dL",licet\on of Basel Two.
s tIme, the financial plan had taken shape. It was already clear
nuch money had to come frorr. abroad, from fuel levies and from
iovernrnent At that point, the financial contribution which the
.t, isation of Sasol would make could not be estimated. However,
the posslbllltywas already under consideration. For sound commercial
reasons, Sasol requested Mr Heunis to postpone the announcement
because contracts needed to be renegotiated. By using existing
contracts to Sasol Two as a point of reference, vast sums of money
were saved. With the majority of contracts concluded, sasol could
give the green light for the official announcement of the project. On 22
February 1979 Minister Heunis announced:
"Sasol Two at Secunda is to be extended to more than double
its production. A levy wi!! be imposed on the consurnptlon of
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petroleum products in order to cover part .of the cost of
expansion. The estimated cost of the expansions, including
extended mining activities, is R3 276 million. The government
has decided that this is a golden opportunity for greater
participation by the prlvata sector in the energy field; the
opportunity will be created for the purchase of shares in the
SasO!Group. A programme to this end is currently being
devised and it is expected that the offer to the public of shares
in the relevant companies in the Sasol Group will take place by
the middle of this year. The expansions will be financed as
follows:-
(1) sharaholding by the State by way of parliamentary
appropriations;
(2) shareholding by the private sector;
(3) export crcclts: and
(4) the State Oil Fund, financed by a levy on all products
manufactured from oil and bridging finance from private
sources, supplemented by State finance,
The first phase of the expansions at Sasol Two is expected to
be completed as early as March 1982 and will be able to start
producing immediately.",
Less than four months after tt·,~,mnouncement, all the contracts and
orders, with tile f' neptlon of certain massmaterials such as pipes, had
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already been placed. Site preparation was already 25 per cent
complete and the first foundation piles were sunk on 1 July 1979.
vVhentrle Sasol Two project was approved in 1974, the estimated time
for completion was six and a half years. According to this timetable,
tile dE'l"3ignwas to have been finalised in September 1979, while
construction was to begin ill July 1977 and be completed in October
19B'1. In reality, Sasol Three (almost an exact replica of Sasol Two)
was almost finished by then. It was fully operational in i982.
According to sasol's reports, Basol had Invested R5 800 million in the
two Sasol plants alone. Today these two plants (Sasol Two and
Three) have an estimated replacement value of R32 000 million. With
Sasol Tvl'o Gtill unoer construction, it was decided in 1979 to proceed
with the construction of Sasol Three. Financing of the project was
undertaken by the Oentral Energy Fund (CI:::D)237 and the Industrial
Development Oorporation {IDC?38 through its subsidiary, Konoll, with
the aid of State qrants,
237 CEF's origins date back to 1964, with the formation of SFF to procure and store
crude all for South Africa's transport needs. The main Objectives of CEF in terms of
the Central Energy Fund Act, Act 38 of 1977 as amended, Is finance and/or promote
the acquisition of coat; the exploitation of coal deposits, and the manufacture of Ilquld
fuel, 011and other products from coal. The 1976 RSA Budg~t 1':lIIiedtwo cents per litre
on the retail selling price of petroleum producrs to be paid Into C~F. The levy payable
on petrol, aviation gasoline, kerosene and distillate fuel Was increased from two cents
per litre to four cents per litre in 107~' and was then disco:1linwod on 31 March 1988.
CEF Annuaf nnanoiai Slatement<: klt 1994-95 p: 19
238 The IDe Is a wholly owned State Corporation established b~'Act 22 of 1940. Its
mission Is to assist i n the f.nanclng of new and existing private sector ""'1terprlses
so that industrial development takas place In South P.:rica according to sound
business principle\.~. IDC Annual R'lport '/994, The 10C grunted R429,2 mllifon In
financial interests in Fosllol' 30d the Saso! group In 1984, and contributed for the
financing of sasot 2 and 3 projects. The 10C 1$actually (1992) a shareholder of Sasol
in 3.4 per cent.
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Sasol became a private sector company in ,979 when Sasol Limited,
the group's holding company, was listed on The Johannesburg Stock
Exchange. The share issue was t'1en the biggest in the history of the
Stock Exchange. Sasol was once again preparing for another
important step of its development. sasol One had shaken off its
withdrawal symptoms. The commissioning of sasol Two had produced
some remarkable achievements. Tile construction of Sasol Three was
progressing extremely well. The time was ripe to round off the
prlvatlsatlon process.
As far back as the 1979 prospectus it had been spelled out that Sasol
would eventually buyout the government's shares in Sasol Two. The
deadline for the takeover was 1989. ln the 1979 prospectus, 1984 had
been set as an optimistiotarget date. Thanks to Sasol's success and
good financial results, it was possible to bring this date forward by
approximately a year. in the midst of fluctuating exchange rates and
uncertain international oil and commodity prices. Despite the diffloult
economic times prevailing in South Africa, on 7 November i983 Sasol
bought out the State's share in Sasol Two, and it became a wholly-
owned subsidiary of sasol Limited. Sasol repaid the Sta~oIn full for its
investment in SasolTwo • with interest calculated from day one. The
buying out of the State's 50 per cent interest in sasol Two, for an
amount of t'12 620 million, concluded a process which had begun ten
years earlier. Sasol's contribution to the allevlatlon of South Africa's
balance of payments problem ct that stage was evident, particularly if
it is borne in mind that the Sasol factories saved the country more than
R2 billion in foreign exchange annually. For the State too, the
prlvatlsatlon was a greAt success. With the takeover of both Sasol
One and Sasol Two, the State's return in the form of shares and cash
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amounted to approximately seven times Its investment in sasot One,
plus tull repayment with interest in the case of its investment in Sasol
Two. Arter the takeover of sasot Two, sasol's assets amounted to
approximately R5,5billion. sasot Synthetic Fuels (Pty) Limited became
responsible for coal conversion into fuels.
At the same time, in 1984, OPEC lowered the price of crude oil to $28
per barrel, reduced its production ceiling to 16 million barrels a day,
and lowered individual production quotas. Despite C'PEC's production
allocation scheme, virtually all the decline in output was absorbed by
Saudi Arabia. While other OPEC members either maintained or
increased thei!; output, Saudi production declined dramatioally. By
August 1985, Saudi Arabia's output had fallen to 2,5 million barrels a
day, less than one-fourth of its production in 1980~198'1. In the second
half of 1985, Saudi Arabia abandoned the role of swing producer. In
order to increase its production and restore its market share, Saudi
Arabia abandoned selling crude oil on the basis of official OPEC prices
and instituted a market-rssponslve price formula based on the value of
products into which its 011was refined, or "netback" sales contracts.
Once this h....pened, OPEC was no lonqer able to manage the price
of oil. In December '1985, OPEC recognised the inevitable, It
abandoned the eystern of fixed official selling prices and concerted
production reductions. For the first time since the "seven sisters"
agreed to set prices, the oil cartel agreed to allow prices to be
determined by the market. Largely due to the dramatic increase in
Saudi Arabia production, OPEC output soared by almost one-third in
1986. The result was volatility and a sharp fall in the price of oil. Spot
market prices fell from about $27 to $31 per barrel in November 1985
to $8 to $10 per barrel In July 1986. The LJllapse of oil prices led to
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a parahel drop in the value of oil exports to their lowest level since
i973239,
Another important problem grew out of the Iran-Iraq war, It was a sign
of the change in the oil markets that the bombing of oil tankers and
shipping facilities in the Persian Gulf did not lead to a run-up in oil
prices during the '1980s. The spare capacity of the other GPEC and
non-OPEC all producers, public stocks in consumir1gcountries, as well
as the oil-sharing arrangement of the International EMrgy Agency
cushioned any potential threat. Itwas the end of the Iran-Iraq war that
posed a threat to oil prices. During the war, Iraqi demands for an
lncrease in its quote met implacable resistance from Iran, which
insisted on maintaining its second place in OPEC quotas (behind Saudi
Arabia) and refused to allow Its enemy to improve its relative posltlon.
Pesclutlon of the conflict was deferred during the war by leaving Iraq
out of the allocation scheme. As long as the war limited the ability of
hath Iran and Iraq to pump all, the lraq-lran cllnflict did not threaten
OPEC's supply management. However, the cease-fire between the
two agreed to in mid·1988, posed a serious threat to OPEC's ability to
control oil supplies, Iraq was in the process of significantly expal1ding
Its production capacity, 80th countries faced higher revenue needs for
rebuilding and resuming economic development sfter the lengthy war,
and both feit justified in producing more because of the post-war
needs and because of their reduced production during the war.
H'.Never, because of the mutual dlstrust and antagonism arising from
the war, OPEC was initially unable to negotiate a new allocation
scheme. By November, action by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had forced
---------.----------~.----
239 Joan Edelman Spero. Tim Politics of intemetlonal Economic Relations, 4th ed,
1990. p, 283,
208
OPEC to agree on a new production agreement to limit production to
i8,5 millon barrels a day and raise prices to $'18 pel barrel. Iran
received .ts ok! share allocation and agreed to allow Iraq to return to
the OPECsystemwith a quota equal to its own. Iraq's lncrease came
at the expense of other cartel members, especlsdy Saudi Arabia,
whose quotas were decreased.
sascl's financial fortunes are intimately connected with events in the
international oil markets240• The serious negative impact of the lower
product prices was cushioned by increased production volumes
achlevso by the of-from-coal sasol's production divislon'241and by the
containment of cost increeses to substantially below the inflation rate.
In 1987, the total market growth of liquid fuels exceeded the increase
in production of synthe';" fuels at Secunda (Sasol) which led "LO a
higher volume of crude 011 being processed than in the previous year.
However, the favourable effect of the increased volumes was
counteracted by lower refiningmargins arising from the gradual rise in
crude oil prices which were not fully reflected in the prices of refined
products'". The '1987 Sasol operating profits of the crude oil refining
division was therefore lower than in the previous year. South Africa
kept its own strategic fuels without extra expenses ft.'r the government
due to the fact that sasol maintained its fuet-from-coal production
which high costs were compensated by diversification of Its by-
products such as the chemicals for industry and agriculture by bold
investment In new chemical plants and infrastructure, as well as new
240 60so1 Annual Report 1St' • p. 3
241 The production of Sasol'r, fuel·from-coal was 40 per cent of the total of South
Africa's total consumption
242 60so1 Annual Report 1987. p.8
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markets. Since the mid·1980s the Sasol Group's emphasis has shifted
towards developing and marketing higher-value chemicals for a wide
spectrum of domestic and international markets. This drive was based
an several favourable factors which included:-
(1) extensive reserves of law-grade coal that have little alternative
commercial value outside the Sasol Group's vast synfuels and
chemical operations;
(2) world-class track record in developing and refining process
technologies, especially in the field of Flscher-Tropsch
synthesis;
(3) favourable economies of scale, especially at Secunda, and the
all-round drive to reduce wastage, enhance the cost base and
improve productivity and quality; and
(4) combination of unique technologies and feedstocks, as well as
the extent of some of its under-exploited petrochemical pools
(most notably oleflns).
Since the mid··1980s, Sasol has entered several new chemical and
associated fields, among them crylonitrile and acrylic fibres, alpha
olefins, polypropylens'", This prompted Sasol to enter the fertiliser
market in 1983, mining explosives in 1986 and polypropylene in 1990.
24; sasot Report Engineering Week. April 1997. p. e
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In addition to producing and marketing a range of chemical fertilisers,
the fertiliser division beneflclates phosphate rock at the 50% Sasol
ChemIcal Industries-owned phosphoric acid facilities in Phalaborwa'".
As the Sasol's chairman wrote in Sasol's Annual Report 1991:-
"Admittedly, there are fewer opportunities for import replacement
now than a few decades ago, but these should not be
disregarded. More often than not it is the successful import
replacement industry that also manages to compete effectively
on export markets".... "Government's serious consideration of
policies to improve the competitiveness of the South African
industry should. be commenced. There are many investment
disadvantages and hence competitive impediments facing the
South African Industry. The major ones are high tax rates,
inadequate investment incentives, scarce human resource skills
and poor pl'Oductivity"... "It is very gratifying, therefore, that
Sasol, in a period of low economic activity, is able to proceed
with confidence with a wide-ranging investment programme.
sasot is currently engaged in projects valued at li3 000 million,
most of which will serve both export and domestic markets".
In fact, since the 1920S, South African trade policy has rested on the
assumption that domestic import substitution industrialisation (lSI)
could be financed by the export of natural resource products such as
gold and diamonds, and by the exploitation of cheap labour. Tr.:s led
244 sascl Pacts 1997. p.5
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to the de ..eloprnent of expensive and complex protectionism structures,
whi-.;h nurtured largely inefficient domestic manufacturing industries.
These tendencies were strengthened by the permissiveness of the
State as regards the protectionist and monopolistic behaviour of
powerful business groups, and by strategic concerns deriving from
apartheld-lnduced international lsotatlorr'",
The formerly State-run synfuel firm, Sasol, has been prlvatlssd but
continues to benefit from State subsidiaries although the government
announced in December '1995 that these would be phased out. Sasol
is likely to shift out of fairly expensive synfuel production into the
development of a petrochemicals industry, which could significantly
boost Jobs and export COIl lings, and aid import substitution.
However, there was also an element of risk: the project's product
would have to compete with OPEC oil, The prices of its products
would therefore be infiuenced by international political considerations.
As the Energy Chief Directorate wrote in its '1995 Annual Report:
"The development of a liquid fuel policy has been a long and
tortuous process. This is mainly due to the formidably complex
issues and the divergent interest groups, often wit:, directly
opposed agendas, involved. Thls sector has been regulated
245 Trade Policy Dossier. Soulll Africa and the GATT, School of Economlc$,
Univer$ity of Cape Town. 1994 p.4
'Because of the crlsls in South Africa's traditional exports and the obvious need to
stimulate competitive manufactured exports, a range of South African commentators
and government Institutions proposed various paths to trade and industrial policy
reform in the late 1980s and early 19905, In addition, both the World Bank and the
GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism issued reports during 1093 recommending the
rationalisation and reform of South African trade policy",
2i2
aver 40 years and there are strang pressures to deregulate. If
this is dane without careful thought, many of the reta'lers and
same of the 60 000 forecourt attendants could lose their
livelihoods. sasol produces 35 per cent of national fuel, and to
complicate matters, the financial assistance which it receives
fr om the motorist via the petrol price, is becoming increasingly
controversial." .
On the other hand, South Africa's acceptance of the GATr trade
reforms integrated South Africa into the world economy more fully than
ever before. Not only will internal changes re-focus industry towards
international markets, but greater opportunities will emerge throughout
the world for South African products. The GATT certainly will provide
the most important tool for South Africa's exports as well as a wider
range of oil suppliers in order to avoid dramatic situations created by
exporters cartel. In any way, South Africa will keep its 35 per cent of
national fuel produced by its own natural resources (oll-lrom-coal) as
a strategic reserve.
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CONCLUSIONS
One cannot deny that there is a close relatlonshlp- but not imperative -
between the possession of natural resources and the wealth of a
country, being one of the factors of Its power, The increasing demand
for energy resources by the industrial countries led them to the need
of implementation of energy policies. Its implementation will allow to
thp 'ldoption of poiicies destined to assure access to the additional
ial supply, reducing its dependency on external supplies. Unlike
the more traditional military aspects of security, which focus on external
threats, many current issues touching on national security emphasise
the growing Hnkages between the domestic and international realms.
Enhanced economic expectations on the part of national populatlons
that frequently cannot be met from within a State's OW" resources may
create demands on government, which, if not satisfied, can produce
internal instability, and thus increase insecurity.
The growing dependency on energy led still to the implementation of
conservative policies, offering incentives for the development of energy
alternatives, In an attempt to reduce the demand and stimulate
production, However, the success of these measures depends largely
on the opportunity of its implementation and on the availability of
energy resources In the country. The access to determined resources
such as oil, imposed new and important obligations on the external
and defence policies as in the years of sanctions imposed on South
.~ ",a, particularly when oil sanctions were Imposed in December 1965
and the British blockaded the port of Seira in Mozambique, through
which most of Rhodesia's oil had passed. Oil was South Africa's
potential Achilles' heei, for none had been found in South Africa. The
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government had therefore invested in converting the country's
abundant supply of coal into oil but it was still reliant on imports, which
came mainly from Iran. Before the 1973 oil crisis supplies had come
from Iran (39 per cent), Saudi Arzbla (24 per cent), the Gulf States (20
per cent) and Iraq (18 per cent), while South Africa's own production
of oll-frorn-coal supplied, in that time, only 7 per cent of the total
country's needs. In 1973 oil accounted for only 2b per cent of South
Africa's total energy requirements but it represented more than 80 per
cent of transport needs.
The surprise attack that launched the 1973 Yom Kippur War was
quickly followed by the biggest oil embargo. In fact, the crisis had
been building over the previous three years as the work market
tightened and oil exporters began pushing IIp prices and asserting
control over the oil resources within their borders. The 1973 crisis
drove prices from $2,50 to $20 a barrel and sent the global economy
into a downturn. Then, at the end of the 1970's, revolution disrupted
supplies from lran, creating a panic that drove prices from $13 to $33
a barrel, seeming to foretell a permanent shortage and continuing
turmoil.
The calls for embargoes and economic sanctions w,\lre ineltiective to
South Africa :~ecause those who advocated them had few links with
South Africa, while those that had, opposed sanctions. Yot the South
African government was not complacent. To Counter tho sanctions
threat it set out to Increase self-reliance and reduce the country's
vulnerabllity. Through tile Defence Amendment Act and the Foreign
Affairs Special Account, trade and investments were promoted but
international partners oc: 'id be shielded from adverse publicity by
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suppressing information. Strategic materials, Including oil, were
stockpiled, and strategic industries were promoted, such as the (ran
and Steel Company (ISCOR), Sasol the coal to oil plants and Armscor
the arms manufacturing company. In the meantime, the battle over
gold prices continued, hut with a decline in the strength of the dollar
and increased demand for gold following the 1973-74 oil crisis the
South Africans emerged in a strong position. In the early seventies,
the gold price rose substantially after the fixed dollar price had been
abandoned In 1971. 8y 1974 gold rose to a high of $198 an ounce,
which served to push up the growth rate of the SouthAfrican economy
to 8.3 per cent that year. Alerted by tile 1973·74 OPEC oil shock,
there was special concern about Southern Africa's minerals. Amo!1g
thcs ~I chrome provides an example of the issues at stake. Between
19' ') and 1980 the world trade in chrome doubled as industrial
demand increased. There was no easy substitute, and although
supplies were plentiful in the main production areas (Soviet Union,
Rhodesia and South Africa) chrome had become critical for Western
economies. South Africa was an attractive supplier because of its
relatively law labour costs, its investment in research, its reliabilityand
its sound infrastructure. In that situation South Africa, which in 1878
produced 35 per dent of the world's chrome and 52 per cent of
ferrcchrome, was of key importance. 1n'977-78 SouthAfrica suppllsd
50 per cent of the EEC's chrome (70per cent in Britain's case) and 48
per cent of the llnited State's. Gold and minerals, mainly chrome,
allowed South Africa to emerge from the first oil crisis in a strong
position and granted the lndlspensable fil'1anci~1resources to malntaln
its energy programme which would suppo ~it through future critical
periods.
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Within a few years, however, it became evident that the price increases
and the spectre of oil shortages was creating powerful counter
reactions. Non-OPEC oil development proceeded at a rapid pace.
Conservation proved far more powerful Ulan generally expected. All
over the world, utilities switched from oil to other fuels. Confronted
with such developments, the exporters found that they could maintain
high prices only through laboriously negotiated production quotas.
OPEC was soon faced with decliring oil demand and diminishing
market shares. Its sbare of the world oil markets (excluding the former
Soviet Union) fell from 63 per cent in 197Z to 38 per cent by the end
of 1985. In one memorable quarter, Saudi Arabia's all production had
slumped to less that of the British sector of the North Sea. In 1986, in
the exporters' quest to regain market share, oil prices collapsed, falling
to $1u before recovering to about $18 a barrel.
In the mearurne, the consuming countries est;;lbHshed security
measures that would help moderate future crisis as deeload by the
South African government who long before had begun to develop
pioneering techniques for the extraction of oil from coal, which South
Africa possesses In abundance, in order to prevent future embargoes
and economic threats with consequence to its security and
sovereignty. Those global security measures included the International
Energy Agency, an international emergency sharing system, increased
communications, and pre-positioned stocks such as the United States
strategic petroleum reserve.
In the same years, the oil market became more flexible and
transparent, witn the development of Uadlng (all as just another
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commodity) and the rise of future markets. Oil is now carried around
the world not only in behemoth supertankers but also in a sea of
electronic information that lnstantaneously sweeps through trading
rooms on every continent. While it can take a decade or more to
develop a major new oil field, today's market can swiftly adjust to
changes in current supply and demand. For example, oil prices rose
dramatically at the beginning of the Gulf orlsts but began declining in
response to adjustments after only two months, as other producers
hastened to bring unused capacity back into production. By the eve
Of Desert Storm, oil prices were actually [ower than they had been a
half-year earlier, in HIe weeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
These char. .3S have bought a dramatic shift in the perspectivas of 011
exporting countries. The are redefining their relationship with the
market and with UIEl international 011 Industry. For the exporting
nations, the essential Issue of sovereignty has been answered, They
own their resources and determine what happens to them. That was
their essential victory in the 1970's. Now undisputed, this fundamental
political recognition pl'O\}ides the exporting countries with the flexibility
to tccus on their longer.term economic interests.
Part of this reflects a shift in the broad intellectual currents in the global
economy. In the 1970s the trend was towards Increased state control
~whether natlonehsetlon in developing countries or price controls In the
Uni~ed States. Today, the trend is quite the Opposite ~ towards
prlvatlsatlor» deregulation and commercialisation.
Many of these developing countries are also in an economic bind.
Populations an;'.growing rapidly. When combined with flt;lt oil prices,
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that means dec;liningreal per capita income. The OPEC surpluses,
which so worried central bankers in the 1970s have long since
disappeared. What is less recognised is tbe debt burden and the
budget and balance-of-payments pressures many of these countries
are under. Like many ather governments around the world, they need
to reduce gover'1ment spending and deficits. Yet they face political
difficulties in ma~<ingsuch adjustments In a world Inwhich oil prlces are
not even keeping pace with inflation, oil earnings can be increased only
through greater productivity and increased output. But that takes
significant invostment - money that many exporters do not have.
Thus economic lmperatlves and changing ideologies are moving
current and would be exp(')rtlngcountries to seek the international 011
lndustrv's capital, technology and management skills. These countries
are showing a new willingness to transfer the risk of exploration and
the investment requlrements to an international oil industry that is
organised to carry such risks and that has the capital - thus preserving
limited state funds for lrwestment tn infrastructure and societal needs.
Around the world, doors are being reopened. Venezuela, which
nationalised foreign companies in 1976, WaS cautiously inviting them
back to develop marginal fields. Argentina, which established the first
state oil cornaany In i922, is now privatising it, and at.the same time
was encouri:lging foreign companies to explore and produce within its
borders. Algeria was actively inviting companies to stern the
threatened decline in its oil production and to bolster natural 99.S
output, and Vietnam no longer a Soviet dole, has offered some of the
most attractive terms to entice companies to explore there. It is
already the site of a mini-oil boom and will become the site of a bigger
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boom ones the United States' restrlctions on American companies are
lifted. China, worried about the adequacy of energy to sustain its
economic growth, is opening new areas to Western companies as well.
The all crisis had two apparently fortunate consequences. For oil
producers, of whom the former Soviet Union happened to be one of
the most important, it turned black liquid lnto gold. It was like a
gL'aranteed weekly winning ticket to the lottery. The millions are simply
rolied In withouteffort, postponing the need for economic reform and,
incidentally, ena):;ling the Soviet Union to pay for its rapidly growing
imports from oapltallst West with exported energy. Between 1970 and
1980 Soviet exports to the developed market economies rose from Just
under 19 per 'pent of total exports ~o 32 pel' cent. It has been
suggested that it was this enormous and unforeseen bonanza that
tempted Brezhnev's rSJ:jime into a more active International policy of
competing with the United States in the middle of the i9705, as
revolutionary unrest once against swept the Third World, and into the
suicidal course of trying to match American arms superiority.
The other spparently fortunate consequence Qf the oil crisis was the
floed of doll;ars which now spurted 'from multH,llIionaire OPF.C States,
often with tiny populatlons, and which vas distrib')ced by the
international banking system In the farm of loans ,0 anyone who
wanted to borrow. Few developing countrles resisted the temptation
to take the millions thus shovelled into tbeir pockets, and which were
to provoke the world debt crisis 01 the early 1980s. For the socialist
countries, Which succumbed to it * notably j:loland ~11dHungary ~loans
seemed a provldemlal way of simultaneously paying for investment in
accelerating growth and raising their people's standard of living.
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On the other hand, the triumph of OPEC in 1973 produced, for the first
time, a body of Third Worla States, mostly backward by any criteria
and hlthert : poor, which now emerged as world-scale super-
millionaires, especially when they consisted of smallish thinly inhabited
stretches of sand or forest ruled by (usually Muslim) sheiks or sultans.
It was plainly impossible to class, say, the United Arab Emirates, each
of whose half-mlHlon inhabitants had, in theory, a share of the GNP
worth over $13 000· almost double the GDP per capita of the United
States at this date, 1975 -in the same pigec.n.hole as, Pakistan, which
then enjoyed a GNP per capita of $130. Oil States with a large
population did not do so well, but it nevertheless became evident that
States dependent on the export of a single primary commodity,
however disadvantaged in other respects, could become extremely
rich, even if this easy money also, almost invariably, tempted them into
tbrowlng it out of the window.
in that specifio field South Africa attained its, al'Tl too. Grace of its gold
and Its minerals, mainly chrome, South Afrit:a got its own financial
resources to produce its own liquid fuels from coal, which rescued it
from crisis, keeping the country out the set of debtor countries that
provoked the W<;lrlddebt crlsls of the early 19805. In fact, the foreign
Soutl1 African debt Incroased from R524 million in the next five years,
By the early 1990s even Saudi Arabia had managed to run into debt.
In 1991, the tots' .It 'Jth African foreign debt reached the sum of R1771
million but its gOld and foreign exchange contingency reserve account
reached the sum of RiO 35'1 million.
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OPEC COUNTRIES STATISTICS 1994
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OPEC CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION
(mb/d)
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Saudi Arabian 1.3 2.2 3.8 7.1 9.9 3.4 6.4 8.1
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Nigeria neg. 0.3 1.1 1.8 2.1 1.5 1.8 1.9
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Toiail> - 8.1 14.3 23.4 27.0 26.7 15.& '2'...7 25.0
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b Totals do 110tadd due to rounding
Source: Tile Won'dBank: Review and outlDok for the oir Market, p. 65
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":!lillian tonnes 011equivalent
N:..rth Al1ll!rlca I 79671USl\ 704,9 723,31 720,2 749,3 764,8 795,3 781,8 765,6 782,2 787,5Canada 68,2 BO,7 68,5 71,0 73,1 76:81 60,3 77,7 74,8 74,9 76,6
Welitern Europe
Austrla 10,1 9,8· 9,8 10,4 10,7 10,61 10.4 10,8 11,6 11,3 11,2
Belgium & Luxembourg
I
21,1 20.4 20,8 23,S 23,7 24,4 23,4 24,8 26,5 27,1 28,1
France 89,4 65,9 84,3 8,6 ~·I86,0 86.4 89,4 94,6 94,4 92,0lIaly 89,2 84,9 84,4 86,5 90,1 91,7 93,8 93,6 92,4 93,5 91,8Netherlands 29,1 28,7 29,2 32,4 32,4 34,5 33,9 3,5 35,8 36,5 36,4
P:lrtugal 9,5 9,5 8,8 9,5 8,9 8,7 11,3 11,1 11,5 12,8 11,9
Sparn 47,6 44,8 42,9 42,7 44,7 45,8 48,1 4E;,7 49,4 52,8 51,5
Swp.den 18,4 17,6 18,4 18,7 17,1 16,3 16,5 16,4 15,5 18,4 18,1
Turkey lB,2 17,0 16,8 18,3 21,0 22,3 20,8 22,1 I 22,1 23,5 27,0
United Kingdom 72,5 $9,6 77,4 77,4 75,2 80,0 81,7 82,9 82,7 63,7 84,1
Germany 123,1 122,5 126,3 133,3 129,5 129,4 121,6 127,3 133,1 134,3 136,9
Aurtrala$la
Australia 27,3 28,5 27,0 28,2 28,7 29,9 31,1 31,6 :30,8 30,9 32,0
New Zealand 3,8 3,9 3,8 4,0 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,8 5,1 5,8 5,6
Rest ofthe world IJapan 207,2 217,9 205,3 200,5 209,21 224,7 232,9 247,7 252,1 258,5 252,6
China 84,7 86,5 90,3 100,0 105,3. 110,2 112,3 110,3 117,9 129,0 143,3
USSR 416,6 417 417,1 418,2 420,21 414,6 413,31 420,1 393,4 339,0 274,5ScuthAfrlca 11,9 11,7 11,5 11.3 11,1 11,9 12,9 12,8 13,2 13,4 15,5
--- I I
Source: South African Energy Staffstics 11150-1993- NO2
:=t
~
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Figure 13
SUB-SAHARAN AFRrCA
GROSS PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICITY
GWh
Countr; Year Thermal Hydro Nuclear cee- Total %of
Ende.d thermal total
Angola • 12195 165,00 877,00 - - 1042,00 0,50
Botswanaa~ 3/96 1017,00 - - - 1017,00 0,49
Congo 12195 1,86 352,01 - - 353,87 0,17
Kenya 6/96 283,68 3103,09 - 291,56c 3678,33 I 1,77
Lesotho ab 3/96 0 0 - - 0 0
Malawi" 3/95 4,41 866,11 - - 860,52 0,41
Mauritius a 12195 913,20 134,18 - - 1047,38 0,50
Mozambique • 12195 28,57 335,900 - - 364,47 0,18
Namibia ab 6195 124,60 1 134,10 - - 1 ~58,70 0,61
South Africa a b 12195 1613:;:4,00 2 C90,C:-,A 11301,00 - 174715,00 84,18
Swaziland a b 3/95 0,8" 109,00 - ._ 109,84 0,05
Tanzania" 12195 252,00 1539,00 - - 1791,00 0,86
Zaire! 12194 5,40 5373,60 - - 5379,00 2,59
Zambia a 3/95 14,00 8102,00 - - 8116,00 3,91
Zimbabwe" 6/95 5526,30 2284,70 - - 7811,00 3,76
Total,GWh 169660,86 26290,69 11301,00 291,56 207544,11 100,0
SADC, GWh 169369,92 17461,99 11301,00 0 197085,53 94,96
South African Customs 162466,44 3333,10 11301,00 0 177100,54 85,33
Union, GWh
• Member of the southem African Development community (SADC)
b Member of the South African Customs Union
• Includes 1,09 GWh generated by Wind turbine
d Includes cahora Bassa
• Includes· pumped storage
, staUstics for year ended 31 Decer. l'!; 1004 nat available at time of publication
Source: Informalion obt9ined from elo;;tricity utilitles and South Africa's National Elflc/deity Regulator
Figure 14
SOUTH AFRiCA
TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Coal ]Crud!) Natural Hydro Nuclear Renewable TOTAL
Year all __t:!is
Million tonnes coal eqUivalent
1950 19,6 3,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,9 25,5
1951 20,5 3,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,0 26,8
1SS2 22,S 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,2 29,2
1953 22,5 3,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,3 29,5
1954 23,3 4,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,5 30,8
1955 26,0 4,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,7 35,7
1956 27,4 4,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,9 37,2
1957 28,5 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,9 37,2
1958 30,4 5,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,2 39,6
1959 29,9 5,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,2 39,4
1960 30,9 5,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,3 ".D,8
1961 32,0 5,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,5 42,3
196'l :33,0 6,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,8 43,9
1963 34,2 6,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,9 45,7
1004 36,3 7,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,1 48,7
1966 39,2 8,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,1 ,)2,4
1966 38,9 8,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,7 53,5
1967 40,0 9,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,0 55,6
1968 41,8 10,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,0 58,2
1969 42,2 11,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,1 58,8
1970 44,0 13,1 0.0 0,0 0,0 6,1 63,2
1971 47,5 14,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,6 68,3
1972 47,4 15,4 0,0 0,3 0,0 6,9 70,0
1973 50,1 17,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 7,2 74,3
1974 52,9 16,3 0,0 0,4 0,0 7,6 77,4
1975 55,4 17,6 0,0 0,4 0,0 8,2 81,S
1976 58,5 18,1 0,0 0,6 0,0 8,7 85,8
1977 &l,3 17,8 0,0 0,6 0,0 9,0 87,7
197$ 62,2 18,4 0,0 0,6 0,0 9,0 90,1
1979 00,7 18,1 0,0 0,4 0,0 9,3 94,4
1980 71,4 17,8 0,0 0,3 0,0 9,9 99,4
1981 81,? 17,6 0,0 0,5 0,0 10,6 109,9
1982 91,5 17,3 0,0 0,3 0,0 10,8 119,9
1983 93,7 17,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 10,7 121,6
1984 100,7 16,7 0,0 0,2 1,3 11,6 130,5
1985 103,7 16,5 0,0 0,:2 1,7 11,5 133,6
1986 105,6 16,2 0,0 0,5 2,8 11,7 136,8
1987 108,9 15,9 0,0 0,5 2,0 120 139,3
1988 118,4 17,1 0,0 1,a 3,4 125 152,3
1989 108,0 18,5 0,0 0,9 3,5 12,b 143,7
1990 1'12,7 18,3 0,0 0,3 2,7 14,0 148,1
1991 108,8 18,9 0,0 0,6 2,9 14,5 146,8
1992 107,4 19,2 0,0 0,2 3,0 14,1 144,0
1993 108,1 22,2 2,5 0,1 2,3 14,3 149,6
-
Source: So:."·' African !Energy Statistlas 195Q.1993 - N' 2
Figure 15
S(')uth Africa's position in the world mineral reserve base 1995
The reserve base is that part of an identined resource that meets spe<.:ified
minimum physical and chemical criteri6 relater! to current mining and
production practices, those of grade, quality, thickness and depth. It is the
in situ demonstrated resource from which reserves are estimated. It may
encompass those parts of the resource that have a reasonable potential
for becoming economically available within planning horizons beyond
those that assure proven technology and current economics. The reserve
base includes those resources that are currently economic (demonstrated
reserves) and marginally uconomic (d~n'fon~trated marginal resources) .
World
.'
I
Commodity Unit SA ·iIo Rank Locan~ of major reserves
Alumino-sill~ates ~ 50 6(J() 37 1 SA USA India
Antimony t Z50000 5 2 Sollvia SA Mexico
Asbestos lit 8200 Nav Nav China Canada CIS
Chromlufll Mt 3200 00 1 SA ZImbabwe CIS
Coal Mt 55 ZOO 11 5 USA CIS Ind!a
Copper kt 13000 2 12 Chile USA CIS
Diamonds kcar Nav Nav 4 AUstralia Zaire So!swana
FI'JQJ'$par kt 36000 12 3 CIS ChIna SA
Gold t 39933 45 1 SA USA Canada
IraI' Mt 59CX) 6 8 CIS Australia BraZil
Lead kt Se)(X) 2 6 Australia USA Canada
Man!),mese Mt 4000 £:11 1 SA CIS Gabon
Nickel kt 11 aoo 10 5 Cuba N. CaledonIa Canada
Phosphate rock Mt 2310 7 3 Morocco USA M
Piat!num-group
metals t 62816 56 1 SA Russia Finland
Sliver t 10000 2 7 USA CIS Canado<
Titanium minerals kt 72000 17 2 AUstraUa SA USA
Uranium t 179100 6 6 Ausiralla Niger Kazakhstan
Vanadium kt 12500 45 1 SA China USA
Vermiculite kt 110000 40 2 USA SA
Zinc kt 15000 5 4 Austmlia Canada USA
Zirconium kt 14300 26 2 Australia SA USA
SoUtee: DapJrlment of MineraI and eMIlr.I Affairs - Annual Repprl, 1995.
Figure 16
South Africa's position in world mineral exports 1994
World
Commodltl Unit SA % Rank MilJor ExpC1rters
Alumlno·sll!cates t 155"000 56 1 SA France USA
Antimony t 2001 4 3 chlna Bolivia SA
A!;beslos kt 131 2 3 Canada Zimbabwe SA
chrome ore kt 903 31 1 SA Turkey CIS
Coal Mt f 14 3 Australia USA SA
Copper kt 82 1 1:' Chile CAnada USA
Ferrochromfurn I 947600 39 1 1. ::A CIS ZimbabWe
Perrornanqaneae t 428700 24 1 SA Norway Brazil
Ferrcsllicon t £5500 2 8 Norwa~ ChIna Brazil
Fluorspar t 251000 13 2 China SA Mexico
Iron are lit 19600 5 6 Australia Brazil CiS
lead t 94000 7 7 Austtall(l China Canada
Manganese ore kt 1244 22 3 GaLon Australl:l SA
Phosphl1te rock kt 1344 5 6 Morccco Jord~n USA
Piatln,IM-groufl
meb\J£ kg lel694 Nav 1 SA RUSSia Australia
SlIIcQh "'ltal t 38100 10 4 China Brazil Norway
Silver t 182 <1 11 MeXIco USA Canada
Vmadlum t 26167 82 1 SA NZ CIS
Vermiculite kt 134 9S 1 SA lJSA
Zlno t 11000 <1 - Australia Canada Peru IZirconium 1« 145 28 2 AUstralia SA USA
South Africa's positlon in world mineral production 1994
Commodity
World ~,-
Major ProducersUnit SA % Rank
Aluminium kt 172 1 22 USA I RUssia canat;la
Alumli1o·slllcates k\ 1BB S2 1 SA CIS USA
.A.ntimony t 4~ 12 4 China CIS BolMa
Asbestos kt 104 4 7 CIS Can3da China
Chroma ore kt 3600 37 1 SA CIS Turkey
Coal (<I 195800 6 4 Chilla USA Intila
Copper kt 173 2 13 Chile USA CIS
Dlamcnds kear 10324 10 5 Australla CIS Zaire
Ferroehromium kt 1104 35 1 SA CIS China
Ferromanganesll kt 662 10 3 CIS China SA
Ferrosillcon kt 99 3 6 CIS China Norway
Fluorspar kt 218 6 4 China Mexico CIS
Golti ! sea 25 1 SA USA Australia
Iron ore kt 32300 :3 8 China Brazil CISLead ki 96 4 9 Australia USA China
MangaoE!se ora kt 2851 12 3 CIS China SA
Nickel kt 30 '3 7 CIS Canada N. CaledonIa
Phosphate rock kt 44?e 2 9 USA IChina Morocco
Piatinum-group
metals ItS 1~l:!2S 53 1 SA I Russia Canada
Silicon metal kt 38 6 7 USA China Brazil
Silvor t 192 1 '14 Mexico USA Peru
Tltanlum minerals kt 751 20 2 Australia l~ CanadaUranium t 1703 5 7 Canada Um,_" NigerVanadium t 21948 5'; 1 SA China CISVermiculite kt 214 43 1 SA USA Brazil
Zinc kt
2~1
j 171 canada Australia China
Zirconium mlnllrals lit 3J :! Australl~ SA Ukraine~.- ...... I L_
Source: Department of Mhlel13/l1nd Energy Affairs - Annual Report. 1995.
!NTERNATION.4L COAL CONSUMPTION
Counny
North Amerlea
USA
Canada
IWestern europeAus'u1a.-Belgium 8. Luxembourg
France
Italy
Netherlan<is
Portugal
Spain
Swede"
Turkey
United J<ingciom
Germany
Australat!a
Australia
NewZeaiand
Rest of the world
Japan
China
I USSR! SoulhAfrica
1983 J 1984 ( 1965=OSSS I 1~ 19BB I 1989
397,4
28,2
430,2
32,3
3,6
10,9
25,2
1ti,3
6,7
0,5
19,2
2,6
9,8
46,5
147,4
32,6
1,3
73,31417,0
322,6
72,4,
35,3
0,9
Mliliontonnes on equivalent
3,2
9.3
19.6
14,8
6,8
15
18,9
2,
19,8
06,6
143,4
s;;l,5
434,1
330,273,S
<:35
32.6
3,'3
9,3
17,9
15,9
7,1
1,9
16,5
2,8
22,1
66.4
141.3
3,0
9,3
17.1
15,2
8.4
2.2
15.5
2,7
22,6
64,1
140,1
36,1
1,0
I-I!453,81' 475 476,9 I
33,4 30,5 27,5
1990 -'-1!l!lCI 1992
461,4
24,4
39,5
1,3
79,0 I
&l.4l277,6
76,6
4'i3
25,5
37,4
1,1
475,5
26,2
2,8
10,2
17,9
13,7
7,7
3,0
19,1
2,2
24,9&l,7
104,4
39,0
1,2
78,0
527,1
2566 ,
74:91
I
1993
424,7
25,8
2,5
8.4
14,0
11,8
6,1
3,1
18,2,-
2,1
24,3
00,1
96,7
37,2
1,3
3,1
I
9,4
25,3
• 13,5
5,3
0,4
19,2
2,2
8.61-
65,6
141
63,0
:.052,4
328,1
65,4
31,2
1,5
69,9
388,5
322,6.
70,2
440,51
29,3
3,5
10,9
22,0
15,1
7,0
0,8
19,2
2,9
10,6
62,0
147,6
I
38,31
0.9 •
69,4
449,1
335,5
76,0
41,4
1,1
76,2
468,4
327,0
82,6
3,1
9,8
19,6
15,0
8,2
2,4
20,4
1,8
24,6
64,2
138,2
75,4
509,9
312,7
75,4
3,6
10,4
19,1
15,8
9,5
2,8
19
2,2
22,3
63,8
129,6
35,3l
1,~
76,0
516,1
'3:J7.9
78.~
3,6
10,8
20,1
15,1
8,2
3,0
18,8
2,4
22,0
59,8
113,3
79,3
541,5
238,0
75,4
Source: South African Energy Statisfias 19:;0-1993 - /II" 2
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Figure 18
SOUTH AFRICA
CONSUMPTION OF LIQUID FUELS
Year Petrol Auto- Jet Avia- Power lliuml- Indus- Heavy liquid TQtll1
motive fuel tlon pataf- nating trial fum- petro-
diesel gaso- fin kero- diesel ace leum
line sene fuel gas
~'~'..----r- al
I 191 11 1681950 loWS ## # 2131
1951 15~~ 231 0 176 ## # 2354
1952 1517 256 2 33 340 181 ## # 2456
1953 1631..1 007 5 34 '384 192 ## " # 26231954 16fi7 375 3 36 4t5 208 tI# 70 # 2804
1955 1P;07 466 4 3i3 410 220 ## 67 # 3)12
1956 1883 563 S 43 417 232 ## 62 # 3205
1957 1979 635 '10 46 415 237 ## 63 5 3390
19513 2075 733 9 46 387 .'.47 ## 97 7 3601
1959 2133 794 33 31 380 284 #II !'*l 12 3735
1960 2219 esl 47 33 371 ~62 ## \17 17 3937
1961 1275 974 61 35 353 270 ## 11'5 24 4f07
1962 2342 1085 69 37 338 28.:1 tI# 128 33 4315
1963 2471 1206 81 35 321 298 ## 168 48 4628
1984 2708 1391 90 42 004 309 ## 186 61 5091
1965 2941 1619 119 39 293 329 #If. 249 78 5667
19f16 3142 1700 170 34 279 352 ## 353 92 6212
1967 3322 2006 189 37 258 387 ## 457 ~O2 6738
1969 35/8 2223 216 34 236 380 ## 502 120 7289
1969 3396 2434 27-:; 43 230 396 #If. 602 143 8021
1970 4368 29al 33() 34 232 440 #If. 689 165 9178
1971 4690 3043 381 38 104 455 #If. 913 100 sszo
1972 5015 3326 380 37 190 4e9 ## 1093 216 10"1'<6
1973 5390 31321 419 40 187 475 ## 1269 246 118471974 5064 3989 446 42 161 4G'..! ## 1090. 260 11514
1975 5594 4306 531 50 143 476 ## 924 280 12304
1976 5005 4576 689 55 119 491 t#l 6S9 292 12586
1977 5401 4634 618 68 106 483 ## e37 282 12419
1978 5640 4895 fl57 61 105 494 ## 868 294 13014
lCJ79 4940 4597 689 # 80 409 72 807 303 l1es7
1900 5153 4677 695 1# 66 378 56 348 311 12184
1981 5670 500$ 737 # 61 409 61 804 320 13157
1982 5897 4766 708 # 52 3J9 66 599 32.3 12705
1983 6128 4639 747 # 46 333 49 511 '$37 12790
1984 6600 5019 748 32 45 374 56 614 356 13854
1985 6343 4921 (,39 29 35 385 42 670 325 13489
1986 6460 4717 687 28 32
1
417 18 579 326 13264
1987 7120 4875 703 29 31 466 17 553 3€J 14157
1986 7995 ~7 788 31 3J 641 26 524 406 15827
1989 8zt..-J5 5354 840 31 34 679 15 536 432 16219
1990 8636 5341 661 34 32 724 9 611 446 16694
tS91 l'~10 6108 864 31 26 727 7 S2(; 476 17705
1992 9173 4951 1009 29 22 744 18 546 491 16983
1993 9205 4920 1095 25 20 8:'15 37 595 468 11200 IL I
1(. Not available
## Previously Included by Heavy Furnace 011
Source: South AfriCan Enetgy statistics 1950-199:) - N°:1
SOUTH .AFRICA
COAL CONSUMPTiON AND PRODUCTION OF THE SASOL GROUP
II y~ Nol'tenei~pmducts -~- --- CoalCol'tsOmi>tlonlnproducln\Jenergyproducts _ .Chemical I Chemicals I TOTAl. Uquld I IndustrIal I':lectrlclty I Steam -I TO·rAt. l.osses TatM Stock I Coalgas fuels gas generation Consumption chal\g~ll productionI plusneltI i _j_ pu:chases I I
Thousand tonnes
1970
1971
I
- 1972
~973
;974
1!?75
! 1&16
1
'977
1978
1979
1980
1961
1S82
1963
1964
1S85
isss
1967
1988
18B9
'1900 i
"
9911*1992
4
IS
6
8
13
80
24
68
ii61-
70
80
131
240
179
167
110
74
1:j.;201
88
831
1213
1154
1168
1174
1068
971 ,
964
9"..5
!>29
870
1195
1687
1474
2138
283f
2113
2913
2827
3289
4502
4H7
4762
4148
1277
1100
1174
1182
10Bl
1051
986
9S3
1040
980
1265
1767
1605
2378
~10
2880
3023
2901
3382
4846
4318
48SO
4231
1440
1283
1333
1453
1220
B5S
931
1098 i
1349
1050
4350
7340
14551
22265
23913
25595
27045
273iJ7
23712
1
28342
282.57
27r:J57
12¥.57
J
682
1132
1283
14[",
1801
2051
214C
2039
2195
2720
2960
2810
3277
~77
3486
3543
3347
3553
3726
3798 -
37851
=1
419
414
434
459
454
4G9
483
502
482
740
1190
1109
2630
Sl
4836
4415 !
32821
3254
3325
3393
3917
44
64
87
107
1"'"
108
107
115
171
210
2Cl5
214 I
197
212
215
126
74
93
93
92
:1
2785 I 0 4062 r -2300
2893 1 0 4053 -2404
3117 0 4291 ·2629
343;5 0 4617 -2618
35fJ 0 4661 -2643
3476 0 4527 ·2567
3..."'<;1 0 4649 -2636
3754 • 0 4737 -2566
4197 0 5237 -2969
4720 0 5700 262
8705 0 9970 372
11473 0 13240 110
20€55 0 22260 -3168
29012 620 I 32010 1 -3435
31C54 599 35263 -4089
33832 538 37050 ~7&3
3S302 766 39091 I -3139
35458 257 38516 -1734
38813 276 40471 1162
33516 I 294 38456 -5174
35475 ~41. 400341 -3413 -
34415j _ 226 39491___ -4112 'I34453 260 38944 -1256
--~~~
1754
1649
1852
1999
2018
1960
2013
2051
2268
5962
10342
13350
19102
28575
31174
33262
35952
36882-
41633
33282
360'21
35379
37€5t:
• Prellminary numbers
Scuros: South Aftfcan Enf'IiJ'/ statistiC$ 1950-1993- N" 2
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Figure 20
SOUTH AFRiCA
COAL CONSUMPTION FOR CONVERSION PURPOSES
.
Electrlcltv I SASOL I TOTA'.Year To~s
Million tonnes
1950 8,63 0,12 # 8,75
1951 !;I,17 (),12 '# 9,29
1952 S,84 0,13 # 9,97
1953 10,41 0,14 # 10,55
1954 11.12 0,14 0,50 11,30
1955 12,34 0,14 0,54 13,0'.!
1956 13,25 0,14 0,76 14,15
1957 13,83 0;15 0,99 14,96
1956 14,71 0,15 1,07 15,94
1959 15,46 0,14 1,17 16,77
1960 16,44 0,14 1,20 17,79
1961 17,10 0,14 1,33 18,56
1962 18,$ 0,16 1,38 20,09
1963 ~9.3$ C,17 1,32 20,84
1964 2O,SS 0,16 1,48 22,03
1965 Z2,07 0,16 1,54 23.76
1966 23,00 0,19 1,71 24,00
1967 24,97 O,~5 1,72 26.94
1968 26,01 0,33 1,79 28.13
1969 27,00 0,36 1,74 29,70
1970 29,48 0,48 1,75 31.72
1911 31.89 0,58 l,GS 34,12
1972 32,76 0,62 1,66 35,05
1973 34,ll.9 0,00 2,00 37,79
1974 36,54 0,92 2,02 39,47
1975 39,09 0,139 1,96 41,93
1976 41,05 0,88 2,0'1 43,95
ISTr 42,4:1 0,88 2,05 45,36
1!;l78 44,26 0,96 2,27 47,EO
1979 49,31 1,113 5,96 56,4tl
1980 54,98 0,93 10,34 66,:7.5
1981 59,40 0,37 13,35 73,11
1982 60,31 0,43 19,1') 65,84
1963 63,54 0,41 28,58 92,53
1004 1)6,86 0,49 31,17 96,52
lG8S 67,91 0,48 ~2a 101,68
1986 68,25 0,45 35,95 104,65
1S!17 7'2,39 0,44 36,88 109,71
1988 78,19 O,IlS 41,63 120,26
1989 72,&1 0,40 33,28 106,18
1990 75,89 0,46 36,62 112,97
1991 74,68 0,40 35,38 l10A6
1992 71,15 0,38 37,6'J 109,19
1993 73,60 O,CS 40,25 113,89
-
Source: Soulh African Energy Statistics 195Q..19&3- N' 2
Figure 21
SUB-5AHARAN AFRICA
NET MAXIMUM GENERATING CAPACITY
MW~ -Country Year Thermal Hydro Nuclear Geo- Total %of
Ended thermal total
Angol,laC 12195 125,22 200,80 - - 326,02 0,74
Botswana ab !!,9C: 172,00 - - - 172,00 0,39
Congo 12195 18,20 89,00 - - 107,20 0,24Kenya d 6/95 100,48 569,50 - 45,35' 715,33 1,62Lesotho ..~ 3/96 1,56 3,27 - - 4,83 0,01
Malawi~ 3/95 24,56 164,60 - - 189,16 0,43
Mauritius a 12195 2n,70 54,20 - - 331,90 0,75
Mozambique • 12195 97,39 491,19t - - 588,58 1,34
Namibia ab 6/95 147,00 240,00 - - 387,00 0,88
South Africa • b 12195 30612,OOQ 2248,60" 1840,00 - 34700,80 78,75
Swaziland a b 3/95 9,50 40,50 - - 50,00 0,11
Tanzania a 12195 139,15 375,00 - - 514,15 1,17
Zaire 12194 37,80 2442,16 - - 2479,96 5,63
Zarnbia • 3/95 84,00 1670,00 - 20,00 1774,00 4,03
Zimbabwe· 6/95 '1056,00 666,00 - - 1772,00 3.91
--- -
Total, MW 32902,56 9255,02 1840,00 65,35 44062,93 100,0
-
SAPC, MW 32746,08 6154,36 1840,00 20,00 40760,44 92,51
South African Customs 30942,06 2532,57 1 840,00 0 35314,63 80,16
Union, MW
Thermal electricity comprises conventional plants of all types, whether or not equipped for
the combined generation of heat and electric energy. Accordingly, they include steam-
operated generating plants, with condensation (with or without extraction) or with back-
pressure turbines and plants using Internal combustion engines or gas turbines whether or
not these are equipped for heat recovery.
• Member of the Southern African Development Community (SAbC)
b Member of theSouth African cuatoms Union
C Available Capacity
d Effective Capacity = sent-out capacity + own use capacity
• Includes wind turbine capacity of 0,35 MtJV
, Includes cahora Bassa
Q Excludes Eskom's 4531 MW ln reserve storage
h Includes pumped f>iorage
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